Tokyo’s dynamic diplomacy: Japan and the subcontinent’s nuclear tests

Contemporary Southeast Asia

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 322-339

  Limaye, Satu P ^a  

^a Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84942795198     PISSN: 0129797X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1355/CS22-2E     Document Type: Article

References (39)

1. Yoichi Funabashi, “Tokyo’s Depression Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, November-December 1998.
2. Australia, Canada, Germany, and the United States joined Japan in imposing sanctions. Their aid amounts were much smaller. China, France, Russia and the United Kingdom did not impose sanctions.
3. France, not an aid recipient, suffered only Tokyo’s censure after its nuclear blasts between September 1995 and January 1996.
4. The countries that have imposed sanctions on India and Pakistan have not lifted these sanctions, although minor adjustments have been made. A Japanese foreign ministry official is quoted as saying that “[t]he subject [of easing sanctions] is under Japan’s independent consideration and the action will not necessarily be the same as what United States does”. See www.indianembassy.org/inews/March99/economy.
5. For a review of the economic sanctions for nuclear tests required by U.S. law, see Satu Limaye, “A Blast to Business: The economic cost of a nuclear test by India or Pakistan could be high”, Business South Asia (Economist Intelligence Unit, May 1996).
6. The Task Force has met three times to date. The membership has changed. In addition to the G–8 countries, Argentina, Australia, Brazil and Ukraine have attended all three meetings. The ROK joined the third. South Africa declined an initial invitation to join because it was then chair of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and was concerned about the appearance of joining a G–8 sponsored meeting. South Africa has not joined since, saying that it will take up the nuclear issue bilaterally. Singapore, as chair of ASEAN when the Task Force was established, also declined to participate.
7. See, for example, press conference by Japan’s MOFA, 3 July 1998.
8. Press conference by Japan’s MOFA, 5 June 1998.
9. See Jasjit Singh’s reply to the report entitled “Unrealistic and partisan: On the Tokyo Forum on disarmament?” Hindustan Times, 12 August 1999.
10. For specific items in the “road map”, see press conference, Japan’s MOFA, 27 October 1998.
11. See press conference by Japan’s MOFA, 23 June 1998, for Japan’s position on Pakistan’s inclusion in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
12. The relevant passage from the MOFA press conference reads, “…we [Japan] felt that especially given this recent series of events, that it would be appropriate for Pakistan to take part in the discussions in the ARF in some capacity or other, but perhaps there is not a consensus on the participation of Pakistan. We have been in the process of communicating with the relevant governments concerned and we will know in due course what the outcome will be, but I think you will not be surprised to hear that there does not seem to be an enthusiastic consensus on the participation of Pakistan. I do not have to refer to which country might be feeling a bit of reservation about it.” Press conference, Japan’s MOFA, 23 June 1998.
13. Quoted in Manoj Joshi, “ASEAN Regional Forum: Manila Serenade”, India Today, 10 August 1998, p. 54.
14. See Purnendra C. Jain, Distant Asian Neighbours: Japan and South Asia (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1996).
15. See, for example, Ralph Cossa, “A Cue for Japan to Take the Anti-Nuclear Lead”, International Herald Tribune, 30 November 1999.
16. According to Japanese press reports, 80 demonstrators took to the streets in Hiroshima, and in Nagasaki 10 persons asked citizens to sign a petition calling for a ban on nuclear weapons. See “Protestors denounce India N-tests”, Daily Yomiuri, 13 May 1998.
17. That India was calling for disarmament at a time when it was also preparing for or at least considering conducting nuclear tests is a logical problem unrelated to the immediate argument about Japanese public responses to the tests.
18. For responses from Japan’s various political parties, see “Party leaders urge more sanctions against India”, Japan Economic Newswire (Kyodo News Service), 13 May 1998.
19. See “India Rejects Japanese Humanitarian Aid”, Kyodo News Service, 26 June 1998.
20. See “Making Waves”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 July 1999.
21. In a statement at the time when it won the two-year non-permanent seat, Japan’s foreign minister made explicit mention of the competition for the seat with India. “For over a year, Japan was competing with India in this election. This, however, has not affected friendly relations existing between Japan and India. In the future, Japan intends to work to further develop its friendly and cooperative relations with India, through such endeavors as cooperation at the United Nations.” See statement on MOFA website at www.mofa.go.jp, 22 October 1996.
22. For a summary of the problems plaguing Japan–India economic relations, see Satu Limaye, “Sushi and Samosas: Japanese Investment in India”, Business South Asia (Economist Intelligence Unit, June 1995).
23. See press conference, Japan’s MOFA, 3 December 1999.
24. For a Japanese view on the security implications of the tests, see East Asian Strategic Review, 1998-1999 (Tokyo: The National Institute for Defence Studies, 1999), especially pp. 62-64.
25. Cited in “Tokyo’s opposition to tests has no strategic basis”, Hindu, 23 June 1998.
26. Press Secretary Sadaaki Numata, Japan’s MOFA press conference, 2 June 1998.
27. This is the first consideration in the section on “Impacts on the Security of East”, East Asian Strategic Review, 1998–1999.
28. See This is the first consideration in the section on “Impacts on the Security of East”, East Asian Strategic Review, 1998–1999. p. 54.
29. This is the first consideration in the section on “Impacts on the Security of East”, East Asian Strategic Review, 1998–1999. p. 54.
30. Some Japanese have already noted that the Security Council failed to impose sanctions on North Korea for its nuclear transgressions too.
31. See East Asian Strategic Review, 1998-1999, pp. 56-57.
32. Yasuhiro Nakasone, “Japan’s firm non-nuclear resolve”, Japan Echo, October 1998.
33. Yoichi Funabashi, “Tokyo’s Depression Diplomacy”, Foreign Affairs, November-December 1998.
34. Indian Ambassador Naresh Chandra, in an interview with the San Diego Tribune, stated that a “lecture from Canada or Japan or Australia carries no weight. Those nations have nuclear guarantees, a nuclear umbrella.” Interview, San Diego Union Tribune, 4 April 1999.
35. T. P. Sreenivasan, Deputy Chief of Mission at the Indian Embassy in Washington told an audience that “[w]ith the wisdom of hindsight, one may wonder whether it was the lack of strategic balance and the lack of sensible and sound nuclear doctrines that caused the nuclear attack on Japan”. Remarks reprinted at www.indianembassy.org, 9 August 1999.
36. Tamotsu Asami, “What India, Pakistan may gain from nuclear tests — aside from sanctions”, Daily Yomiuri, 3 June 1998.
37. These feelings may have increased after President Clinton’s visit to the subcontinent in March 2000. Many regard President Clinton and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott’s comments before and during the trip as essentially conceding the reality of nuclear weapons in the subcontinent, though by no means approving or officially recognizing the region’s nuclear weapons.
38. I am grateful to Michael Green of the Council on Foreign Relations for this observation.
39. East Asian Strategic Review 1998-1999, p. 64.