How to make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond “Heuristics and Biases”

European Review of Social Psychology

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 1991, Pages 83-115

  Gigerenzer, Gerd ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SALZBURG   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84953484366     PISSN: 10463283     EISSN: 1479277X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/14792779143000033     Document Type: Article

References (89)

1. Adler, J.E. (1984). Abstraction is uncooperative. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, 14, 165–181.
2. Ajzen, I. (1977). Intuitive theories of events and the effects of base-rate information on prediction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 303–314.
3. Arkes, H.R. (1981). Impediments to accurate clinical judgment and possible ways to minimize their impact. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 49, 323–330.
4. Bar-Hillel, M. (1980). The base-rate fallacy in probability judgments. Acta Psychological 44, 211–233.
5. Barnard, G.A. (1979). Discussion of the paper by Professors Lindley and Tversky and Dr Brown. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society (A), 142, 171–172.
6. Bazerman, M.H. (1990), Judgment in Managerial Decision Making, New York: Wiley.
7. Birnbaum, M.H. (1983). Base rates in Bayesian inference: Signal detection analysis of the cab problem. American Journal of Psychology, 96, 85–94.
8. Björkman, M. (1984). Decision making, risk taking and psychological time: Review of empirical findings and psychological theory. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 25, 31–49.
9. Borgida, E., & Brekke, N. (1981). The base rate fallacy in attribution and prediction. In J.H. Harvey, W. Ickes & R.F. Kidd (Eds), New Directions in Attribution Research, Vol. 3, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, pp. 63–95.
10. Caraco, T., Martindale, S., & Whittam, T.S. (1980). An empirical demonstration of risk-sensitive foraging preferences. Animal Behavior, 28, 820–830.
11. Casscells, W., Schoenberger, A., & Grayboys, T. (1978). Interpretation by physicians of clinical laboratory results. New England Journal of Medicine, 299, 999–1000.
12. Cohen, L.J. (1982). Are people programmed to commit fallacies? Further thoughts about the interpretation of experimental data on probability judgment. Journal of the Theory of Social Behavior, 12, 251–274.
13. Cosmides, L. (1989). The logic of social exchange: Has natural selection shaped how humans reason? Studies with the Wason selection task. Cognition, 31, 187-276.
14. Daston, L. (1980). Probabilistic expectation and rationality in classical probability theory. Historia Mathematica 7, 234–260.
15. Daston, L. (1987). The domestication of risk: Mathematical probability and insurance 1650–1830. In L. Kruger, L. Daston & M. Heidelberger (Eds), The Probabilistic Revolution. Vol. I: Ideas in History, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 237–260.
16. Daston, L. (1988). Classical Probability in the Enlightenment, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
17. Edwards, W. (1968). Conservatism in human information processing. In B. Kleinmuntz (Ed.), Formal Representation of Human Judgment, New York: Wiley, pp. 17–52.
18. Edwards, W., & Von Winterfeldt, D. (1986). On cognitive illusions and their implications. In H.R. Arkes & K.R. Hammond (Eds), Judgment and Decision Making, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 642–679.
19. Fiedler, K. (1983). On the testability of the availability heuristic. In R.W. Scholz (Ed.), Decision Making Under Uncertainty, Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 109–119.
20. Fiedler, K. (1988). The dependence of the conjunction fallacy on subtle linguistic factors. Psychological Research, 50, 123–129.
21. Finetti, B. De (1989). Probabilism. Erkenntnis, 31, 169–223 (original work published in 1931).
22. Fischhoff, B. (1982). Debiasing. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky (Eds), Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 422–444.
23. Frey, B.S. (1990). Entscheidungsanomalien: Die Sicht der Okonomie. Psychologische Rundschau, 41, 67–83.
24. Freyd, J.J. (1983). Shareability: The social psychology of epistemology. Cognitive Science, 7, 191–210.
25. Gergen, K. (1973). Social psychology as history. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 26, 309–320.
26. Gigerenzer, G. (1990). Strong AI and the problem of “second order” algorithms. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 13, 663–664.
27. Gigerenzer, G. (1991). From tools to theories. A heuristic of discovery in cognitive psychology. Psychological Review, 98(2).
