The difficult journey of democratization in Indonesia

Contemporary Southeast Asia

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 307-326

  Hara, Abubakar E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF JEMBER   (Indonesia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84937334568     PISSN: 0129797X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1355/CS23-2G     Document Type: Article

References (44)

1. Political analysts usually differentiate between the transition to democracy and consolidation of democracy. Transition occurs when a non-democratic regime is replaced by a democratic regime through a fair and free general election, while consolidation includes a period in which democratic values start to spread and become part of the culture and daily life of the people in the country in question. See, for example, Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracy”, in The Changing Nature of Democracy, edited by Takashi Inoguchi, Edward Newman, and John Keane (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1998), pp. 48–68.
2. For further information about Forum Demokrasi (Fordem), see Muhammad A.S. Hikam, “Non-Governmental Organizations and the Empowerment of Civil Society”, in Indonesia: The Challenge of Change, edited by Richard W. Baker et al. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), pp. 224–26.
3. Kompas, 12 January 2001.
4. By “minimal conditions” Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan say this means that the state has to be able to run fair and free general elections, to protect its citizens based on the rule of law, and to guarantee that the winner of the election has the authority to govern. See Linz and Stepan, op. cit., p. 49.
5. Doh Chull Shin, “On the Third Wave of Democratization, a Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research”, World Politics 47 (October 1994): 143.
6. Ibid. See also, Georg Sørensen, Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 24–63; and Linz and Stepan, op. cit., pp. 48–-51.
7. Quoted in Sørensen, op. cit., p. 40.
8. Quoted in Sørensen, op. cit., p. 28.
9. Larry Diamond, “The Global State of Democracy”, Current History 99, no. 641 (December 2000): 414.
10. This is Adam Przeworski’s view, as quoted in Steven L. Solnick, “Russia’s ‘Transition’: Is Democracy Delayed Democracy Denied?”, Social Research, Fall 1999.
11. Larry Diamond uses “uncivic society” to explain the condition of democracy in Nigeria, meaning a growing “culture of self-interest, fragmentation, exploitation, cynicism, dishonesty, and distrust” among the people and élite groups in a society. He uses the term “the uncivic society” to contrast it with the idea of “civic community” developed by Robert Putman. For Putman, the “civic community” is a political culture and social structure which develops good “horizontal relations of reciprocity and co-operation” that breed “honesty, trust, and law abidingness”. See Larry Diamond, “Nigeria: The Uncivic Society and Descent into Praetorianism”, in Politics in Developing Countries, Comparing Experiences with Democracy, edited by Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (Boulder, London: Lyne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p. 418.
12. The term “democratic reversals” means a breakdown of a newly democratic regime followed by the installation of military authorities or civilian autocracy. See Diamond, “The Global State of Democracy”, p. 413.
13. The term “democratic reversals” means a breakdown of a newly democratic regime followed by the installation of military authorities or civilian autocracy. See Diamond, “The Global State of Democracy”, p. 414.
14. Alfred P. Montero, “Review Essay: Assessing the Third Wave Democracies”, Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 40, no. 2 (1998): 119–20.
15. Terms used by Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl, as quoted by Solnick, op. cit.
16. Linz and Stepan, op. cit., p. 49.
17. Montero mentions that the learning process has been one important factor in building democracy in Southern Europe. Similarly, Brazil was considered a case of failure in maintaining democracy in the mid-1990s. However, for Montero, the impeachment of President Fernando Collor de Mello in 1992, “may be read both as a low point for Brazilian politics and an event that strengthened Brazilian democracy for the long haul”. See Montero, op. cit., p. 120.
