The claims of Reflective Equilibrium

Inquiry (United Kingdom)

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 1982, Pages 307-330

  Raz, Joseph ^a  

^a BALLIOL COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84937576730     PISSN: 0020174X     EISSN: 15023923     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00201748208601970     Document Type: Article

References (15)

1. All page references in the text are to J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1971. Since Rawls is happy to apply his method to morality in general I shall refer to a sense of justice or to a moral capacity, interchangeably.
2. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice., p. 50.
3. J. Rawls, ‘Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics’, Philosophical Review, Vol. 60 (1951), No. 2. Rawls allowed only particular pre-philosophical judgments to count. But he has later come to revise this view. See his The Independence of Moral Theory’, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 48 (1974-75), p. 7.
4. K. Nielsen, ‘Grounding Rights and a Method of Reflective Equilibrium’, Inquiry, this issue, p. 293.
5. Norman Daniels, ‘Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics’, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 76 (1979), p. 274.
6. ‘The Independence of Moral Theory’, Journal of Philosophy p. 7.
7. ‘The Independence of Moral Theory’, Journal of Philosophy p. 10.
8. ‘The Independence of Moral Theory’, Journal of Philosophy p. 6.
9. See also A Theory of Justice, Journal of Philosophy., pp. 51-52.
10. ‘The Independence of Moral Theory’, Journal of Philosophy., p. 7
11. R. M. Dworkin, The Original Position, N. Daniels (Ed.), Reading Rawls, 1ackwell, Oxford 1975, p. 26.
12. ‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory’, The Original Position p. 560.
13. ‘The Original Position’, The Original Position p. 28.
14. See his ‘Moral Realism’, J. Casey (Ed.), Morality and Moral Reasoning, Methuen, London 1971, p. 101; ‘Truth, Realism, and the Regulation of Theory’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 5 (1980), p. 353; ‘Rule Following and Moral Realism’, S. H. Holtzman and C. M. Leich (Eds.), Wittgenstein: to Follow a Rule, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1981, p. 163.
15. ‘Rule Following and Moral Realism’, Morality and Moral Reasoning., pp. 175-6.