28. Gigerenzer, G. (in press). On cognitive illusions and nationality. In E. Eels & T. Manuszewski (Eds), Reasoning and Rationality. Essays in Honour of L.J. Cohen, Amsterdam: Radop.
29. Gigerenzer, G., Hell, W., & Blank, H. (1988). Presentation and content: The use of base rates as a continuous variable. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 14, 513–525.
30. Gigerenzer, G., & Hug, K. (1991). Reasoning about social contracts: cheating and perspective change. Manuscript submitted for publication.
31. Gigerenzer, G., Hoffrage, U., & Kleinbolting, H. (in press). Probabilistic mental models: A Brunswikian theory of confidence. Psychological Review.
32. Gigerenzer, G., & Murray, D.J. (1987). Cognition as Intuitive Statistics, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
33. Gigerenzer, G., Swijtink, Z., Porter, T., Daston, L., Beatty, J., & Kruger, L. (1989). The Empire of Chance: How Probability Changed Science and Everyday Life, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
34. Ginossar, Z., & Trope, Y. (1980). The effects of base rates and individuating information on judgments about another person. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 16, 228–242.
35. Ginossar, Z., & Trope, Y. (1987). Problem solving in judgment under uncertainty. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 464–474.
36. Graumann, C.F. (1988). Der Kognitivismus in der Sozialpsychologie. Die Kehrseite der “Wende”. Psychologische Rundschau, 39, 83–90.
37. Gregory, R.L. (1974). Concepts and Mechanism of Perception, New York: Scribner.
38. Grether, D.M. (1980). Bayes rule as a descriptive model: The representativeness heuristic. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 95, 537–557.
39. Grice, H.P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In D. Davidson & G. Harman (Eds), The Logic of Grammar, Encino, CA: Dickenson.
40. Groner, M., Groner, R., & Bischof, W.F. (1983). Approaches to heuristics: A historical review. In R. Groner, M. Groner & W.F. Bischof (Eds), Methods of Heuristics, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, pp. 1–18.
41. Hacking, I. (1965). Logic of Statistical Inference, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
42. Hacking, I. (1975). The Emergence of Probability, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
43. Hansen, R.D., & Donoghue, J.M. (1977). The power of consensus: Information derived from one's own and others' behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 294–302.
44. Hasher, L., & Zacks, R.T. (1979). Automatic and effortful processes in memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 108, 356–388.
45. Hofstatter, P.R. (1939). Ueber die Schatzung von Gruppeneigenschaften. Zeitschrift fiir Psychologie, 145, 1–44.
46. Holland, J.H., Holyoak, K.J., Nisbett, R.E., & Thagard, P.R. (1986). Induction: Processes of Inference, Learning and Discovery, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
47. Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1983). Mental Models, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
48. Jungermann, H. (1983). The two camps on rationality. In R.W. Scholz (Ed.), Decision Making Under Uncertainty, Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 63–86.
49. Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (Eds) (1982). Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
50. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973). On the psychology of prediction. Psychological Review, 80, 237–251.
51. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1982). On the study of statistical intuitions. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky (Eds), Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 493–508.
52. Kelley, H.H. (1967). Attribution theory in social psychology. In D. Levine (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, Vol. 15, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
53. Kelley, H.H., & Michaela, I.L. (1980). Attribution theory and research. Annual Review of Psychology, 31, 457–501.
54. Koriat, A., Lichtenstein, S., & Fischhoff, B. (1980). Reasons for confidence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 6, 107–118.
55. Kruger, L., Daston, L., & Heidelberger, M. (Eds) (1987). The Probabilistic Revolution. Vol I: Ideas in History, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
56. Kruger, L., Gigerenzer, G., & Morgan, M.S. (Eds) (1987). The Probabilistic Revolution. Vol. II: Ideas in the Sciences, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
57. Landman, J., & Manis, M. (1983). Social cognition: Some historical and theoretical perspectives. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 16, 49–123.
