Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action

Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

Volumn , Issue , 2015, Pages 1-280

  Ostrom, Elinor ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84953850914     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781316423936     Document Type: Book

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