Contemporary theories of liberalism: Public reason as a post-enlightenment project

Contemporary Theories of Liberalism: Public Reason as a Post-Enlightenment Project

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 1-240

  Gaus, Gerald F ^a  

^a TULANE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 84950152249     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4135/9781446218754     Document Type: Book

References (384)

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3. John Milton, Areopagitica: A Speech for the Liberty on Unlicensed Printing, to the Parliament of England in Areopagitica and Other Tracts (London: Dent, 1925), p. 50.
4. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in John Gray, ed., On Liberty and Other Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 26 (Ch. 2, para. 7).
5. Ludwig von Mises, Liberalism in the Classical Tradition (San Francisco: Cobden Press, 1985), p. 7.
6. James H. Fetzer, The Philosophy of Science (New York: Paragon House, 1993), pp. 148-149.
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8. von Mises, Liberalism in the Classical Tradition, pp. 5-7.
9. Mill, On Liberty, p. 63. (Ch. 3, para. 1).
10. Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Lewis White Beck, trans. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), p. 44 (Second Section).
11. Isaiah Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 23.
12. Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1988), p. 6.
13. John Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake: Politics and Culture at The Close of the Modern Age (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 122ff.
14. James Rachels, The Elements of Morality, 3rd edn (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1999), Ch. 2.
15. Isaiah Berlin, ‘Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-Century European Thought’, in The Crooked Timber of Humanity, Henry Hardy, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 71-72.
16. Richard B. Brandt’s classic study, Hopi Ethics: A Theoretical Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).
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26. Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980).
27. Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky, eds, Judgments Under Uncertainty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 13.
28. Stephen Stich, The Fragmentation of Reason (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), p. 13. Emphasis in original.
29. Thomas Kuhn, ‘Reflections on My Critics’ in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 20.
30. Fetzer, The Philosophy of Science, p. 136.
31. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 185.
32. Fred D’Agostino, Free Public Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
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34. P.F. Strawson, ‘Social Morality and Individual Ideals’, Philosophy, vol. 36 (January 1961), p. 3.
35. John Rawls, Political Liberalism, paperback edn (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 56-57.
36. Passmore, The Perfectability of Man, p. 204.
37. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, James H. Tully, ed. (Indiana: Hackett, 1983), p. 32.
38. William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 259.
39. Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice, John Ladd (trans.) (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p. 76 (section 44). Emphasis in original.
40. John Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake: Politics and Culture at The Close of the Modern Age (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 66.
41. Immanuel Kant, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ in Lewis White Beck, ed., On History (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), p. 3.
42. Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice, p. 81 (section 47).
43. Cheryl Misak, Truth, Politics, Morality: Pragmatism and Deliberation (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 10.
44. Carl Schmit, The Concept of the Political (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1976), p. 27.
45. Misak, Truth, Politics, Morality, pp. 11-12.
46. Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. xl, 36.
47. H.W. Newton-Smith, The Rationality of Science (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981).
48. Galston, ‘Peirce’s Cable and Plato’s Cave’ in his Liberal Purposes, Ch. 2. Galston’s view has evolved in a more pluralistic direction.
49. Liberal Pluralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
50. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986)
51. George Sher, Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)
52. Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl, Liberty and Nature (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1991).
53. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. xviii. doi: 10.4135/9781446218754.n1
54. Isaiah Berlin, ‘Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-Century European Thought’ in Henry Hardy, ed., The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 70-71. [citation omitted]
55. Isaiah Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’ in The Crooked Timber of Humanity, p. 7.
56. Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 34ff.
57. Isaiah Berlin, ‘The Apotheosis of the Romantic Will’ in The Crooked Timber of Humanity, p. 237.
58. Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism, p. 146.
59. John Kekes, ‘Pluralism and Conflict in Morality’, The Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 26 (January 1992): 37-50, p. 37.
60. Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’, pp. 11-12
61. Bernard Williams, ‘Conflict of Values’ in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 71-82.
62. Berlin, ‘Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-Century European Thought’, p. 79.
63. Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’, p. 11.
64. John Gray, Isaiah Berlin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 46ff.
65. Glen Newey, ‘Value Pluralism in Contemporary Liberalism’, Dialogue, vol. 37 (1998): 493-522.
66. Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’, p. 11.
