National security and malay unity: The issue of radical religious elements in Malaysia

Contemporary Southeast Asia

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 261-282

  Abdullah, Kamarulnizam ^a  

^a UNIVERSITI KEBANGSAAN MALAYSIA   (Malaysia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84937331511     PISSN: 0129797X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1355/CS21-2F     Document Type: Article

References (64)

1. Anwar-il-Haq Ahady, “The Decline of Islamic Fundamentalism”, Journal of Asian and African Studies, no. 3-4 (1992): 229-43.
2. See G.H. Jansen, Militant Islam (Pan Books, 1979), p. 17.
3. Deen (faith); Dunya (the temporal world); Dawla (state, the political).
4. The word dakwah is loosely used in the Malaysian context. Originally, dakwah came from the Arabic word da’wa, which is derived from the roots da’a, meaning “to call” or “to invite”, that is, the duty of Muslims to call mankind to Islam.
5. See Barry Buzan, “People, State, and Fear: The National Security in the Third World”, in National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats, edited by Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited for Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 1988); Caroline Thomas, “Third World Security”, in International Security in the Modern World, edited by Roger Carey and Trever C. Salmon (London and New York: Macmillan Press and St. Martins Press, 1996); and Muthiah Alagappa, The National Security of Developing States: Lessons from Thailand (Auburn House, 1987).
6. See Barry Buzan, People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 105.
7. See Caroline Thomas, “Third World Security and Western Concept: On an Unhappy Marriage and the Need for a Divorce”, in The State and Stability in the South, edited by Caroline Thomas and P. Saravanamuttu (Macmillan Press, 1989), p. 177.
8. The Federal Constitution of Malaysia, Article 160.
9. See Sharifah Zaleha binte Syed Hassan, “Beyond Orthodoxy: Religious Reforms and Legitimacy in Malaysia”, Ilmu Masyarakat, no. 25(194/95): 85-108; and also Firdaus Haji Abdullah, Radical Malay Politics: Its Origin and Early Development (Pelanduk Publications, 1985).
10. Mohamad Abu Bakar, “Islam and Nationalism in Contemporary Malay Society”, in Islam and Society in Southeast Asia, edited by Taufik Abdullah and Sharon Siddique (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986), p. 156.
11. William Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, second edition (Oxford University Press, 1994 [1967]), p. 58.
12. Muhammad Syukri Salleh, “An Ethical Approach to Development: The Arqam Philosophy and Achievements”, Humanomics 10, no. 1(1994): 25-60.
13. This position is reflected under Article 3(1) of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia, which stipulates that “Islam is the religion of the Federation; but other religions may be practised in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation.”
14. “Islamist”, in this article, refers to individuals or groups of individuals who advocate a submission to the teachings of Islam, from personal etiquette to the system of governance.
15. See Berita Harian (Malaysia), Internet edition, 3 July 1997.
16. It is interesting to note that ABIM at this time appeared to be less vocal since the co-optation of Anwar into UMNO.
17. See an article entitled, “Reformasi: Tuntutan dan Amanah”, in Harakah (official newspaper of PAS), 8 January 1999.
18. What the federal government has planned is to streamline syariah law and to transfer it to its jurisdiction. The Conference of Rulers held on 31 July 1997, gave the federal government the green light to pursue the plan (Berita Harian, Internet edition, 1 August 1997).
19. Straits Times, 3 September 1998.
20. Harakah, 11 January 1999.
21. See also Jomo and Ahmeed Shabery, “Malaysia’s Islamic Movements”, in Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia, edited by Joel S. Kahn and Francis Loh Kok Wah (Asian Studies Association in association with Allen & Unwin, 1992).
22. The coalition party, or Parti Perikatan, consisted of UMNO, MCA, and MIC.
23. See the Federal Government of Malaysia, White Paper on Threat to Muslim Unity and National Security (1984), p. 5
24. After PAS was badly defeated in the 1978 federal elections, cracks began to appear among party stalwarts. Some party members expressed their reservations about the leadership’s ability, led by Dato’ Asri, in handling the party’s affairs. Nationally, PAS was split between the “old guard” leadership … struggling to retain power against the competition of the party’s largely Arabic educated and Islamic fundamentalist “Young Turk’…” (See D. Mauzy, Coalition Government in Malaysia [Marican & Sons, 1983], pp. 130-31). By 1981, tension between the two camps became intense. As a result, Dato’ Asri “was forced” to resign prior to the general election in 1982 and formed a party called Berjasa. He was replaced by Haji Yusuf Rawa who was considered to be moderate and accepted by the Young Turk camp. What was interesting was that those identified as the Young Turks, such as Haji Abdul Hadi, Fadhil Noor and Haji Nakhaei (who later joined UMNO) were in fact the products of ABIM. They decided not to follow Anwar Ibrahim’s steps by joining UMNO, but rather believed that Islam was best served by joining PAS.
