The epistemic divide

Southern Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 39, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 385-401

  Sawyer, Sarah ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84953238134     PISSN: 00384283     EISSN: 20416962     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2001.tb01824.x     Document Type: Article

References (34)

1. Bach, K., 1987. Thought and reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2. Boghossian, P. A., 1997. What the externalist can know a priori. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 47: 161-175.
3. Brown, J., 1995. The incompatibility of anti-individualism and privileged access. Analysis 55: 149-156.
4. Brueckner, A., 1992. What an anti-individualist knows a priori. Analysis 52: 111-118.
5. Brueckner, A., 1994. Knowledge of content and knowledge of the external world. Philosophical Review 3: 327-343.
6. Burge, T., 1977. Belief de re. Journal of Philosophy 74: 338-362.
7. Burge, T., 1979. Individualism and the mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73-121.
8. Burge, T., 1982. Other bodies. In Thought and object: Essays on intentionality, ed. A.Woodfield. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
9. Burge, T., 1986. Intellectual norms and foundations of mind. Journal of Philosophy 83: 697-720.
10. Crawford, S., 1998. In defence of object-dependent thoughts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98: 201-210.
11. Davies, M., 1999. Externalism, architecturalism, and epistemic warrant. In Knowing our own minds: Essays on self-knowledge, ed. C.MacDonald, B.Smith, and C.Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
12. Evans, G., 1982. The Varieties of Reference, ed. J.McDowell. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
13. Gallois, A., 1996. The world without, the mind within. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
14. Kaplan, D., 1989. Demonstratives. In Themes from Kaplan, ed. J.Almog, H.Wettstein, and J.Perry. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
15. Kripke, S., 1980. Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
16. McDowell, J., 1980. The sense and reference of a proper name. In Reference, truth and reality, ed. M.Platts. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
17. McDowell, J., 1982. Criteria defeasibility and knowledge. In Perceptual knowledge, ed. J.Dancy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
18. McDowell, J., 1984. De re senses. In Frege: Tradition and influence, ed. C.Wright. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
19. McDowell, J., 1986. Singular thought and the extent of inner space. In Subject, thought and context, ed. P.Pettit and J.McDowell. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
20. McKinsey, M., 1991. Anti-individualism and privileged access. Analysis 51: 9-16.
21. McKinsey, M., 1994. Accepting the consequences of anti-individualism. Analysis 54: 124-128.
22. McLaughlin, B., and M. Tye.,. 1998. Is content-externalism compatible with privileged access? The Philosophical Review 107: 349-380.
23. Noonan, H., 1986. Russellian thoughts and methodological solipsism. In Language, mind and logic, ed. J.Butterfield. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
24. Noonan, H., 1991. Object-dependent thoughts and psychological redundancy. Analysis 51: 1-9.
25. Noonan, H., 1993. Object-dependent thoughts: A case of superficial necessity but deep contingency. In Mental Causation, ed. J.Heil and A.Mele. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
26. Peacocke, C., 1981. Demonstrative thought and psychological explanation. Synthese 49: 187-217.
27. Putnam, H., 1975. The meaning of ‘meaning’. In his Mind, Language and Reality, Philosophical Papers II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, 215-271.
28. Russell, B., 1912. The problems of philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
29. Russell, B., 1956. The philosophy of logical atomism. In Logic and knowledge: Essays 1901-1950, ed. R. C.Marsh. London: Allen & Unwin.
30. Sainsbury, R. M., 1986. Russell on acquaintance. In Philosophers ancient and modern, ed. G.Vesey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 219-244.
31. Sawyer, S., 1998. Privileged access to the world. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74: 523-533.
32. Sawyer, S., 1999. An Externalist Account of Introspective Knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80: 358-378.
33. Segal, G., 1989. The return of the individual. Mind 98: 39-57.
34. Snowden, P., 1981. Perception, vision and causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81: 175-192.