China and the nuclear non-proliferation regime

Contemporary Southeast Asia

Volumn 22, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 445-478

  Malik, J Mohan ^a  

^a DEAKIN UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84937329215     PISSN: 0129797X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1355/CS22-3B     Document Type: Article

References (87)

1. See the works of A. L. Hsieh, Communist China’s Strategy in Nuclear Era (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962); M. H. Halperin and D. H. Perkins, Communist China and Arms Control (London: Praeger, 1965); O. R. Young, “Chinese Views on the Spread of Nuclear Weapons”, and J. Stone, “Arms Control: Can China Be Ignored,” in Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, Vol. II, Report to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1966); J. D. Pollack, “Chinese Attitudes Toward Nuclear Weapons, 1964–69”, China Quarterly, no. 50 (April–June 1972); and H. Gelber, Nuclear Weapons and Chinese Policy, Adelphi Papers, No. 99 (London: IISS, Summer 1973).
2. Hsieh, op. cit.; Mark Ryan, Chinese Attitudes Toward Nuclear Weapons: China and the United States during the Korean War (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1989).
3. Xie Yixian, Zhongguo Waijiaoshi 1949/1979 [A Diplomatic History of China] (Zhengzhou: Henan People’s Press, 1988), p. 303; and Mingquan Zhu, “The Evolution of China’s Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy”, Nonproliferation Review 4, no. 2 (Winter 1997).
4. For details, see Gerald Segal, The Great Power Triangle (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1982), pp. 129–31.
5. Renmin Ribao, 13 June 1968, p. 1; and SIPRI Yearbook 1968–69, p. 159.
6. For a detailed analysis of this period, see Chi Chiang Hu, “Arms Control Policy of the People’s Republic of China 1949–1978” (Ph.D. thesis, Balliol College, Oxford, 1984), p. 151.
7. “On Disarmament”, Hongqi, 1 June 1980, p. 47.
8. Peking Review, 2 June 1978, pp. 7–9. Emphasis added.
9. K. N. Ramachandran, “China and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Issue”, IDSA Journal (New Delhi), No. 1 (July–September 1980), p. 98.
10. C. Van Doren and R. Jones, China & Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Two Perspectives, PPNN Occasional Paper Number Three (University of Southampton, July 1989), p. 13.
11. nd Session, Serial No. 98-148, 16 May 1984), pp. 20–21.
12. L. S. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), pp. 316–19.
13. Statement made by Wang Shu to the 27th General Conference of the IAEA, 11 October 1983, Record of the IAEA, 27th Session, 1983. Emphasis added.
14. Statement made by Wang Shu to the 27th General Conference of the IAEA, 11 October 1983, Record of the IAEA, 27th Session, 1983. Emphasis added. See also Wu Xiuquan, in Non-Proliferation: The Why and the Wherefore, edited by J. Goldblat (SIPRI: Taylor & Francis, 1985), pp. 41–55.
15. “Zhao’s Nonproliferation Stand seen as Path to US Aid Pact”, Washington Post, 13 January 1984, p. 1.
16. L. H. Gelb, “US Aides Suspect Continuing Chinese Nuclear Aid to Pakistan”, International Herald Tribune (hereafter cited as IHT), 24 June 1984, pp. 1–2.
17. Xinhua News Bulletin, 19 January 1985, pp. 35–36.
18. L. S. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988), pp. 73, 344.
19. Statement of Zhou Ping in 7 IAEA Bulletin (Winter 1985), p. 59.
20. These guidelines (announced in 1978) for nuclear transfers, though not legally binding, include commitments to require IAEA safeguards on exports; to obtain promises of peaceful use and other assurances for nuclear exports on a government-to-government basis; and to exercise restraint in the transfer of sensitive reprocessing, or enrichment technology, or equipment. See L. A. Dunn, “The Emerging Nuclear Suppliers: Some Guidelines for Policy”, CISA Working Paper No. 61 (UCLA, February 1988), p. 6.
21. Spector, op. cit., p. 74. Italics mine. Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. A. Q. Khan, in an interview claimed that Sino-Pakistani nuclear accord covered “all nuclear activities”, that is, military nuclear activities as well. See “China May Help Build Pakistan’s N. Bomb”, Financial Times, 29 September 1986, p. 5.
