Using genetic algorithms to simulate the evolution of an oligopoly game

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 1585, Issue , 1999, Pages 293-300

  Chen, Shu Heng ^a   Ni, Chih Chi ^a  

^a NATIONAL CHENGCHI UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

Cartels; Coevolution; Genetic algorithms; Oligopoly; Price wars; State dependent markov chain

Indexed keywords

GENETIC ALGORITHMS; MARKOV PROCESSES;

CARTELS; CO-EVOLUTION; OLIGOPOLY; PRICE WAR; STATE-DEPENDENT;

COMPETITION;

EID: 84956866888     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/3-540-48873-1_38     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (3)

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2. Midgley, D. F., R. E. Marks, and L. G. Cooper (1996), “Breeding Competitive Strategies," Forthcoming in Management Sciences.
3. Yao, X. and P. J. Darwen (1994), “An Experimental Study of N-Person Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Games," Inoformatica, Vol. 18, pp. 435-450.