Why it is time to move beyond nagelian reduction

Probabilities, Laws, and Structures

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 245-262

  Kaiser, Marie I ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

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EID: 84955387860     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-3030-4_18     Document Type: Chapter

References (77)

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4. Cf. Carl Hempel, Paul Oppenheim, “Studies in the Logic of Explanation”, in: Philosophy of Science 15, 2, 1948, pp. 135-175.
5. Nagel, N The Structure of Science, p. 354.
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7. Cf. Frederick Suppe, The Structure of Scientific Theories. 2nd ed. Urbana: University of Illinois Press 1977
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57. Cf. Bickle, “Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave and Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account”, in: Biology and Philosophy.
58. Cf. Clifford Hooker, “Towards a General Theory of Reduction. Part I: Historical and Scientific Setting. Part II: Identity in Reduction. Part III: Cross-Categorial Reduction”, in: Dialogue 20, 1981, pp. 38-59.
59. Bickle, B “Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave”, in: Dialogue., p. 23.
60. Bickle, B “Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account”, in: Dialogue, p. 27.
61. Carl Craver, “Structures of Scientific Theories“, in: Peter Machamer, Michael Silberstein (Eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science. Malden/Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 2002, pp. 55-79;
62. Cf. Laura Perini, “Explanation in Two Dimensions: Diagrams and Biological Explanation”, in: Biology and Philosophy 20, 2005, pp. 257-269
63. Cf. Lindley Darden, Theory Change in Science: Strategies from Mendelian Genetics. New York: Oxford University Press 1991
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65. Cf. Craver, “Structures of Scientific Theories”, Theory Change in Science: Strategies from Mendelian Genetics.
66. Cf. Waters, “Beyond Theoretical Reduction and Layer-Cake Antireduction: How DNA Retooled Genetics and Transformed Biological Practice”, Theory Change in Science: Strategies from Mendelian Genetics.
67. Cf. Sarkar, “Models of Reduction and Categories of Reductionism”, Theory Change in Science: Strategies from Mendelian Genetics.
68. Cf. Wimsatt, “Reductive Explanation: A Functional Account”, Theory Change in Science: Strategies from Mendelian Genetics.
69. Peter Ma-chamer, Lindley Darden, Carl Craver, “Thinking about Mechanisms”, in: Philosophy of Science 67, 2000, pp. 1-25.
70. Mary Morgan, Margaret Morrison, Models as Mediators. Perspectives on Natural and Social Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999.
71. Cf. Waters, “Beyond Theoretical Reduction and Layer-Cake Antireduction: How DNA Retooled Genetics and Transformed Biological Practice”, Models as Mediators. Perspectives on Natural and Social Science.
72. Marie I. Kaiser, “An Account of Explanatory Reduction in the Life Sciences“, in: History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, forthcoming.
73. Andreas Huttemann, Alan Love, “Aspects of Reductive Explanation in Biological Science: Intrinsicality, Fundamentality, and Temporality”, in: British Journal for Philosophy of Science, forthcoming.
74. Sarkar, S “Genetics and Reductionism”, in: British Journal for Philosophy of Science., p. 19.
75. Cf. Nagel, “The Structure of Science”, in: British Journal for Philosophy of Science, pp. 358-366.
76. Cf. Kaiser, “An Account of Explanatory Reduction in the Life Sciences“, in: British Journal for Philosophy of Science.
77. Cf. Huttemann, Love, “Aspects of Reductive Explanation in Biological Science: Intrin-sicality, Fundamentality, and Temporality”, in: British Journal for Philosophy of Science.