Pareto efficiency, simple game stability, and social structure in finitely repeated games

The Journal of Mathematical Sociology

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 1995, Pages 55-72

  Pollock, Gregory B ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84937283165     PISSN: 0022250X     EISSN: 15455874     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.1995.9990152     Document Type: Article

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