58. Laplace, P.S. (1951). A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, New York: Dover (original work published 1814).
59. Leary, D.E. (1987). From act psychology to probabilistic functionalism: The place of Egon Brunswik in the history of psychology. In M.S. Ash & W.R. Woodward (Eds), Psychology in Twentieth-Century Thought and Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 115–142.
60. Levi, I. (1983). Who commits the base rate fallacy? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 6, 502–506.
61. Lichtenstein, S., Fischhoff, B., & Phillips, L.D. (1982). Calibration of probabilities: The state of the art to 1980. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky (Eds), Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 306–334.
62. May, R.S. (1987), Realismus von subjektiven Wahrscheinlichkeiten, Frankfurt/Main: Lang.
63. Mises, R. Von (1957). Probability, Statistics, and Truth, London: Allen and Unwin (original work published in 1928).
64. Newcombe, R.D., & Rutter, D.R. (1982). Ten reasons why ANOVA theory and research fail to explain attribution processes: L Conceptual problems. Current Psychological Reviews, 2, 95–108.
65. Nisbett, R.E., & Borgida, E. (1975). Attribution and the psychology of prediction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32, 932–943.
66. Nisbett, R.E., & Ross, L. (1980). Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
67. Peirce, C.S., & Jastrow, J. (1884). On small differences of sensation. Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences, 3, 75–83.
68. Piaget, J. (1930). The Child's Conception of Causality, London: Kegan Paul.
69. Pollard, P., & Evans, J. St. B. T., (1983). The role of “representativeness” in statistical inference: A critical appraisal. In J. St B.T. Evans (Ed.), Thinking and Reasoning: Psychological Approaches, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 107–134.
70. Porter, T. (1986). The Rise of Statistical Thinking, 1820–1900, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
71. Saks, M., & Kidd, R.F. (1980). Human information processing and adjudication: Trial by heuristics. Law and Society Review, 15, 123–160.
72. Scholz, R.W. (Ed.) (1983). Decision Making under Uncertainty, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
73. Shafer, G. (1976), A Mathematical Theory of Evidence, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
74. Shanteau, J. (1989). Cognitive heuristics and biases in behavioral auditing: Review, comments and observations. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 14, 165–177.
75. Sherman, S.J., Judd, C.M., & Park, B. (1989). Social cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 40, 281–326.
76. Simon, H.A. (1957). Models of Man: Social and Rational, New York: Wiley.
77. Spettell, C.M., & Liebert R.M. (1986). Training for safety in automated person-machine systems, American Psychologist, 41, 545–550.
78. Strack, F. (1988). Social cognition: Sozialpsychologie innerhalb des Paradigmas der Informationsverarbeitung. Psychologische Rundschau, 39, 72–82.
79. Tversky, A. (1977). Features of similarity. Psychological Review, 84, 327–352.
80. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185, 1124–1131.
81. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1980). Causal schemata in judgments under uncertainty. In M. Fishbein (Ed.), Progress in Social Psychology, Vol. 1, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, pp. 49–72.
82. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1982). Evidential impact of base rates. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky (Eds), Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 153–160.
83. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90, 293–315.
84. Wallendael, L.R. Van, & Hastie, R. (1990). Tracing the footsteps of Sherlock Holmes: Cognitive representations of hypothesis testing. Memory & Cognition, 18, 240–250.
85. Wallsten, T.S. (1983). The theoretical status of judgmental heuristics. In R.W. Scholz (Ed.), Decision Making Under Uncertainty, Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 21–37.
86. Wells, G.L., & Harvey, J.H. (1977). Do people use consensus information in making causal attributions? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 279–293.
87. Wells, G.L., & Harvey, J.H. (1978). Naive attributors' attributions and predictions: What is informative and when is an effect an effect? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 483–490.
88. Wendt, D. (1966). Versuche zur Erfassung eines subjektiven Verlasslichkeitsniveaus. Zeitschaft fur Psychologie 172, 40–81.
89. Winterfeldt, D. Von, & Edwards, W. (1986). Decision Analysis and Behavioral research, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.