The territorial disputes between China and Vietnam and regional stability

Contemporary Southeast Asia

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 86-113

  Amer, Ramses ^a  

^a UPPSALA UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84933476799     PISSN: 0129797X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1355/CS19-1E     Document Type: Article

References (100)

1. Unless otherwise stated the information on the period up to the end of 1991 is derived from Ramses Amer, The Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam and Sino-Vietnamese Relations (Kuala Lumpur: Forum, 1991), pp. 29–35, 93–95 and 121–23; Ramses Amer, “Sino-Vietnamese Normalization in the Light of the Crisis of the Late 1970s”, Pacific Affairs 67, no. 3 (Fall 1994): 357–66, 374–75 and 381; and Ramses Amer, “Vietnam and its Neighbours: The Border Dispute Dimension”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 17, no. 3 (December 1995): 301–2.
2. From the Chinese side, see, for example, “China’s Indisputable Sovereignty Over the Xisha and Nansha Islands”, Beijing Review, no. 7 (18 February 1979), pp. 15–24; and “The Truth about the Sino-Vietnamese Boundary Question”, Beijing Review (25 May 1979), pp. 14–26. From the Vietnamese side, see, for example, La souveraineté du Viet Nam sur les archipels Hoang Sa et Truong Sa (Hanoi: Département de la presse et de l’information. Ministère des affaires étrangères, République Socialiste du Veit Nam, 1979); and Memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Concerning the Chinese Au-thorities’ Provocations and Territorial Encroachments in the Border Region of Vietnam (Hanoi: Department of Press and Information, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, March 1979).
3. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Part Three, Far East, 1227 A3/1 (12 November 1991) (hereafter cited as BBC/FE). According to Xinhua News Agency, the provisional agreement on the handling of border affairs resulted from talks between the two sides held in early October 1991. These talks were held to meet the “needs” of normalization of relations and for peace and economic development in the border region (ibid., 1224 A3/1 [8 November 1991]).
4. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Part Three, Far East, 1227 A3/1 (12 November 1991) (hereafter cited as BBC/FE). According to Xinhua News Agency, the provisional agreement on the handling of border affairs resulted from talks between the two sides held in early October 1991. These talks were held to meet the “needs” of normalization of relations and for peace and economic development in the border region, 1305 A3/1–3 (15 February 1992); 1306 A3/1 (17 February 1992); and, 1307 A3/1 (18 February 1992)
5. For the full text of “The Law of the People’s Republic of China on its Territorial Waters and Their Contiguous Areas” adopted by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on 25 February 1992, see ibid., 1316 C1/1-2 (28 February 1992). See also “People’s Republic of China. Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone”, in International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 8, No. 1 (March 1993): 158–61. For an overview of the initial reactions in the East-and Southeast Asian regions, see “Testing the waters”, Far Eastern Economic Review (12 March 1992), pp. 8–9 (hereafter cited as FEER).
6. BBC/FE/1385 A1/2-3 (20 May 1992); and, 1388 i (23 May 1992); 1417 A2/3-4 (26 June 1992); and 1430 A1/1 (11 July 1992). See also Michael Vatikiotis, “China stirs the pot”, FEER, 9 July 1992, pp. 14–15.
