Paradigms lost: Japan’s Asia policy in a time of growing Chinese power

Contemporary Southeast Asia

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 365-385

  Johnstone, Christopher B ^a  

^a Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84937321025     PISSN: 0129797X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1355/CS21-3C     Document Type: Article

References (46)

1. See, for example, Kenneth P. Pyle, The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era (Washington: AEI Press, 1992), pp. 131-46.
2. Jeffrey E. Garten, A Cold Peace: America, Japan, Germany, and the Struggle for Supremacy (New York: Times Books, 1992).
3. On this point see, for example, Yoichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan’s Role in APEC (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1995), pp. 223-35.
4. These figures, compiled by Japan’s Ministry of Finance, are based on notifications from investing firms and are thus thought to somewhat overstate actual levels of investment. Nevertheless, they serve as a useful barometer of trends in Japanese FDI flows.
5. China and Indonesia are notable exceptions to this pattern. Japan imports a large volume of raw materials from both countries.
6. Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, Annual Report 1997 (Tokyo: OECF, Japan, 1997), p. 240.
7. Yasusuke Murakami, “The Debt Comes Due for Mass Higher Education,” Japan Echo 15, no. 3 (Autumn 1988): 71-80. Quoted in Pyle, op. cit., p. 139.
8. Michael Green describes Japan’s growing frustration with the dominance of free-market ideology in the IMF and World Bank, beginning in the late 1980s. Although Japan held the number-two post at the World Bank, Japanese officials were largely unable to influence Bank policies. See Michael J. Green, “Japan and the International Financial System: Lessons from the Asian Monetary Crisis,” in Reluctant Realism: Japanese Foreign Policy in an Era of Uncertain Power (Council on Foreign Relations, forthcoming)
9. Eric Altbach, “The Asian Monetary Fund Proposal: A Case Study of Japanese Regional Leadership,” JEI Report No. 47A (19 December 1997), p. 7. 0. At one point, the U.S. House of Representatives, reacting to Tokyo’s early reluctance to increase its financial contribution to the war effort, voted to begin withdrawing 5,000 American troops annually from Japan unless it agreed to pay all of the costs associated with stationing forces there. See Pyle, op. cit., p. 128.
10. American criticism of Japan’s contribution to the war effort was limited to the Congress and the media, and did not extend to the President. The White House was publicly sympathetic to the constitutional limits on Japanese action.
11. Cited in Norman D. Levin, “Prospects for U.S.-Japanese Security Cooperation,” in Danny Unger and Paul Blackburn, eds., Japan’s Emerging Global Role (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1993), p. 79.
12. At first glance, these two strands of Japanese thinking about the alliance – frustration with Tokyo’s inability to get out from under American power on the one hand, and concern about eroding American commitment on the other – may appear contradictory. In fact, they represent just one example of a pattern that has characterized Japanese foreign policy for much of the post-war period: the delicate effort to avoid entrapment in American wars and conflicts, while at the same time preventing American abandonment of the alliance. For an exploration of Japan’s abandonment-versus-entrapment dilemma through the lens of Japanese defence industrial policy, see Michael J. Green, Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).
13. National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1996: Instruments of U.S. Power (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1996), p. 114.
14. Funabashi, op. cit., p. 68.
15. The merits of American complaints concerning Japanese trade practices are beyond the scope of this article. The substance of Washington’s positions in these disputes is less important than the fact, in the eyes of many Japanese, that the United States appeared increasingly to emphasize trade issues while neglecting the security relationship.
16. For a detailed account of the FSX dispute, see Green, Arming Japan, pp. 86-107.
17. For a review of Japanese public opinion trends during this period, see Christopher B. Johnstone, “Go West or Look East? Japanese Views of America and Asia,” JEI Report, No. 21A, 7 June 1996.
