Computationalism

Synthese: An International Journal for Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of Science

Volumn 105, Issue 3, 1995, Pages 303-317

  Hardcastle, Valerie Gray ^a  

^a VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84951613055     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF01063561     Document Type: Article

References (62)

1. The Nature of Mind
2. The Causal Theory of the Mind
3. Materialism Without Reductionism: What Physicalism Does Not Entail
4. Causal Laws and Effective Strategies
5. An Unsolvable Problem of Elementary Number Theory. Preliminary Report
6. Functional Analysis
7. On Some Fundamental Distinctions of Computationalism
8. Why the Law of Effect Won't Go Away
9. International Systems
10. Explanations in Psychology
11. The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanation
12. Über Formal Unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und Verwandter Systeme, I
13. Lectures on On Undecidable Propositions of Formal Mathematical Systems
14. Partitions, Probabilistic Causal Laws, and Simpson's Paradox
15. The Nature and Plausibility of Cognitivism
16. Analog and Analog
17. Semantic Engines
18. Psychicalist Materialism
19. Causality, Identity, and Supervenience of the Mind-Body Problem
20. Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World
21. Van Fraassen on Explanation
22. An Argument for the Identity Theory
23. Review of Art, Mind and Religion
24. How to Define Theoretical Terms
25. Psychophysical and Theoretical Identification
26. Form, Function, and Feel
27. The Theory of Algorithms
28. Artificial Intelligence — A Personal View
29. Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and Search
30. Formal Reductions of the General Combinatorial Decision Problem
31. The Wave Equation with Computable Initial Data Such That Its Unique Solution is Not Computable
32. Minds and Machines
33. Reductionism and the Nature of Psychology
34. Probability, Explanation, and Information
35. Sensations and Brain Processes
36. Reports of Immediate Experience
37. Kripke on Functionalism and Automata
38. On Computable Numbers, With an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem
39. Reductionism, Levels of Organization, and the Mind-Body Problem
40. Functions