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1
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0141597607
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Oxford, Oxford University Press) for a detailed discussion of different accounts of well-being. Here it is argued that an experientialist account — a type of qualified mental state theory — is superior to desire and perfectionist (“objective property”) accounts
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Mark Bernstein (1998) On Moral Considerability: (Oxford, Oxford University Press) for a detailed discussion of different accounts of well-being. Here it is argued that an experientialist account — a type of qualified mental state theory — is superior to desire and perfectionist (“objective property”) accounts.
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(1998)
On Moral Considerability
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Bernstein, M.1
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2
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85037734657
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There he argues that most of us do not sacrifice nearly enough to satisfy morality’s dictates. Our disagreement is that, perhaps, we ought not to deprive ourselves quite to the level suggested by Singer (i.e., to the point of marginal utility). But this is because such extreme self-denial would in most cases be self-defeating: we would not lower the levels of suffering and death due to famine as much as we otherwise could
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Peter Singer (1972) Famine, affluence, and morality Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1. There he argues that most of us do not sacrifice nearly enough to satisfy morality’s dictates. Our disagreement is that, perhaps, we ought not to deprive ourselves quite to the level suggested by Singer (i.e., to the point of marginal utility). But this is because such extreme self-denial would in most cases be self-defeating: we would not lower the levels of suffering and death due to famine as much as we otherwise could.
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(1972)
Famine, Affluence, and Morality Philosophy and Public Affairs
, vol.1
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Singer, P.1
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3
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0003740191
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(Oxford, Oxford University Press). Parfit treats “coordination problems” differently. He believes that in these situations we should abandon CA as the guiding consequentialist principle and endorse, instead, CR, or an analogue of CR
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Derek Parfit (1984) Reasons and Persons (Oxford, Oxford University Press). Parfit treats “coordination problems” differently. He believes that in these situations we should abandon CA as the guiding consequentialist principle and endorse, instead, CR, or an analogue of CR.
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(1984)
Reasons and Persons
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Parfit, D.1
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4
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85037735053
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Jonathan Dancy (ed), Reading Parfit (Oxford, Oxford University Press)
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Frank Jackson (1998) which effects? in Jonathan Dancy (ed), Reading Parfit (Oxford, Oxford University Press)
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(1998)
Which Effects?
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Jackson, F.1
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