John Finnis on Aquinas 'The Philosopher'

Heythrop Journal - Quarterly Review of Philosophy and Theology

Volumn 41, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 1-24

  Bradley, Denis J M ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 84949131021     PISSN: 00181196     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2265.00121     Document Type: Article

References (75)

1. John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. xxi, 385. UK price: £35.00 hardback (0-19-878084-2); £13.00 paperback (0-19-878085-0).
2. Germain Grisez, 'The First Principles of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2', Natural Law Forum 10 (1965), pp. 168-201.
3. e siècle (Paris: Éditions Saint-Paul, 1994), p. 437.
4. Pinckaers, 'L'Enseignement', p. 436.
5. See Finnis, p. 26.
6. See III Sent., d. 23, a. 2, a. 2, sol. 1 (Moos, III, 724-7, nn. 135-47);
7. In Peri Herm., I, lect. 3, n. 31;
8. De ver., q. 1, a. 3 (Spiazzi, 6a).
9. See II Sent., d. 24, q. 3, a. 1 (Mandonnet, II, 617);
10. De ver., q. 15, a. 1 (Spiazzi, 307b; 308b).
11. See Benoit Garceau, O.M.I., Judicium: Vocabulaire, sources, doctrine de saint Thomas d'Aquin (Montreal: Institut d'Études Médié vales; Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1968), pp. 131-4.
12. See I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7 (Mandonnet, I, 489-90);
13. d. 38, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2 (Mandonnet, I, 904);
14. III Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 2 (Moos, III, 1178, n. 37);
15. SLA, II, c. 28, 427b6, 186-89 (In de An., III, lect. 4; Pirotta, 155b, n. 629);
16. 427b21, 273-84 (Pirotta, 156b, n. 635);
17. De ver., q. 15, a. 1; q. 24, a. 5, ad 4;
18. In Metaph., I, lect. 2 (Cathala-Spiazzi, 13, n. 46);
19. In Post Anal., I, lect 36, n. 11.
20. See De ver., q. 1, a. 9; q. 10, a. 6; q. 14, a. 1;
21. ST, I, q. 85, a. a. 2, ad. 3; a. 6.
22. See SLA, II, c. 29, 428a1, 48-51 (In de An., III, lect. 5; Pirotta, 158b, n. 639);
23. Super Ioannem, c. I, lect. 1 (Cai, 8, n. 26).
24. Cf. Peter Hoenen, S.J., 'De Origine Primorum Principiorum Scientiae', Gregorianum 14 (1933), pp. 153-84; esp. 178-9.
25. See In Metaph., IV, lect. 6 (Cathala, 167a, n. 599).
26. See SLA, III, c. 4, 430a10, 29-35 (In de An., III, lect. 10; Pirotta, 174a, n. 729).
27. See ST, I-II, q. 19, a. 3, ad 1.
28. See De ver., q. 22, a. 12, ad 2 (Spiazzi, 409b).
29. See III Sent., d. 33, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 4 (Moos, III, 1066, n. 243);
30. De ver., q. 22, a. 12, ad 2; (Spiazzi, 409b).
31. See Finnis, pp. 105 n. 4, 115, 124-5, 131 n. g.
32. See De ver., q. 14, a. 3 (Spiazzi, 287a): 'Unde bonum in actibus humanis [theologus] non considerat absolute, quia ibi non ponit finem, sed in ordine ad id bonum quod ponit finem.'
33. See ST, I-II, q. 69, a. 3; II-II, q. 180, a. 2; q. 181, a. 1, ad 3; q. 182, a. 1, ad 2.
34. See ST, I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 1; I-II, q. 180, a. 3; ad 1; ad 2;
35. De trin., q. 6, a. 3.
36. See ST, I-II, q. 3, a. 5, ad 3; a. 7.
37. See SCG, III, c. 48;
38. SLE, I, 9, 1097b6 (In Ethic., lect. 9; Spiazzi, 31, n. 113).
39. See ST, I, q. 29, a. 1, ad 5.
40. See Finnis, p. 105.
41. See Finnis, p. 140.
42. See Finnis, pp. 138-9.
43. See ST, I, q. 29, a. 3: ' "Persona" significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura, scilicet subsistens in rationali natura';
44. De pot., q. 9, a. 3 (Pession, 230a): '... omne quod est dignissimum in creaturis, Deo sit attribuendum, convenienter nomen personae Deo attribui potest ...'
45. See Anthony Kenny, Freewill and Responsibility (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 50-2.
46. See ST, II-II, q. 64, a. 7;
47. Finnis, p. 276.
48. See Finnis, pp. 141-2, esp. n. 41.