67. Isaiah Berlin, ‘Does Political Theory Still Exist?', in Philosophy, Politics and Society, second series, Peter Laslett and W.G. Runciman, eds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), p. 26.
68. Daniel Weinstock, ‘The Graying of Berlin’, Critical Review, vol. 11 (Fall 1997): 481-501, p. 489.
69. Isaiah Berlin, ‘Reply to Ronald H. McKinney’, The Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 26 (1992): 557-560, p. 560.
70. Gray, Isaiah Berlin, pp. 71ff.
71. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism in John Gray ed., On Liberty and Other Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 168 (Ch. 4, para. 3). Text slightly altered.
72. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, James Strachey, ed., trans. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1962), p. 61.
73. Jonathan Riley, ‘Interpreting Berlin’s Liberalism’, American Political Science Review, vol. 95 (June 2001): 283-297
74. Richard Wollheim, ‘The Idea of a Common Human Nature’ in Isaiah Berlin: A Celebration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 64-79.
75. Gray, Isaiah Berlin, p. 47.
76. Williams, ‘Conflict of Values’, p. 77.
77. Ruth Chang, ‘Introduction’ to her edited collection, Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 1
78. Bernard Williams, ‘Conflicts of Value’, p. 77
79. Fred D’Agostino, ‘Incommensurability and Commensuration: Lessons from (and to) Ethico-Political Theory’, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 31 (2000): 429-447.
80. D’Agostino, ‘Incommensurability and Commensuration;’ Joseph Raz, ‘Value Incommensurability: Some Preliminaries’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 86 (1985-86): 117-134.
81. Riley, ‘Interpreting Berlin’s Liberalism’, pp. 286ff
82. Amartya Sen, On Ethics and Economics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), pp. 61ff.
83. Berlin, ‘Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-Century European Thought’, p. 70
84. Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ in his Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 171.
85. S.I. Benn, A Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 49.
86. W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 144.
87. Robert A. Kocis, A Critical Appraisal of Sir Isaiah Berlin’s Political Philosophy (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellon Press, 1989), Ch. 4.
88. Chang, ‘Introduction’, pp. 13ff.
89. James Griffin ‘Incommensurability: What’s the Problem?’ in Chang, ed., Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason, pp. 35-51.
90. Gray, Isaiah Berlin, pp. 50ff.
91. Berlin, ‘Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-Century European Thought’, p. 79.
92. Isaiah Berlin, ‘The Apotheosis of the Romantic Will’, p. 224.
93. Political Concepts and Political Theories (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), Ch. 6.
94. Gray, Isaiah Berlin, p. 51.
95. Michael Stocker, Plural and Conflicting Values (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 176ff.
96. Sir David Ross, The Right and the Good, pp. 142ff.
97. Donald Regan, ‘Value, Comparability and Choice’ in Chang, ed., Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason, p. 135.
98. Joseph Raz, ‘Incommensurability and Agency’ in Chang, ed., Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason, p. 112.
99. John Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism (Oxford: Polity Press, 2000), p. 42.
100. Philip Tetlock, ‘Coping with Trade-Offs: Psychological Constraints and Political Implications’, in Arthur Lupia, Matthew D. McCubbins and Samuel L. Popkin, eds, Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice and the Bounds of Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
101. Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, pp. 113-116.
102. Michael Walzer, ‘Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 2 (1973): 160-180, pp. 166-167.
103. Benn, A Theory of Freedom, pp. 56ff.
104. Benn, A Theory of Freedom, p. 63.
105. Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, pp. 168-169.
106. Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, p. 167.
107. Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’, p. 13.
108. Bernard Williams, ‘Ethical Consistency’ in his Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 166-186.
109. Stocker, Plural and Conflicting Values, p. 19.
110. Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’, p. 12.
111. Berlin, ‘Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-Century European Thought’, pp. 79-80.
112. Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’, p. 8.
113. Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, p. 168.
114. Berlin and Williams, ‘Pluralism and Liberalism: A Reply’ and Berlin, ‘Reply to Robert A. Kocis’, Political Studies, vol. 31 (1983): 383-385.
115. Gray, Isaiah Berlin; Crowder, ‘Pluralism and Liberalism’.
116. Isaiah Berlin, ‘The Bent Twig’ in The Crooked Timber of Humanity, p. 259.
117. Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’, p. 12.
