Maastricht and the codecision procedure: A success story

International and Comparative Law Quarterly

Volumn 45, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 293-318

  Boyron, Sophie ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 84937274502     PISSN: 00205893     EISSN: 14716895     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020589300059005     Document Type: Article

References (57)

1. Idem, Art. 138c.
2. Idem, Art.l38d.
3. Idem, Art.l38e.
4. Idem, Art.l89b.
5. See the opinion of Jean-Claude Piris, “After Maastricht, Are the Community Institutions more Efficacious, more Democratic and more Transparent?” (1994) 19 E.L.Rev. 449,469–470.
6. See recently Case C-65/90 Parliament v. Council [1992] E.C.R. 1–4593.
7. See idem, para.16, which is drafted in an all-embracing manner: “II résulte de la jurisprudence de la Cour que l'exigence de consulter le Parlement européen au cours de la procédure législative, dans les cas prévus par le traité, implique l'exigence d'une nouvelle consultation a chaque fois que le texte finalement adopteé considéré dans son ensemble, s'écarte dans sa substance même de celui sur lequel le Parlement a déjà été consulteé à l'ex-ception des cas où les amendements correspondent, pour I'essentiel. au souhait exprimé par le Parlement lui-même.”
8. See the text of Art.l89b(2), idem, and compare with the text of Art.l89c(a): “The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the opinion of the European Parliament, shall adopt a common position.”
9. See Art.l89b, para.2 (the three-month time limit for the Parliament to decide on the common position), para.3 (the three-month time limit for the Council to act on the Parliament's amendments), para.S (the six-week time limits for the conciliation committee to approve a joint text and then for the Council and the Parliament to approve it) and finally para.6 (the six-week time limits for the Council to confirm its common position and for the European Parliament to reject it).
10. See Art.l89b(2): “If within three months of such communication, the European Parliament … (c) indicates, by an absolute majority of its component members, that it intends to reject the common position, it shall immediately inform the Council. The Council may convene a meeting of the Conciliation Committee referred to in paragraph 4 to explain further its position.”
11. This optional conciliation was convened during the discussion of the text regulating the power of motorbikes. See the Commission's proposal (1992) OJ. C93/116
12. the common position (1993) OJ. C193/1.
13. (1993) OJ. C329/141.
14. See Art.l89b(4), where the role of the Commission is emphasised as regards the conciliation committee: “The Commission shall take part in the Conciliation Committee's proceedings and shall take all the necessary initiatives with a view to reconciling the positions of the European Parliament and the Council.”
15. See Mégret et al., Le droit de la CEE (1979), Vol.9, pp.135–136
16. Wyatt and Dash-wood, European Community Law (1993), pp.47–48.
17. See the argument based on the effet utile developed by Dashwood, “Community Legislative Procedures in the Era of the Treaty on European Union” (1994) 19 E.L.Rev. 343.
18. Art.l89b(2): “If within three months of such communication, the European Parliament: (a) approves the common position, the Council shall definitively adopt the act in question in accordance with that common position.”
19. See Dashwood, Art.
20. This was the directive on the application of open network provision to voice telephony; see the common position (1993) OJ. C193/1.
21. See “Rapport d'activités du 2eme semestre de 1994” of the parliamentary delegation to the conciliation committee, unpublished.
22. See the report of the Commission on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union SEC(95)731, p.19: “Si I'on s'en tient aux seules propositions de la Commission présentées depuis 1'entrée en vigueur du Traité, la durée moyenne de la procédure est intérieure a 300 jours. Cependant, il sera nécessaire d'affiner cette appréciation sur une période plus longue.”
23. See infra Sections III.A and B on the problems of comitology and amounts deemed necessary.
24. Reg.3378 of 22 Dec. 1994 amending Reg.l576/89/EEC laying down general rules on the definition, description and presentation of spirit drinks, and Reg.l601/94/EEC laying down general rules on the definition, description and presentation of aromatised wines, wine-based drinks and wine product cocktails following the Uruguay Round of the multilateral trade negotiations (1994) OJ. L366/1.
25. See infra Section III.
26. See the amended proposal COM/94/48 final—COD 437 and the common position (1993) OJ. C193/1.
27. The delegation of the Parliament to the conciliation committee has expressed the wish for a new constitutional convention entailing the systematic rejection of the common position in such a case. However, no such practice has yet had time to develop. See also Rules of Procedure, Art.78(4): “Parliament shall vote on a motion to reject the Council text.”
28. See the Commission's proposal (1989) OJ. C10/3
29. the amended proposal (1993) OJ. C44/36
30. the common position (1994) O.J. C101/65 and the rejection by the European Parliament.
31. See the Commission's proposal (1993) O.J. C222/5.
32. See the Parliament's opinion (1993) O.J. C176/95
33. the common position (1994) O.J. CI 37/42.
34. See the final text (1994) O.J. L280/83.
35. See the Commission's proposal (1992) OJ. C227/3.
36. See the opinion of the European Parliament (1993) O.J. C194/325
37. the common position (1994) O.J. C91/82.
38. See the final text (1994) O.J. L365/24.
39. See the Commission's proposal COM/93/708 final (1994) O.J. C66.
40. See the Commission's proposal COM/93/523 final (1994) OJ. C160.
41. E.g. the Council accepted 18 of the 22 amendments put forward during the second reading. See EPdocA4–14/94 for the position of the European Parliament after the second reading. See also the opinion delivered by the European Parliament (1994) O J. C217/18
42. the common position (1994) O.J. C244/51.
43. See e.g. the opinion of the European Parliament (1994) O.J. C217/24
44. the common position (1994) OJ. C232/57
45. the amendments of the European Parliament for the second reading EPdocA4–13/94 and (1994) O.J. C323/17.
46. In French the “ Montana Estimés Nécessaires” or MEN.
47. See Decision 87/373 (1987) O.J. L197/33.
48. See Case 302/87 Parliament v. Council [1988] E.C.R. 5615. The European Parliament tried to have the decision annulled but the ECJ considered that the Parliament did not have locus standi under Art.173 and rejected the claim on this basis. Nothing was said on the merits.
49. See (1993) O.J. C20/175.
50. See infra n.62.
51. E.g. under Art.45 of the French Constitution of 1958 the “commission mixte pari-taire”, the institution which draws up compromise texts between the Sénat and the Assemblée Nationale consists of 14 MPs (seven from each chamber).
52. Dashwood, Art, at p.357. seems to think that it is unrealistic to expect ministers to attend these lengthy deliberations. However, conciliation meetings would be considerably shorter if ministers were systematically present.
53. See the final text (1995) O.J. C52/1.
54. See O.J.
55. For a similar proposal see Justus Lipsius, “The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference” (1995) 20 E.L.Rev. 235: “The European Parliament should always be able to participate in the adoption of legislative acts, either on a consultative basis, or through a new ‘co-decision procedure’ which would give it larger powers; the co-operation procedure should disappear; the assent procedure for legislative acts, which is completely inadequate, should also disappear.”
56. On this point see Piris, E.L.Rev., at pp.478–479
57. Lipsius, E.L.Rev., at p.263.