The effect of information in a behavioral irrigation experiment

Water Resources and Economics

Volumn 12, Issue , 2015, Pages 14-26

  Janssen, Marco A ^a   Anderies, John M ^a   Pérez, Irene ^a   Yu, David J ^a,b  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric commons dilemma; Communication; Experimental economics; Inequality; Public infrastructure

Indexed keywords

ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT; DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM; ENVIRONMENTAL DISTURBANCE; EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN; INFORMATION SYSTEM; INVESTMENT; RESOURCE AVAILABILITY; RESOURCE USE; WATER ECONOMICS; WATER USE;

EID: 84947614928     PISSN: 22124284     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.wre.2015.09.001     Document Type: Article

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