118. R. Jahanbegloo, Conversations with Isaiah Berlin (London: Peter Halban, 1992), p. 44.
119. Berlin, ‘Reply to Ronald H. McKinney’, p. 557.
120. Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, p. 171.
121. Weinstock, ‘The Graying of Berlin’, p. 491.
122. Gray, Isaiah Berlin, p. 153.
123. Ronald H. McKinney, ‘Towards a Postmodern Ethics: Sir Isaiah Berlin and John Caputo’, The Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 26 (1992): 395-407.
124. Loren Lomasky, ‘Liberal Obituary?', in Tibor Machan and Douglas B. Rasmussen, eds, Liberty for the Twenty-First Century (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995), pp. 243-258.
125. John Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p. 2.
126. John Rawls, Political Liberalism, paperback edn (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. xl, 36.
127. Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, p. 6.
128. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 147.
129. Steven D. Smith, ‘The Restoration of Tolerance’, California Law Review, vol. 78 (1990): 304-355, p. 335.
130. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 148.
131. Frank I. Michelman ‘Book Review Panel: Odus Vivendi Postmodernus? On Just Interpretations and the Thinning of Justice’, Cardozo Law Review, vol. 21 (May 2000): 1945-1970, p. 1970.
132. George Klosko, ‘Rawls’s Argument From Political Stability’, Columbia Law Review, vol. 94 (October 1994): 1882-1987, p. 1883.
133. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 147.
134. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Michael Oakeshott, ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948), p. 80 (Ch. 13).
135. James Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).
136. Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, p. 25.
137. John Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 156.
138. Isaiah Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 56.
139. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 83 (Ch. 13). Emphasis added.
140. Karl von Clausewitz, On War, O.J. Matthijs Jolles, trans. (New York: Modern Library, 1943), p. 16 (Book I, Ch. 1).
141. Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, p. 21.
142. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 84 (Ch. 13).
143. Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, p. 25.
144. R.E. Ewin, Virtues and Rights: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), p. 27. Citations omitted.
145. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 116 (Ch. 18).
146. Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, p. 21.
147. John Gray, Isaiah Berlin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), Ch. 5.
148. David Gauthier, ‘Public Reason’, Social Philosophy and Policy, vol. 12 (Winter 1995): 19-42, pp. 19-20.
149. Fred D’Agostino and Gerald F. Gaus, eds, Public Reason (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 43-66.
150. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 26 (Ch. 5).
151. Gauthier, ‘Public Reason’, p. 27.
152. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 26 (Ch. 5).
153. Gauthier, ‘Public Reason’, p. 31. Emphasis in original.
154. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 173 (Ch. 26). Emphasis in original.
155. Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), Ch. 4.
156. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 122 (Ch. 19).
157. Thomas Hobbes, De Cive in Bernard Gert, ed., Man and Citizen (New York: Anchor Books, 1972), p. 185 (section VI.16).
158. Ewin, Virtues and Rights, pp. 149-150.
159. Michael Ridge, ‘Hobbesian Public Reason’, Ethics, vol. 108 (April 1998): 538-568, p. 548.
160. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 131 (Ch. 15). Emphasis added.
161. Gauthier, ‘Public Reason’, p. 35.
162. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 211 (Ch. 29).
163. Hampton, Political Philosophy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 51-52
164. Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, pp. 197ff.
165. Gauthier, ‘Public Reason’, p. 37.
166. Ridge, ‘Hobbesian Public Reason’, p. 540.
167. Gauthier, ‘Public Reason’, p. 38.
168. Ridge, ‘Hobbesian Public Reason’, p. 560.
169. Gauthier, ‘Public Reason’, pp, 33ff
170. Ridge, ‘Hobbesian Public Reason’, pp. 546ff
171. Ewin, Virtues and Rights, Ch. 7
172. Hampton, Political Philosophy, pp. 49ff.
173. Ridge, ‘Hobbesian Public Reason’, p. 558.
174. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 180 (Ch. 26).
175. Ridge, ‘Hobbesian Public Reason’, p. 557.
176. Ewin, Virtue and Rights, p. 31.
177. Gauthier, ‘Public Reason’, p. 37. Emphasis added.
178. Bernard Williams, ‘Deciding to Believe’ in his Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 150.
179. John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic (London: Longman, 1947), Book VI, Ch. xii, section 3; Book VI, Ch. xii, section 2.
