Applications of principal-agent models to government contracting and accountability decision making

International Journal of Public Administration

Volumn 25, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 441-461

  Coats, Jennifer C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI ST LOUIS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84937382518     PISSN: 01900692     EISSN: 15324265     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1081/PAD-120013250     Document Type: Article

References (38)

1. Rosen, H., 1999. Public Finance Boston: Irwin/McGraw-Hill. 5th Edition
2. Halachmi, A., 1996. Franchising in Government: Can a Principal-Agent Perspective be the First Step Toward the Development of a Theory?. Policy Studies Journal, 24 (4): 478–495.
3. Rosen, H., 1999. Public Finance Boston: Irwin/McGraw-Hill. 5th Edition
4. Halachmi, A., 1996. Franchising in Government: Can a Principal-Agent Perspective be the First Step Toward the Development of a Theory?. Policy Studies Journal, 24 (4): 478–495.
5. Tobin, J., 1970. On Limiting the Domain of Inequality. The Journal of Law and Economics, 13 (2): 263–277.
6. Holmstrom, B., and Milgrom, P., 1991. Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7 (Spring): 25–51.
7. Dicke, L.A., and Ott, J.S., 1999. Public Agency Accountability in Human Services Contracting. Public Productivity and Management Review, 22 (4): 502–516.
8. An anonymous referee contributed this insight
9. Ott, J.S., and Dicke, L.A., 2000. Important But Largely Unanswered Questions About Accountability in Contracted Public Human Services. International Journal of Organizational Theory and Behavior, 3 (3&4): 283–317.
10. They also identify an operational definition of accountability as “answerability for adherence to the terms of contracts and for judicious use of public funds” (p. 288)
11. While issues of accountability within the public sector are also very important, they are beyond the scope of the paper
12. Rosen, H., 1999. Public Fina nce Boston: Irwin/McGraw-Hill. 5th Edition
13. Halachmi, A., 1996. Franchising in Government: Can a Principal-Agent Perspective be the First Step Toward the Development of a Theory?. Policy Studies Journal, 24 (4): 478–495.
14. Ott, J.S., and Dicke, L.A., 2000. Important But Largely Unanswered Questions About Accountability in Contracted Public Human Services. International Journal of Organizational Theory and Behavior, 3 (3&4): 283–317.
15. Easley, D., and O'Hara, M., 1983. The Economic Role of the Nonprofit Firm. Bell Journal of Economics, 14: 531–538.
16. Easley, D., and O'Hara, M., 1988. Contracts and Asymmetric Information in the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 9: 229–246.
17. Easley; O'Hara (1988) provide the example of for-profit hospitals that enter into constrained-profit contracts for the treatment of Medicare patients, but may engage in standard for-profit contracts with other patients
18. Holmstrom, B., and Milgrom, P., 1991. Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7 (Spring): 25–51.
19. Halachmi, A., 1996. Franchising in Government: Can a Principal-Agent Perspective be the First Step Toward the Development of a Theory?. Policy Studies Journal, 24 (4): 478–495.
20. Holmstrom, B., and Milgrom, P., 1991. Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7 (Spring): 25–51.
21. Ott, J.S., and Dicke, L.A., 2000. Important But Largely Unanswered Questions About Accountability in Contracted Public Human Services. International Journal of Organizational Theory and Behavior, 3 (3&4): 283–317.
22. Holmstrom, B., and Milgrom, P., 1991. Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7 (Spring): 25–51.
23. There are risks associated with both the randomness of asset returns and from errors in measuring output (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992)
24. Holmstrom and Milgrom control for risk aversion that influences the decision in the same way as the other two parameters
25. Milgrom, P., and Roberts, J., 1992. Economics, Organization, and Management Inglewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
26. Anderson, E., and Schmittlein, D., 1983. Integration of the Sales Force: An Empirical Examination. Rand Journal of Economics, 15 (3): 385–95. The study cited by Holmstrom and Milgrom is
27. Milgrom, P., and Roberts, J., 1992. Economics, Organization, and Management 311Inglewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
28. Ott, J.S., and Dicke, L.A., 2000. Important But Largely Unanswered Questions About Accountability in Contracted Public Human Services. International Journal of Organizational Theory and Behavior, 3 (3&4): 283–317.
29. Ott, J.S., and Dicke, L.A., 2000. Important But Largely Unanswered Questions About Accountability in Contracted Public Human Services. International Journal of Organizational Theory and Behavior, 3 (3&4): 301
30. Baker, G.; Gibbons, R.; Murphy, K. Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm 1999. Harvard Business School Working Paper, p. 1
31. Baker, G.; Gibbons, R.; Murphy, K. Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm 1999. Harvard Business School Working Paper
32. Milgrom, P., and Roberts, J., 1992. Economics, Organization, and Management Inglewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
33. Dicke, L.A., and Ott, J.S., 1999. Public Agency Accountability in Human Services Contracting. Public Productivity and Management Review, 22 (4): 502–516.
34. Hackett, S.; Wiggns, S.; Battalio, R. The Endogenous Choice Between Contracts and Firms: An Experimental Study of Institutional Choice 1993, Texas A&M Department of Economics Working Paper no. 93-07
35. Hackett, S.; Wiggns, S.; Battalio, R. The Endogenous Choice Between Contracts and Firms: An Experimental Study of Institutional Choice 1993, Texas A&M Department of Economics Working Paper no., p. 2
36. Hackett, S.; Wiggns, S.; Battalio, R. The Endogenous Choice Between Contracts and Firms: An Experimental Study of Institutional Choice 1993, Texas A&M Department of Economics Working Paper no., p. 2 and p. 3
37. Rosen, H., 1999. Public Finance Boston: Irwin/McGraw-Hill. 5th Edition
38. See Hackett et al. (1993) and Milgrom and Roberts (1992)