25. Haji Hadi Awang received his education from the pondok system (traditional religious boarding school) before continuing his studies at University of Medina and Al-Azhar University. His oratorical skills and fluency in Arabic attracted hundreds of people to attend his weekly morning Friday lectures at his hometown in Rusila, Terengganu.
26. White Paper on Threat to Muslim Unity…, p. 10.
27. See A.C Milner, “Rethinking Islamic Fundamentalism in Malaysia”, Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs 20, no 2 (1986): 48-75.
28. See Halim Mahmood, PAS Pimpinan Baru [New PAS Leadership] (Hafar, 1983), p. 29
29. A.C Milner, op cit., p. 59.
30. See a report by Biro Agama [Religious Bureau] UMNO Malaysia (n. d.), pp. 10-11.
31. See a report by Biro Agama [Religious Bureau] UMNO Malaysia (n. d.), The Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) in its 27 August 1992 edition reported that at least 200 couples dissolved their marriage.
32. FEER, 27 August 1982; and 3 March 1983.
33. Biro Agama [Religious Bureau] UMNO Malaysia (n. d.), p. 9
34. The incident was also reported in Malacca; FEER, 8 May 1986.
35. White Paper on Threat to Muslim Unity…, p.2.
36. See Foreword, White Paper on Threat to Muslim Unity…., pp. iii-iv.
37. See Foreword, White Paper on Threat to Muslim Unity, p. 6.
38. See Foreword, White Paper on Threat to Muslim Unity, p. 2.
39. S. Barraclough, “The Dynamics of Coercion in the Malaysian Political Process”, Modern Asian Studies 19, no. 4 (1985): 803.
40. He was an alumnus of the Higher Islamic Studies Centre at Nilam Puri Kelantan. He continued his studies, first at Jamaliah College in Madras, and then at Darul Ulum, Deoband, Uttar Pradesh, India, where he obtained a degree in Islamic Studies. He took another degree in syariah’ at Al-Azhar University, Cairo, Egypt. He was also known as Ibrahim Libya because he once studied to obtain a diploma in Islamic dakwah (mission) in Tripoli, Libya, between 1973 and 1974. He worked as a missionary financed by the Libyan government and was attached to the Religious Division, Prime Minister’s Department (also known as Pusat Islam). Subsequently he returned to Memali, his home village to open a pondok (religious school).
41. A warrant of arrest was first issued on Ibrahim Mahmood in September 1984. However, the operation was halted when some 100 of his followers, armed with sharpened bamboos, blocked the way leading to his house. The police also attempted to persuade Ibrahim Mahmood to surrender through his parents and closest friends but to no avail. The police were even threatened by PAS supporters in Memali. Prior to the incident, angry PAS supporters blocked and hijacked a convoy of police cars and vans. Among the passengers was the Baling Police Chief, OCPD Tunku Muzaffar Shah Tunku Ibrahim. They demanded the return of parangs (machetes) confiscated by the police weeks earlier. To avoid an ugly incident, the police returned the parangs. For further information, refer to the Federal Government of Malaysia, White Paper on the Memali Incident 21 (1986), pp.10-11.
42. White Paper on the Memali Incident 21 (1986), pp. 6-7.
43. White Paper on the Memali Incident 21 (1986), p.7.
44. White Paper on the Memali Incident 21 (1986), p. 22.
45. FEER, 5 December 1985.
46. Interview, Kuala Lumpur, 6 June 1996.
47. White Paper on the Memali Incident, pp. v-vi.
48. See the New Straits Times, 4 September 1994.
49. For details on the Aurad Muhammadiah, refer to Ashaari Muhammad, Aurad Muhammadiah Pegangan Darul Arqam (Penerangan Al-Arqam, 1986). For a counter-argument, refer to Penyelewengan Al-Arqam dari Ajaran Islam (Jabatan Hal Ehwal Agama Islam Negeri Kedah Darul Aman, 1994)
50. Interview, Kuala Lumpur, 24 May 1996
51. Utusan Malaysia, 6 August 1994
52. Interview.
53. New Straits Times, 19 August 1994
54. Interview with Professor Dr Zakaria Haji Ahmad, Head of Strategic and Security Studies Unit, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi, 28 April 1996.
55. Sharifah Zaleha, “Beyond Orthodoxy”, p. 93.
56. Sharifah Zaleha, “Beyond Orthodoxy”, p. 94
57. In a letter to the New Straits Times editor, which was published on 25 June 1996, Surapong Posayanond, the Thai ambassador to Malaysia denied the allegation that his government had provided training and logistical facilities for the so-called Tentera Badr.
58. Utusan Malaysia, 16 July 1994.
59. See the International Herald Tribune, 15 October 1996.
60. See Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation (Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 72.
61. J. Nagata, The Reflowering of Malaysian Islam: Modern Religious Radicals and their Roots (University of British Columbia Press, 1984), p. xxii.
62. UMNO membership in 1996, according to the then Secretary, was 2,667,459 (Star, Internet edition, 11 October 1996).
63. The Economist, 10 September 1994.
64. See Harold Crouch, “Authoritarian Trends, the UMNO Split and the Limits to State Power”, in Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia, edited by S. Kahn and Francis Loh Kok Wah (Asian Studies of Australia in association with Allen & Unwin), pp. 23-24.