180. David Schmidtz, Rational Choice and Moral Agency (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 196.
181. Christopher McMahon, Collective Rationality and Collective Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 8.
182. Simon Blackburn argues for this conclusion in his Ruling Passions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 183-190.
183. Kurt Baier, The Rational and the Moral Order: The Social Roots of Reason and Morality (Chicago, IL: Open Court, 1995), pp. 173ff.
184. Robert Nozick, The Nature of Rationality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 133.
185. McMahon, Collective Rationality and Collective Reasoning, p. 63.
186. Christopher McMahon, Authority and Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 104.
187. Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 102. Emphasis in original.
188. R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York: John Wiley, 1957), p. 90.
189. Waldron, Law and Disagreement, p. 104. Emphasis in original.
190. David Lewis, Convention (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 15. Emphasis in original.
191. Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 138.
192. Peter C. Ordershook, Game Theory and Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 305.
193. Noel B. Reynolds, ‘Law as Convention’, Ratio Juris, vol. 2 (March 1989): 105-120, p. 107 and Green, ‘Law, Coordination and the Common Good’, p. 301.
194. Lewis, Convention, pp. 10ff.
195. Green, ‘Law, Coordination and the Common Good’, p. 309ff.
196. Waldron, Law and Disagreement, p. 108. Emphasis added.
197. Waldron, Law and Disagreement, p. 121.
198. Baier, The Rational and the Moral Order, p. 28.
199. David Gauthier, ‘Individual Reason’, in J.B. Schneewind, ed., Reason, Ethics, and Society (Chicago, IL: Open Court, 1996), pp. 38-57.
200. Lance J. Ripps, ‘Cognitive Process in Propositional Reasoning’, Psychological Review, vol. 90 (1983): 38-71
201. Martin D.S. Braine, ‘On the Relation Between the Natural Logic of Reasoning and Standard Logic’, Psychological Review, vol. 85 (January 1978): 1-21.
202. David Gauthier, ‘Public Reason’, Social Philosophy and Policy, vol. 12 (Winter 1995): 19-42
203. Michael Ridge, ‘Hobbesian Public Reason’, Ethics, vol. 108 (April 1998): 538-568.
204. Philip Pettit, The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society and Politics, with a new postscript (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, 1996), p. 68.
205. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd edn G.E.M. Anscomb, trans. (New York: Macmillan, 1958), section 185.
206. Pettit, The Common Mind, p. 89.
207. Susan Hurley, Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 91.
208. David K. Henderson, ‘Charity and Interpretation’ in Michael Martin and Lee C. McIntyre, Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994): 323-41, p. 329.
209. Hurley, Natural Reasons, pp. 93-94.
210. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 52, 88.
211. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 107.
212. McMahon, Collective Rationality and Collective Reasoning, p. 109.
213. Pettit, The Common Mind, p. 353.
214. Pettit, The Common Mind, p. 305.
215. Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 52.
216. Pettit, The Common Mind, p. 310.
217. Philip Pettit, ‘Freedom as Antipower’, Ethics, vol. 106 (April 1996): 576-604.
218. George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, A Novel (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1949), p. 280.
219. Justificatory Liberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), Ch. 2.
220. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989)
221. Richard Rorty, ‘Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism’ in his Objectivity, Relativism and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 197-202.
222. Pettit, The Common Mind, p. 326.
223. Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Christian Lenhart and Shierry Weber Nicholson, trans. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 52ff.
224. P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays (London: Methuen, 1974).
225. J.R. Lucas, On Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 7.
226. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, p. 49.
227. Jürgen Habermas, Communication and The Evolution of Society, Thomas McCarthy, trans. (London: Heinemann, 1976), p. 3.
228. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, p. 65. Emphasis in original.
229. Jürgen Habermas, ‘Popular Sovereignty as Procedure’, William Rehg, trans., in James Bohman and William Rehg, eds, Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), p. 44.
230. Thomas Christiano, ‘The Significance of Public Deliberation’ in Bohman and Rehg, eds, Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, pp. 243-277.
231. Julius Fröbel quoted in Habermas, ‘Popular Sovereignty as Procedure’, p. 46. Emphasis in original.
232. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p. 179.
233. Cheryl Misak, Truth, Politics, Morality: Pragmatism and Deliberation (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 60.
234. Christiano, ‘The Significance of Public Deliberation’, pp. 262ff.
235. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, pp. 31, 457ff.