18. Time, 20 November 1989, p. 82. Quoted in Pyle, op. cit., p. 138.
19. This book was in some ways a sequel to Ishihara’s 1989 best-seller, ‘No’ to ieru Nihon [The Japan That Can Say ‘No’], which argued that Japan was sacrificing its national interests by not resisting U.S. pressure on a variety of issues.
20. Kazuo Ogura, “’Ajia no fukken’ no tame ni,” Chuo Koron, July 1993; translated as “A Call for a New Concept of Asia”, Japan Echo 20, no. 3 (Autumn 1993): 37-44.
21. Yoichi Funabashi, “The Asianization of Asia,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 1993.
22. Yoichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, pp. 223-25.
23. Yoichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, p. 225.
24. To be fair, Funabashi did warn about the “possibility of geopolitical struggles” between the region’s major powers, and cautioned that Asia’s growing sense of community was by no means an unstoppable trend. See Funabashi, “The Asianization of Asia”.
25. It is worth remembering, of course, that not all Southeast Asian leaders were as welcoming of a Japanese leadership role in Asia as Prime Minister Mahathir. Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s Senior Minister, has repeatedly warned against the dangers of Japanese remilitarization. See, for example, Fareed Zakaria, “Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 1994.
26. Susumu Yamakage, “Japan’s National Security and Asia-Pacific’s Regional Institutions in the Post-Cold War Era,” in Network Power: Japan and Asia, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 288.
27. For a detailed description of Japan’s role in the creation and development of APEC, see Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion.
28. For a detailed description of Japan’s role in the creation and development of APEC, see Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion. p. 238.
29. Quoted in Wolf Mendl, Japan’s Asia Policy: Regional Security and Global Interests (New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 111.
30. See, for example, the 1995 and 1994 editions of the Diplomatic Bluebook, available on the Internet at www.mofa.go.jp.
31. National Defense University, op. cit., p. 115.
32. Annual opinion surveys conducted by the Prime Minister’s office during this period indicated growing feelings of “friendliness” in Japan towards ASEAN — but sentiment towards the region remained, on balance, negative. Japanese views of South Korea and China actually worsened in the early 1990s. See Johnstone, “Go West or Look East? Japanese Views of America and Asia,”, p. 10.
33. Michael J. Green and Benjamin L. Self, “Japan’s Changing China Policy: From Commercial Liberalism to Reluctant Realism”, Survival 38, no. 2 (Summer 1996).
34. Government of Japan, Prime Minster’s Office, Gaiko ni kan suru seron chosa [Public opinion surveys concerning diplomacy], October 1997.
35. Washington feared that the new facility would offer loans under less stringent conditions than the IMF, thus undercutting the Fund’s authority.
36. Michael J. Green, “Japan-China Relations”, in Reluctant Realism.
37. For an elaboration of this argument, see Christopher B. Johnstone, “Japan’s China Policy: Implications for U.S.-Japan Relations,” Asian Survey 38, no. 11 (November 1998): 1067-85.
38. st Century, 17 April 1996.
39. For a description of bilateral dynamics during the economic crisis, see Christopher B. Johnstone, “Strained Alliance: U.S.-Japan Diplomacy in the Asian Financial Crisis,” Survival 41, no. 2 (Summer 1999).
40. Just days after the missile flew over northern Japan, the United States went ahead with a previously scheduled meeting of the Four Party talks — and announced a new package of food aid for North Korea.
41. Ogura Kazuo, “Atarashii Ajia no sozo,” Voice, March 1999. Translated as “Creating a New Asia”, in Japan Echo 26, no. 3 (June 1999): 12-16.
42. Green and Self, op. cit., p. 52.
43. Marc Castellano, “Japanese Aid to Focus on National Interests, East Asia,” JEI Report, No. 32B, 20 August 1999, p. 9.
44. Henny Sender, “Stemming the Flood”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 July 1999, pp. 52-54.
45. Yamakage, op. cit., p. 296.
46. Michael Green describes how Japan is “recalculating” the meaning of autonomy within the context of the alliance. See Green, Arming Japan, pp. 157-58.