Two-factor authentication for the bitcoin protocol

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 9331, Issue , 2015, Pages 155-171

  Mann, Christopher ^a   Loebenberger, Daniel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AUTHENTICATION; SMARTPHONES; USER INTERFACES;

AUTHENTICATION METHODS; ON-LINE BANKING; TWO FACTOR AUTHENTICATION; USER EXPERIENCE;

ELECTRONIC MONEY;

EID: 84951869859     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-24858-5_10     Document Type: Conference Paper

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