22. Jane’s Defence Weekly, 11 March 1989, p. 10.
23. Cited from Van Doren and Jones, op. cit., p. 31.
24. R. D. V. Sismanidis, “Chinese Security as Asia Evolves: Constraints and Ambiguities”, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 15, no. 2, (Summer 1996): 63–80, 72–73.
25. “China: Arms Control and Disarmament,” Beijing Review 38, no. 46 (1995): p. 18.
26. China claims to have not joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) so far “due to historical reasons”. Sha Zukang, “China’s Stand on Non-Proliferation”, Beijing Review, 8–14 February 1999, pp. 6–9.
27. Information here is based on Center for Nonproliferation Studies, China and Proliferation: Encouraging Developments and Continuing Concerns (Monterey Institute of International Studies, CNS Projects: EANP Factsheets, April 1999).
28. Associated Press, 23 July 1998.
29. See responses to questions for the record, dated 10 May 1996, from J. Moseman, Director, Congressional Affairs, CIA, in Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States and Its Interests Abroad (Washington, DC: GPO, 22 February 1996), p. 75. Italics mine.
30. Testimony of P. Leventhal, President, Nuclear Control Institute on “China Trade Policy” presented to the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection Committee on Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, 14 May 1998.
31. See E. Ahrari, “Sino–Indian Nuclear Perspectives”, Jane’s Intelligence Review (hereafter cited as JIR), August 1998, p. 33; and Mohan Malik, “Nuclear Proliferation in Asia–The China Factor”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 53 no.1, (April 1999): pp. 31–34.
32. The information here draws on S. Doll, “China’s Record of Proliferation Misbehavior”, Issue Brief, Nuclear Control Institute, Washington, 29 September 1997.
33. B. Gertz, “China Aids Pakistani Plutonium Plant,” Washington Times, 3 April 1996, p. A4; and G. Milhollin and G. White, “A New China Syndrome: China’s Arms Bazaar,” Washington Post, 12 May 1991, pp. C1, C4.
34. In return, Pakistan has shared with China advanced conventional and nuclear technology that it acquired from the West. Pakistan is also a major buyer of Chinese conventional weaponry and the Chinese navy enjoys privileged access to its naval bases in the Arabian Sea. Pakistan reportedly shared with China the stolen gas centrifuge nuclear technology from Holland. The acquisition of the unexploded US Tomahawk cruise missile fired against Osama bin Laden’s camps in August 1998, which accidentally landed in Pakistan, by the Chinese is another example of the mutually beneficial arms relationship
35. R. Windrem, “China gave Pakistan design data, training and nuclear material”, Indian Express, 9 June 1999, p. 1.
36. See J. Garver, “Nuclear Weapons and the China–India Relationship”, Paper presented at the conference on “South Asia’s Nuclear Dilemma”, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 18–19 February 1999; T. Weiner, “US and Chinese Aid Was Essential as Pakistan Built Bomb,” International Herald Tribune (IHT), 2 June 1998, p. 1; “Atom Arms Parts Sold to Pakistan by China, US Says,” New York Times, 8 February 1996, p. Al.
37. For a confirmation of Chinese supplies of ballistic missiles to Pakistan, see Chinese ambassador to the USA, Zhu Qizhen’s address to the National Press Club, Washington DC, Reuters Transcript Report (27 June 1991), cited in J. Wilson and Hua Di, “China’s Ballistic Missile Program”, International Security 17, no. 2 (Fall 1992): 37; and D. Lennox, “Control Regimes Fail to Stem the Spread,” JIR (September 1999), pp. 50–54.
38. R. J. Smith, “China Linked to Pakistani Missile Plant”, Washington Post, 25 August 1996, p. 1.
39. S. Gupta, “2,400 km-range Shaheen II to be ready within a year”, Hindustan Times, 27 September 1999, p. 1; “India Says China has sent Missiles to Pakistan”, Reuters wire story, 7 August 1997. See also J. Smith and D. Ottaway, “Spy Photos Suggest China Missile Trade”, Washington Post, 3 July 1995, p. Al.
40. “US says Pakistan has full Chinese missile system”, Reuters, 14 September 1999, www.cnn.com.asianow 14 September 1999; R. J. Smith, “Spy Photos Suggest China Missile Trade,” Washington Post, 3 July 1995, p. 1; and G. Milhollin, “China Cheats (What a Surprise!)”, New York Times, 24 April 1997, p. A35.
41. Reuters, “Missiles ‘supplied to Pakistan’,” South China Morning Post, 15 September 1999; and “State Department: US Won’t Punish China on Missiles”, Inside China Today, 16 September 1999.
