Intransitive non-interference for cryptographic purposes

Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

Volumn 2003-January, Issue , 2003, Pages 140-152

  Backes, M ^a   Pfitzmann, B ^a  

^a IBM RESEARCH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GRAPH THEORY; NETWORK SECURITY; PROBABILITY;

COMPUTATIONAL RESTRICTION; ERROR PROBABILITIES; GRAPH-THEORETIC TECHNIQUE; INFORMATION FLOWS; INTRANSITIVE NON-INTERFERENCE; NON INTERFERENCE; PROBABILISTIC INFORMATION; PROBABILISTIC METHODS;

CRYPTOGRAPHY;

EID: 84954437845     PISSN: 10816011     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/SECPRI.2003.1199333     Document Type: Conference Paper

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