236. Joshua Cohen, ‘Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy’, in Bohman and Rehg, eds, Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, pp. 409ff.
237. Benjamin Constant, ‘The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns’, in Political Writings, Biancamria Fontana, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 310-311.
238. Robert Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 154-155, 169ff.
239. Cohen, ‘Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy’, p. 412.
240. Joshua Cohen, ‘Democracy and Liberty’, in Jon Elster, ed., Deliberative Democracy, p. 192.
241. Cohen, ‘Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy’, p. 407.
242. Cohen, ‘Democracy and Liberty’, p. 203.
243. Cohen, ‘Democracy and Liberty’, p. 220.
244. Joshua Cohen, ‘Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy’, in Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit, eds, The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), p. 21.
245. Frederick Watkins, The Political Tradition of the West: A Study in the Development of Modern Liberalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948), p. 244.
246. Modern Liberal Theory of Man (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1983), pp. 205ff.
247. Gerald J. Postema, ‘Public Practical Reason: An Archeology’, Social Philosophy and Policy, vol. 12 (Winter 1995), p. 70.
248. Gerald J. Postema, ‘Public Practical Reason: Political Practice’, in Ian Shapiro and Judith Wagner DeCrew, eds, Nomos XXXVII: Theory and Practice (New York: New York University Press, 1995), p. 356.
249. Cohen, ‘Democracy and Liberty’, p. 197.
250. Postema, ‘Public Practical Reason: Political Practice’, p. 356.
251. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract in The Social Contract and Discourses, G.D.H. Cole, trans. (London: Dent, 1973): 248 (Book V, Ch. i).
252. Cohen, ‘Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy’, p. 21.
253. Postema, ‘Public Practical Reason: Political Practice’, p. 369.
254. Postema, ‘Public Practical Reason: An Archeology’, pp. 70ff.
255. Fred D’Agostino, Free Public Reason: Making It Up As We Go (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 30ff. Cf. Postema, ‘Public Practical Reason: Political Practice’, p. 350.
256. Cohen, ‘Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy’, p. 412.
257. Cohen, ‘Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy’, p. 23. Emphasis added.
258. Christopher Cherniak, Minimal Rationality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986).
259. Herbert Simon, Reason in Human Affairs (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1983).
260. Susan C. Stokes, ‘Pathologies of Deliberation’, in Jon Elster, ed., Deliberative Democracy, pp. 123-139
261. Adam Przeworski, ‘Deliberation and Ideological Domination’ in Jon Elster, ed., Deliberative Democracy, pp. 140-160.
262. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ‘Availability: a Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability’, in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky, eds, Judgments under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 163-179.
263. ‘The Rational, The Reasonable and Justification’, Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 3 (September 1995): 234-258.
264. Fred D’Agostino and Gerald F. Gaus, eds, Public Reason (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1998).
265. Lee Ross and Craig A. Anderson, ‘Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On the Origins and Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments’, in Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, Judgments Under Uncertainty, pp. 129-152.
266. Nisbett and Ross, Human Inference, Ch. 8.
267. Gilbert Harman, Change in View (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), pp. 29ff
268. Stephen Stich, The Fragmentation of Reason (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 8-10.
269. Justificatory Liberalism, pp. 38ff.
270. Joshua Cohen, ‘Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus’, in David Copp, Jean Hampton and John E. Roemer, eds, The Idea of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 281-282. Cohen attributes this view to Mark Johnston.
271. Cherniak, Minimal Rationality.
272. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, James Strachey, trans. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1961), p. 21.
273. Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
274. Cohen, ‘Democracy and Liberty’, p. 195.
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277. Thomas Jefferson on Democracy, Saul K. Padover, ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1939), p. 15.
278. Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 269ff.
279. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, G.D.H. Cole, trans. (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1973), p. 185 (Book II, Ch. iii).
280. William Riker, Liberalism Against Populism (Prospect Heights: Waveland Press, 1988), p. 11.
281. Jules Coleman and John Ferejohn, ‘Democracy and Social Choice’, Ethics, vol. 97 (October 1986): 6-25, at 15.
282. Anthony Storr, The Integrity of the Personality (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964), p. 68.
283. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism, p. 115.
284. Michael Argyle, The Psychology of Interpersonal Behavior, 3rd edn (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), p. 211.
285. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism, p. 238.