42. M. Hibbs, “No US Agency Consensus on DPRK Nuclear Progress”, Nucleonics Week, 6 January 1994, p. 10.
43. L. Spector et al., Tracking Nuclear Proliferation (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), p. 49.
44. B. Gertz, “China Still Shipping Arms Despite Pledges”, Washington Times, 15 April 1999, p. 1. Beijing is reported to have diverted U.S.-manufactured equipment to Pakistan’s National Development Centre by disguising the shipment in export documents as “Masada Cookware”. J. S. Bermudez, Jr, “DPRK–Pakistan Ghauri Missile Cooperation,” Federation of American Scientists (FAS), 12 August 1998,
45. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington D.C.: Department of Defence, 1996), p. 14.
46. China exports over US$60 million worth of nuclear technology to Iran annually. C. Coughlin, “U.S. Sounds Alarm Over Iran Nuclear Threat”, Sunday Telegraph (London), 23 February 1997, p. 24.
47. K. Timmerman, “Tehran’s A-Bomb Program Shows Startling Progress”, Washington Times, 8 May 1995, p. 1.
48. Representative T. Lantos, “Chinese Ballistic Missile Sales”, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights, House Foreign Affairs Committee, 20 May 1993, p. 4; Senate Hearings on “Weapons Proliferation in China”, International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 10 April 1997; B. Gertz, “China Sold Iran Missile Technology”, Washington Times, 21 November 1996, p. A1. China has transferred short-range CSS-8 ballistic missiles to Iran.
49. B. Opall, “US Queries China on Iran: Fears Transfer of Missile Technology”, Defense News, 19–25 June 1995, p. 1.
50. R. Einhorn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Non-proliferation, Testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on International Security, reported in “State Dept. Revises Report on China’s Arms Sales to Iran”, Washington Times, 15 April 1997, p. A3.
51. M. Yost, “China’s Deadly Trade in the Mideast”, Wall Street Journal, 4 December 1996, p. A18.
52. T. Kelsey, “Chinese Arms Dealers Flaunt UN Embargo–China Ships Vital Nuclear Cargo to Iraq”, Sunday Independent (London), 30 September 1990, reprinted in Congressional Record, 18 October 1990, p. H10531.
53. Proliferation: Chinese Case Studies, Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Security Proliferation, and Federal Services of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 105th Congress, 1st Session, 10 April 1997, p. 8, 12.
54. S. A. Kan, “Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief 92056, Current Policy Issues, 1 June 1998.
55. The actual U.S.–China Nuclear Co-operation agreement had been signed in 1985, but no co-operation had occurred under the agreement as of January 1998, primarily because of concerns over China’s proliferation activities.
56. B. Gellman and J. Pomfret, “US Action Stymied China Sale to Iran”, Washington Post, 13 March 1998; and B. Gertz, “China in New Nuclear Sales Effort”, Washington Times, 13 March 1998, p. 1.
57. Cited from Testimony of P. Leventhal, President, Nuclear Control Institute on “China Trade Policy”, presented to the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection Committee on Commerce, US House of Representatives, 14 May 1998.
58. Zhu, “The Evolution of China’s Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy”, 1997; and A. I. Johnston, “Learning versus Adaptation,” China Journal 35 (January 1996).
59. The official Chinese reaction remains typical. As Shen Guofang, a Foreign Ministry spokesman, said soon after the discovery of the ring magnets sale: “China has never transferred or sold any nuclear technology or equipment to Pakistan…We therefore hope the US Government will not base its policy-making on hearsay.” Agency France Presse (AFP, Hong Kong), 26 March 1996.
60. See, for example, Dingli Shen, “Promoting Nuclear Nonproliferation: A Chinese View” (Paper presented at the Sixth ISODARCO Beijing Seminar on Arms Control, 29 October–1 November 1998, Shanghai, China).
61. M. Hibbs, “Reported VVER-1000 Sale to India Raises NSG Concern on Safeguards”, Nucleonics Week, 12 January 1995, p. 1. LEU was meant for India’s civilian nuclear energy reactor. Considering the hostile state of Sino-Indian relations, it is unlikely that China would knowingly assist India’s nuclear weapons programme.
62. See “Engaging China on Nonproliferation”, Testimony by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State R. Einhorn before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 10 April 1997.
63. On taking advantage of the contradictions that exist between these countries, see Hu Yumin, “The US Post-Cold War Nonproliferation Policy”, International Strategic Studies, No. 3 (Beijing, July 1999), p. 54.
