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1
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84949356618
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An alternative expected utility model is presented by, (main article note 24). Theirs does not, however, hinge on the concept set forth here of the victim as an unsafe actor
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An alternative expected utility model is presented by Bueno de Mcsquita and Riker. ‘An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation’, pp.295–6 (main article note 24). Theirs does not, however, hinge on the concept set forth here of the victim as an unsafe actor.
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‘An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation’
, pp. 295-296
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de Mcsquita, B.1
Riker2
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3
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33846508626
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The meaning of attack may of course vary. Different sorts of coercive measures would be associated with different expected utility calculations. In addition, this reasoning only sets forth the conditions for dissuading attack by a motivated adversary. States may choose not to attack because they simply have no interest in doing so, regardless of the existence or absence of specific threats. To use Patrick Morgan’s terminology, this exercise examines the requirements of immediate deterrence rather than general deterrence, (main article note 16)
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The meaning of attack may of course vary. Different sorts of coercive measures would be associated with different expected utility calculations. In addition, this reasoning only sets forth the conditions for dissuading attack by a motivated adversary. States may choose not to attack because they simply have no interest in doing so, regardless of the existence or absence of specific threats. To use Patrick Morgan’s terminology, this exercise examines the requirements of immediate deterrence rather than general deterrence. See Morgan, Deterrence, pp.42–2 (main article note 16).
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Deterrence
, pp. 42-52
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Morgan1
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5
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0003919454
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This line of reasoning, and the significance of the nuclear revolution is supported also by evidence from research in psychology suggesting that ‘losses hurt more than gains gratify’. Under such circumstances, the party hoping to forestall losses may be more willing to run risks than an aggressor motivated by hoped for gains, –70, (main article note 35)
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This line of reasoning, and the significance of the nuclear revolution is supported also by evidence from research in psychology suggesting that ‘losses hurt more than gains gratify’. Under such circumstances, the party hoping to forestall losses may be more willing to run risks than an aggressor motivated by hoped for gains. See Jervis, Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, pp.169–70, 171 (main article note 35).
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Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution
, pp. 169-171
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Jervis1
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