What are multi-protocol guessing attacks and how to prevent them

Proceedings of the Workshop on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises, WETICE

Volumn 2002-January, Issue , 2002, Pages 77-82

  Malladi, S ^a,b   Alves Foss, J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF IDAHO   (United States)

^b Satyam Computers Pvt Ltd   (India)

Author keywords

Collaborative work; Communication channels; Conferences; Costs; Cryptographic protocols; Cryptography; Humans; Information security; International collaboration; Isolation technology

Indexed keywords

COMMUNICATION CHANNELS (INFORMATION THEORY); COSTS; CRYPTOGRAPHY; INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION; SECURITY OF DATA;

COLLABORATIVE WORK; CONFERENCES; CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS; HUMANS; INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATIONS; ISOLATION TECHNOLOGY;

NETWORK SECURITY;

EID: 84948699217     PISSN: 15244547     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/ENABL.2002.1029992     Document Type: Conference Paper

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