49. Finnis argues that acts which are 'per se mala' can be identified 'without using moral qualifications' (p. 278). Identifying legitimate cases of 'self-defence', though, seems impossible if no moral qualifications are allowed. On what other grounds would one deny the appellation 'self-defence' to an escaping robber who returns a pursuing policeman's gunfire? Some moral connotations are built into the term: an act of 'self-defence' is either morally legitimate or it is not a case of self-defence
50. See Finnis, p. 82.
51. See Finnis, p. 145.
52. See Finnis, p. 181, n. e.
53. See ST, II-II q. 109, a. 3, ad 1.
54. See ST, I-II, q. 60, a. 3;
55. II-II, q. 61, a. 2.
56. See Pera, 114-15, nn. 2559-60.
57. See Expos, de trin., q. 2, a. 3.
58. See Anton C. Pegis, introduction to A Gilson Reader: Selections from the Writings of Etienne Gilson, edited by Anton C. Pegis (Garden City, New York: Hanover House, 1957), pp. 7-20;
59. ' "Sub Ratione Dei": A Reply to Professor Anderson', New Scholasticism 39 (1965), pp. 141-57.
60. See Finnis, p. 10.
61. No less eminent a student of natural law theory than Leo Strauss was convinced, rightly or wrongly, that 'the ultimate consequences of the Thomistic view of natural law is that natural law is practically inseparable not only from natural theology - i.e., from a natural theology which is, in fact, based on belief in biblical revelation - but even from revealed theology' (Natural Right and History [Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1950], p. 164).
62. See ST, I, q. 75, prologus: 'Naturam autem hominis considerare pertinet ad theologum ex parte animae, non autem ex parte corporis, nisi secundum habitudinem quam habet corpus ad animam.'
63. See ST, I-II, q. 71, a. 2, ad 4: 'Lex autem aeterna comparatur ad ordinem rationis humanae sicut ars ad artificiatum. Unde eiusdem rationis est quod Vitium et peccatum sit contra ordinem rationis humanae, et quod sit contra legem aeternam.'
64. See Finnis, p. 323.
65. See Finnis, p. 308, n. 64.
66. See ST, I-II, q. 6, prologus.
67. See ST, I-II, q. 65, a. 2: '... solae virtutes infusae sunt perfectae, et simpliciter dicendae virtutes: quia bene ordinant hominem ad finem ultimum simpliciter. Aliae vero virtutes, sunt secundum quid virtutes, non autem simpliciter: ordinant enim hominem bene respectu finis ultimi in aliquo genere, non autem respectu finis simpliciter.'
68. See ST, I-II, q. 71, a. 1: 'Directe quidem virtus importat dispositionem quandam alicuius convenienter se habentis secundum modum suae naturae ...'
69. See ST, I-II, qq. 107-8.
70. Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 2.
71. MacIntyre, p. 170.
72. On one point, MacIntyre is surely correct: modern Thomists have 'never on any major issue refuted their opponents in such a way as to persuade those opponents' (p. 176). But the observation has a tautological ring. Whether Thomism is rationally superior to its historical predecessors, Aristotelianism and Augustinianism, because it transcended their limitations while 'preserving from them what had withstood dialectical objection' (p. 175), is a moot question. MacIntyre's Hegelian view of Aquinas is unacceptable to those 'notable Thomists', Finnis among them, who themselves hold as well as ascribe 'to Aquinas a belief in a set of necessarily true first principles which any truly rational person is able to evaluate as true' (p. 175).
73. See ST, II-II, q. 2, a. 4: 'Ratio enim humana in rebus divinis est multum deficiens: cuius signum est quia philosophi, de rebus humanis naturali investigatione perscrutantes, in multis erraverunt et sibi ipsis contraria senserunt.'
74. See Finnis, p. 168, esp. n. 156.
75. See Leo Strauss, 'The Three Waves of Modernity', in Hilail Gildin (ed.), Political Philosophy: Six Essays by Leo Strauss (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975), pp. 81-98.