May 1940: Contingency and fragility of the German RMA

The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050

Volumn , Issue , 2015, Pages 154-174

  Murray, Williamson ^a  

^a INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES   (United States)

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EID: 84954244721     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511817335.009     Document Type: Chapter

References (31)

1. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge, 1996).
2. Antoine de Saint Exupery, Pilote de guerre (New York, 1942), pp. 94-5.
3. Robert O. Paxton, Parades and Politics at Vichy: The French Officer Corps under Marshal Petain (Princeton, NJ, 1966).
4. Adolf Hitler, Wehrmacht Officer Policy, and Social Revolution, The Historical Journal 43:3 (2000), pp. 801-25.
5. Burton Klein, Germany’s Economic Preparations for War [Cambridge, MA, 1959].
6. Alan Milward, The German Economy at War [London, 1965].
7. Williamson Murray, The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1935-1939: The Path to Ruin [Princeton, NJ, 1984], pp. 3-52.
8. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ, 1975), p. 141.
9. Brian Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars (Oxford, 1980).
10. James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Lawrence, KS, 1991), p. 37.
11. Erich Ludendorff, Ludendorff’s Own Story, August 1914-November 1918, vol. 1 (New York, 1919), p. 24.
12. Dieter Ose, “Der ‘Auftrag’: eine deutsche militarische Tradition,” Europd’ische Wehrkunde 31:6 (1981), pp. 164-5.
13. Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918 (Westport, CT, 1989).
14. Martin Samuels, Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918 (London, 1995).
15. Manfred Messerschmidt and Ursula von Gersdorff, eds., Offtziere im Bild von Dokumenten aus drei Jahrhunderten (Stuttgart, 1964), pp. 124-6.
16. M. Plettenberg, Guderian: Hintergrunde des deutschen Schicksals, 1918-1945 (Diisseldorf, 1950), p. 14.
17. Robert O’Neill, “Doctrine and Training in the German Army,” in Michael Howard, ed., The Theory and Practice of War (New York, 1966), p. 157.
18. Erich von Manstein, Aus einem Soldatenleben, 1887-1939 (Bonn, 1958), pp. 241-2.
19. Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York, 1957), pp. 34-6.
20. Robert M. Kennedy, The German Campaign in Poland, 1939 (Washington, DC, 1956).
21. Klaus A. Maier et al., Germany and the Second World War, vol. 2, Germany’s Initial Conquests in Europe (Oxford, 1991), part 3.
22. Richard Muller, “Close Air Support: The German, British, and American Experiences, 1918-1941,” in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, Chapter 4.
23. Williamson Murray, German Military Effectiveness (Baltimore, MD, 1992), Chapter 2.
24. Robert A. Doughty, Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939 (Hamden, CT, 1985).
25. Eugenia C. Kiesling, Arming Against Hitler: France and the Limits of Military Planning (Lawrence, KS, 1996).
26. Karl Heinz Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende: Der Westfeldzug 1940 (Munich, 1995), PP. 180-5.
27. Robert A. Doughty, The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940 (Hamden, CT, 1990), pp. 14-16.
28. Williamson Murray, “The German Response to Victory in Poland: A Case Study in Professionalism,” Armed Forces and Society, Winter 1981.
29. Telford Taylor, The March of Conquest: The German Victories in Western Europe, 1940 (New York, 1958), pp. 61-4, 170.
30. Christian Hartmann, Haider, Generalstabschef Hitlers 193S-1942 (Paderborn, 1991), pp. 172-84.
31. Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers, ed. B. H. Liddell Hart (New York, 1953), pp. 8-11.