18. The idea of negara integralistik (integralist state) was introduced by Supomo in the formation of the Indonesian Constitution in 1945. In Supomo’s view, people (individuals) and state are integrated with each other. See Marsillam Simanjuntak, Pandangan Negara Integralistik: Sumber, Unsur dan Riwayatnya dalam Persiapan UUD 1945 [The View of the Integralistic State: Sources, Elements and Its History in the Preparation of 1945 Constitution] (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1994), p. ii. According to Richard Robison, the main features of the organic or integralist state are “its functional concept of social structure and organization and its view of the state as transcending particular vested interests within society but embodying its common interests”. See Richard Robison, “Indonesia: Trends in State and Regime”, in Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism, edited by Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison and Gary Rodan (St. Leonard, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1993), p. 42.
19. The United States, as the leading liberal democratic country, promotes the growth of democracy in the world notably by supporting democracy movements. When the movements are able to topple authoritarian governments, the United States, then promotes the conduct of a fair and free general election as the main hallmark of the democratization process. See Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy”, Foreign Affairs 76, no. 6 (1997).
20. An Australian academic, Jamie Mackie, for example, judged that the election was “amazingly free, fair and not very violent”. See J.A.C. Mackie, “Opening Address”, in Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis, edited by Chris Manning and Peter van Diermen (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), p. xxii.
21. ht t p: //www. f reedomhouse. or g/research/f reeworl d/2000/count ryrat i ngs/ indonesia.htm, viewed on 17 February 2001.
22. The mechanism to allocate the seats for the Members of Parliament (the House of Representatives), as Anthony Smith outlined, was as follows: “The number of seats a party receives will be determined by the number of votes it obtains in each province. Once the number of members for a given party is determined, based on its proportion of the vote for a given province, the central committee of that party then decides who should be chosen to sit in the DPR. Theoretically (and according to electoral law) this should be done with consideration to reward those who polled highest and to give representation to every district. However, this could not be achieved in practice. It is possible for a candidate to ‘win’ a district seat but fail to be selected for the DPR.” See Anthony L. Smith, “Indonesia: Transforming the Leviathan”, in Governments and Politics in Southeast Asia, edited by John Funston (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, forthcoming).
23. The general election model was originally designed by Team Seven appointed by the Ministry of Domestic Affairs to prepare the 1999 election. The Team, consisting mainly of academics, was finally able to mix the proportional and district systems into one system.
24. Among the new political parties, which had significant voices in the debate at that time were PAN, PDI-P and PKB, while the old political parties were those in the DPR, such as PDI, PPP, and Golkar.
25. See Kompas, 2 June 1998, and 28 October 1998.
26. By the end of March 2001, a government team had finished a revised proposal for various political laws, including those related to the general election, political parties, and the legislative body, and attempted to convey this proposal to society. The proposed laws promote the district system, a bicameral Parliament, a direct presidential election, and an axing of allocated seats for the military to allow for the election of all seats in Parliament.
27. Some academics and DPR members even suggest the formation of a DPR ethical body to monitor and check the behaviour of MPs.
28. The process of amending the 1945 Constitution was started by the MPR Ad Hoc Committee I, formed in October 1999. Although it has not come to any conclusions on important issues such as the political process, there have been two sets of amendments to the Constitution. However, after the annual MPR session in August 2000, the debate on the amendment was suddenly curtailed owing to protests by those who felt that there had been limited discussions on the amendments. The MPR Ad Hoc Committee I then formed a group of experts from various academic backgrounds to help draft the next set of amendments. The President also formed a Constitution Board to amend the 1945 Constitution. However, instead of amending that Constitution, these newly formed institutions proposed to draft a new constitution. Therefore, it seems that Indonesia is still a long way from settling its constitutional arrangements. For the full text of the second amendment of the 1945 Constitution, see the Kompas homepage at http://www.kompas.com/liputan/stmpr/news/0008/06/uud1.htm.