64. See Mohan Malik, “China’s Asia Policy: Restrain Japan, Contain India”, Japan Times, 12 June 1999, p. 21. The South Korean newspaper Joong Ang Ilbo reported on 25 November 1999 that China had recently sold to North Korea “massive quantities” of military equipment; see
65. Privately, Chinese strategists justify this on the grounds that all NWSs have helped at least one allied state to go nuclear: for example, the United States helped Britain, the Soviets helped China, the French and the Americans helped Israel.
66. “China might be pitting North Korea against Japan in the same way as it is pitting Pakistan against India”, writes T. Delpech, in “Nuclear Weapons and the ‘New World Order’: Early Warning from Asia?” Survival 40, no. 4 (Winter 1998–99): 65. Chinese assistance to North Korea and Pakistan epitomizes the emergence of a set of mutually reinforcing proliferation linkages while highlighting the global nature of the nuclear problem and the blurring of the distinctions between Northeast Asian and South Asian security complexes.
67. Conversation with Yu Changsen, 7 April 1999.
68. “US Officials Say China Still Sells Missile Data”, IHT, 13 November 1998, p. 1; and N. C. Menon, “US gets new data on China’s missile tech sale to Pak”, Hindustan Times, 8 December 1998, p. 1.
69. See “China Silent on Whether Iran Nuclear Sale Shelved”, Reuters wire story, 26 August 1997. On 28 November 1999, Ehud Barak told the Chinese leader Li Peng that Israel was concerned about China’s continuing sales of arms to Iran and reminded him of “China’s important decision” of 1997 to cease such transfers.
70. B. Barber, “Israel doesn’t want US ire over China”, Washington Times, 14 April 2000, p. 1.
71. On China’s attempts to link non-proliferation issues to the US arms sales to Taiwan, see Shirley A. Kan, “Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, CRS Issue Brief 92056, Current Policy Issues, 1 June 1998.
72. R. S. Greenberger and M. Forney, “China Tests Weapons Limit with Pakistan”, Wall Street Journal, 15 December 1998, p. 1.
73. As the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said recently: “I wish to emphasise once again China has never transferred nuclear weapons or relevant technology to other countries…China has never done it in the past, we do not do it now, nor will we do it in the future.” Agence France Presse (Kyodo), 21 October 1998.
74. Lu Zhongwei, “International Security Environment Goes through Changes”, Beijing Review, 23 August 1999, p. 10; and J. Pomfret, “China Maps Changes in Defense Strategy”, IHT, 12 June 1999, p. 1.
75. Jian Taojie, “TMD–Source of Tension in the World”, Beijing Review, 21 June 1999, pp. 9–10.
76. R. Weixing Hu, “India’s Nuclear Bomb and Future Sino–Indian Relations”, East Asia 17, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 61.
77. E. Eckholm, “China Says U.S. Missile Shield Could Force an Arms Buildup”, New York Times, 11 May 2000, p.1.
78. “Arms control policies could be reviewed, China warns US”, Times of India, 15 April 2000, p.10.
79. T. V. Paul, “Great Equalizers or Agents of Chaos? Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Emerging International Order”, in International Order and the Future of World Politics, edited by T. V. Paul and J. A. Hall (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 384.
80. Hong Yuan, “The Implication of TMD System in Japan to China’s Security” (Paper presented at the Sixth ISODARCO Beijing Seminar on Arms Control, 29 October – 1 November 1998, Shanghai, China).
81. Sha Zukang, “China’s Stand on Non-Proliferation”, Beijing Review, 8–14 February 1999, p. 8.
82. Eckholm, op. cit.
83. Ming Zhang, China’s Changing Nuclear Posture: Reactions to the South Asian Nuclear Tests (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), pp. 60, 47; and “What Threat?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (September/October 1999), p. 57.
84. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, China Daily Report, 27 August 1998.
85. Dingli Shen, “Toward a Nuclear–Weapon Free World: A Chinese Perspective,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (March/April 1994), p. 54.
86. A. I. Johnston, “Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence Versus Multilateral Arms Control”, China Quarterly, no. 162 (June 1996), pp. 552–63; and “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited Deterrence”, International Security 20, no. 2 (Winter 1995/96): 5–42.
87. R. A. Manning, “China’s New Nuclear Doctrine”, Wall Street Journal, 25 June 1999, p. 1.