286. Arend Lijphart, ‘The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945-85', American Political Science Review, vol. 85 (June 1990): 481-496.
287. Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 182 (Book II, Ch. 1).
288. Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld, ‘Rousseau’s General Will: A Condorcetian Perspective’, The American Political Science Review, vol. 82 (June 1988): 567-576.
289. David Estlund, ‘Making Truth Safe for Democracy’ in David Copp, Jean Hampton and John E. Roemer, eds, The Idea of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 71-100
290. Susan Hurley, Natural Reasons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
291. Rex Martin, A System of Rights, p. 142.
292. Elaine Spitz, Majority Rule (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1984), p. 206
293. Brian Barry, ‘The Public Interest’ in Anthony Quinton, ed., Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 112-126
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295. Arthur Kuflik, ‘Majority Rule Procedure’ in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman eds, NOMOS XVIII: Due Process (New York: New York University Press, 1977), p. 306.
296. Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book II, Ch. iii.
297. David Estlund, ‘Making Truth Safe for Democracy’, p. 93.
298. Martin, A System of Rights, p. 138.
299. David Hume, ‘Of the Independency of Parliament’ in his Essays Moral, Political and Literary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 42-43.
300. James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, Clinton Rossiter, ed. (New York: New American Library, 1961), Madison, Federalist 51, p. 322.
301. The Economist, August 6, 1994, p. 20, col. 2.
302. ‘The Paradox of Persisting Opposition’, Politics, Philosophy and Economics, vol. 1 (February 2002): 109-46.
303. Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 250 (Book 4, Ch. 2).
304. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, Werner S. Pluhar, trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), p. 160 (section 40).
305. Immanuel Kant, ‘What is Enlightenment?', in Hans Reiss, ed., Kant’s Political Writings, H.B. Nisbett, trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 54-60.
306. David Estlund, ‘Beyond Fairness and Deliberation’, in James Bohman and William Rehg, eds, Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 186-187.
307. Richard B. Friedman, ‘On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy’, in Richard E. Flathman, ed., Concepts in Social and Political Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 142-143.
308. David Estlund, ‘The Epistemic Dimension of Democratic Authority’, The Modern Schoolman, vol. 74 (May 1997): 264.
309. Estlund, ‘The Epistemic Dimension of Democratic Authority’, p. 272.
310. Mill, ‘Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform’, in The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, J.M. Robson, ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), vol. 19, pp. 324-325.
311. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, p. 335 (Ch. VIII).
312. Estlund, ‘Beyond Fairness and Deliberation’, p. 183.
313. Estlund, ‘Making Truth Safe for Democracy’, p. 84.
314. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 98.
315. Estlund, ‘The Epistemic Dimension of Democratic Authority’, p. 274.
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317. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 490-491.
318. John Rawls, Political Liberalism, paperback edn (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. xl, 36.
319. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999)
320. John Rawls, Collected Papers, Samuel Freeman, ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), Ch. 26.
321. Rawls, ‘Public Reason Revisited’, p. 776.
322. Rawls, ‘Public Reason Revisited’, p. 776.
323. Jürgen Habermas, ‘Reconciliation through Public Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism’, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 92 (March 1995): 109-131, p. 129.
324. S.I. Benn and G.F. Gaus, ‘The Liberal Conception of the Public and Private’ in Benn and Gaus eds, Public and Private in Social Life (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1983), pp. 31, 65.
325. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Erwin Kelly, ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001) pp. 166, 190.
326. Habermas, ‘Reconciliation through Public Reason’, p. 129.
327. Political Concepts and Political Theories (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000).
328. William E. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse, 2nd edn (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), Ch. 1.
329. W.B. Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’ in his Philosophy and the Historical Understanding (New York: Skocken, 1968), Ch. 8.
330. Rawls, ‘Public Reason Revisited’, p. 779.
331. Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 12-14.
332. Rawls, ‘Public Reason Revisited’, p. 792. Emphasis added.
333. Rawls, ‘Public Reason Revisited’, p. 770.
334. Fred D’Agostino, Free Public Reason: Making It up As We Go (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 30-31.
335. Kurt Baier, ‘Justice as the Aims of Political Philosophy’, Ethics, vol. 99 (July 1989): 771-790, pp. 775ff.
336. Rawls, ‘Public Reason Revisited’, p. 772.
337. Rawls, ‘Public Reason Revisited’, p. 765.
338. John Rawls, Political Liberalism, paperback edn (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 137.
339. S.I. Benn, A Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 87.
340. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, in Peter Laslett, ed., Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 287 (section 4).
341. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Michael Oakeshott, ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946), p. 85 (Ch. 14).
342. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 253.
343. Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 155.
344. Lawrence A. Kurdek, ‘Perspective Taking as the Cognitive Basis of Children’s Moral Development: A Review of the Literature’, Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, vol. 24 (January 1978): 3-28.
345. Dennis Krebs and Janet Gillmore, ‘The Relationship among the First Stages of Cognitive Development, Role Taking Abilities, and Moral Development’, Child Development, vol. 53 (1982): 877-886
346. Bärbel Inhelder and Jean Piaget, ‘The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence’, in Howard E. Gruber and J. Jacques Vonéche, eds, The Essential Piaget (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), pp. 403-444, at 440-441.
347. Eric Mack, ‘Liberalism, Neutralism and Rights’, in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds, NOMOS XXX: Religion, Morality and the Law (New York: New York University Press, 1988), pp. 46-70, at 55-56.
348. Marilyn Friedman, ‘The Impracticality of Impartiality’, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 86 (1989): 645-656.
349. Carl Wellman, Challenge and Response: Justification in Ethics (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971), Ch. 3.
350. John L. Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986), p. 38.
351. George S. Pappas and Marshall Swain, ‘Introduction’ to their edited collection, Essays on Knowledge and Justification (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 11-40, at 13ff.
352. Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990), pp. 162ff.
353. David O. Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 94-95.
354. Douglas Odegard, ‘Can Justified Belief Be False?', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 6 (1976): 561-568.
355. Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge, pp. 127ff.
356. Jeffrey Reiman, Justice and Modern Moral Philosophy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 1. Emphasis added.
357. Wellman, Challenge and Response, p. 98.
358. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana Press/Collins, 1985), p. 85.
359. Kurt Baier, ‘Rationality, Reason and the Good’, in David Copp and David Zimmerman, eds, Morality, Reason and Truth: New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allenheld, 1984), pp. 193-211.
360. Christopher Cherniak, Minimal Rationality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), Ch. 5.
361. Stephen Stich’s The Fragmentation of Reason (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990).
362. Cherniak, Minimal Rationality, Chs 3, 5.
363. Social Philosophy (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), Chs 7-11 for a sketch of the justified elements of a public morality.
364. John Gray, ‘Contractarian Method, Private Property and the Market Economy’ in his Liberalisms (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 161-198, at 169ff, 186ff.
365. Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice, pp. 39ff, Chs 6-8.
366. Jeremy Shearmur, ‘Epistemological Limits of the State: Reflections on Popper’s Open Society’, Political Studies, vol. 38 (1990): 116-125, at 124.
367. Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: the Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, 2nd edn (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 36-37.
368. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 137. Emphasis added.
369. Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice, John Ladd (trans.) (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), section 44 (p. 76). Emphasis in original.
370. Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism, p. 78.
371. Ewin, Virtues and Rights, p. 32. The main theme of Ewin’s work is the necessity of abandoning reliance on ‘private’ judgment to achieve cooperation.
372. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Michael Oakeshott, ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946), p. 102 (Ch. 15). Emphasis in original.
373. Ewin, Virtues and Rights, p. 34.
374. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, section 7.
375. Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 184ff.
376. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 246.
377. Christopher Bertram, ‘Public Reason’, Imprints: A Journal of Analytical Socialism, vol. 2 (June 1997): 72-85, at 83-84.
378. Randall G. Holcombe, ‘Constitutions as Constraints’, Constitutional Political Economy, vol. 2 (Fall 1991): 303-328, at 303.
379. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1990), p. 139.
380. Stephen Macedo, The New Right v. The Constitution (Washington, DC: The Cato Institute, 1987), p. 27.
381. James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, Clinton Rossiter, ed. (New York: New American Library, 1961), p. 324.
382. J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, in John Gray, ed., ‘On Liberty’ and Other Essays, p. 245 (Ch. III).
383. J. Roland Pennock, Democratic Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), Ch. VII.
384. Stephen Holmes, ‘Gag Rules or the Politics of Omission’ in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 19-58. doi: 10.4135/9781446218754.n8