29. In the New Order period, more than half of the 1,000 MPR members were appointed. Only 425 out of 500 DPR members were elected in general elections, while the remaining 75 members were allocated to the military. All 500 DPR members sat in the MPR, but were supplemented by 500 hand-picked appointees. After the 1999 elec-tions, the weightings in the MPR changed. The 500 members of the DPR (including 35 military appointees) are now supplemented by 200 others for the MPR session. Unlike in Soeharto’s time, most of these 200 are regional representatives rather than partisan appointees. The Constitution does not specify the weighting of the propor-tions in the MPR.
30. Other pro-reform leaders, such as Amien Rais, attempted to support limited changes to the system, but his most popular proposal was only to limit the presidential term in office. He also talked about the need to limit the power of the President, which he thought was too excessive. However, he did not have a new proposal, but only attempted to accommodate and complete the existing political system applied by Soeharto under the 1945 Constitution.
31. One of the advantages of a parliamentary system is that it can overcome crisis in the government when the leading executive, the Prime Minister, has lost his/her cred-ibility. He/she can be simply removed from power by a party motion. Whereas in a presidential system, such a mechanism does not exist and opposition parties usually have to wait until the President finishes his/her fixed term in office or go through a lengthy and supremely difficult legal proceeding. See, for example, articles in Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives, 2 vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).
32. David Bourchier, “The 1950s in New Order Ideology and Politics”, in Democracy in Indonesia 1950s and 1990s, edited by David Bourchier and John Legge (Clayton, Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1994), pp. 50–62.
33. Robert Cribb, “Nation: Making Indonesia”, in Indonesia Beyond Suharto, Polity, Economy, Society Transition, edited by Donald K. Emmerson (Armonk, New York, London: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 37.
34. Marcus Mietzner, “The 1999 General Session: Wahid, Megawati and the Fight for the Presidency”, in Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis, edited by Chris Manning and Peter van Diermen (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), p. 47.
35. The Central Axis (Poros Tengah) is a loose coalition of Islamic parties formed prior to and during the October 1999 MPR General Session to support Gus Dur as the President. It consisted of the PPP, PAN, the PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang or Moon and Star Party) and the PK (Partai Keadilan or Justice Party). It was joined by Wahid’s own party, the PKB, and a large element of Golkar, to deliver the presidency to Gus Dur.
36. Ali Masykur Musa, a young PKB politician, and MPR Secretary General in a seminar held by Jember University, East Java, on 6–7 January 2001, stated plainly that the system now is a presidential and not a parliamentary system. He disregarded the fact that Gus Dur was chosen by MPR (Parliament) members.
37. Jawa Pos reported that the replacement of nineteen ministers was an exceptional record befitting a place in the Indonesian Record Museum (Musium Rekor Indonesia – MURI in Semarang). The number was enough to form a new Cabinet. The ministers fired by the President have also become Gus Dur’s leading political opponents. See Jawa Pos, 17 March 2001.
38. Kompas, 21 February 2001; and R. William Liddle, “Tiga Observasi Sederhana [Three Simple Observations]”, Kompas, 25 April 2001.
39. “View from the Top, Parliament, the Constitution, and the Future, as seen from the Presidential Palace: Greg Barton interviews President Abdurrahman Wahid”, Inside Indonesia, October–December 2000.
40. The current government in Indonesia inherited a political system, which had often been rhetorically said to be based on consensus and stability. Such a “consensus” was actually achieved by privileging government policies and by eliminating political opponents whose interests and voices were potentially against those of the government. To appease further these dissenting voices, the New Order military-backed government discredited these voices as threatening the stability, and development programmes for the country, and even Pancasila as the national ideology. These different voices were accused of being promoted by extreme-left or right groups. By engineering the consensus, the government did not actually solve problems in society, but turned them into assumptions of bigger threats to the nation, such as political stability and/or communism. Many political and social problems are still there and might erupt into open conflicts in the future.
41. Straits Times (Singapore), 29 January 2001.
42. Radio Netherlands’ interview with Chairul Anam, one of the PKB leaders, 7 February 2001.
43. Straits Times (Singapore), 21 February 2001.
44. http://satunet.com/artikel/isi/00/06/30/19479.html, viewed on 23 April 2001.