Securing “encryption + proof of knowledge” in the random oracle model

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 2271, Issue , 2002, Pages 277-289

  Abe, Masayuki ^a  

^a NTT CORPORATION   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

HASH FUNCTIONS;

CHOSEN CIPHERTEXT ATTACK; CIPHERTEXTS; ELGAMAL ENCRYPTION; ENCRYPTION SCHEMES; RANDOM ORACLE; RANDOM ORACLE MODEL; SCHNORR SIGNATURE SCHEME;

AUTHENTICATION;

EID: 84944891017     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/3-540-45760-7_19     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (22)

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