Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB

American Political Science Review

Volumn 79, Issue 4, 1985, Pages 1094-1116

  Moe, Terry M ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84936018509     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1956250     Document Type: Article

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