7. BBC/FE/1428 A2/1 (9 July 1992); and 1430 A1/1.
8. BBC/FE/1428 A2/1 (9 July 1992); and 1430 A1/1., 1479 i and A2/1 (7 September 1992); and 1487 A2/6-7 (16 September 1992).
9. BBC/FE/1428 A2/1 (9 July 1992); and 1430 A1/1., 1486 A2/3 (15 September 1992).
10. Author’s discussions with officials and researchers in Hanoi, and visit to the Vietnamese border province of Lang Son in December 1994.
11. BBC/FE/1299 A3/3 (8 February 1992). See also “Hanoi, Peking reopen border crossing”, FEER, 16 April 1992, p. 14.
12. BBC/FE/1492 A2/1 (22 September 1992).
13. BBC/FE/1492 A2/1, 1519 A1/2-3 (23 October 1992).
14. BBC/FE/1492 A2/1, 1552 A2/1 (1 December 1992); 1553 A1/1-4 (2 December 1992); 1554 A1/4-5 (3 December 1992); 1555 A1/7-11 (4 December 1992); and 1556 A1/1-3 (5 December 1992).
15. BBC/FE/1492 A2/1 (22 September 1992), 1560 A1/9 (10 December 1992); 1561 A2/4-5 (11 December 1992); 1565 A2/6 (15 December 1992); and 1566 A2/1 (17 December 1992).
16. BBC/FE/1492 A2/1 (22 September 1992)., 1620 A2/2 (23 February 1993).
17. BBC/FE/1492 A2/1 (22 September 1992)., 1689 A2/4-5 (15 May 1993); and 1691 A2/2-3 (18 May 1993).
18. BBC/FE/1492 A2/1 (22 September 1992)., 1777 A1/3 (26 August 1993); 1783 G/1-2 (2 September 1993); and 1786 G/4 (6 September 1993).
19. BBC/FE/1492 A2/1 (22 September 1992)., 1825 B/2-3 (21 October 1993).
20. BBC/FE/1492 A2/1 (22 September 1992)., 1843 G/1-3 (11 November 1993); 1845 G/5-6 (13 November 1993); 1846 G/1-2 (15 November 1993); and 1848 B/3-4 and G/4 (17 November 1993). The detailed information pertaining to the border disputes is derived from an interview with Vietnam’s Foreign Minister by the Voice of Vietnam (date of the interview not given!) (Ibid., 1848 B/3-4).
21. BBC/FE/1492 A2/1 (22 September 1992)., 1935 B/3 (2 March 1994); and, 1936 G/2-3 (3 March 1994).
22. BBC/FE/1492 A2/1 (22 September 1992)., 1957 B/7 (28 March 1994).
23. BBC/FE/1492 A2/1 (22 September 1992)., 1978 B/3 (22 April 1994); 1979 B/9 (23 April 1994); 1980 B/6 (25 April 1994); and Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Daily Report. East Asia, 94-077 (21 April 1994), p. 55; 94-078 (22 April 1994), pp. 48–49 (hereafter cited as FBIS-EAS).
24. BBC/FE/1492 A2/1 (22 September 1992)., 94-090 (10 May 1994), p. 45; and BBC/FE/1991 B/10 (7 May 1994).
25. The report was carried by Agence France Press (AFP) in Hong Kong and quoted in ibid., 1996 B/5 (13 May 1994). According to AFP, the Chinese statement was the “clearest claim of sovereignty over this region yet made by the Chinese” (ibid., 1996 B/5).
26. BBC/FE/1492 A2/1 (22 September 1992)., 1996 B/5; and FBIS-EAS-94-093 (13 May 1994), p. 70.
27. BBC/FE/1997 G/4-5 (14 May 1994).
28. FBIS-EAS-94-094 (16 May 1994), pp. 57–58.
29. The interview published in the Straits Times, 19 May 1994, p. 17, has been reproduced in FBIS-EAS-94-097 (9 May 1994), pp. 68–69. In the context of increased military presence in the area, it can be noted that on 12 May KYODO carried a report citing “Vietnamese Government sources” that China had increased its naval presence in the Spratly archipelago. The report also cited other sources as claiming that Vietnam had “rushed” naval vessels to the area (ibid., 94-093, 13 May 1994, pp. 69–70).
30. This refers to the conflict relating to the oil concessions and the sovereignty issues in that area and not to the larger conflict over the Spratly archipelago.
31. BBC/FE/2024 G/1 (17 June 1994).
32. BBC/FE/2024 G/1 (17 June 1994)., 2027 B/3-4 (21 June 1994); and FBIS-EAS-94-118 (20 June 1994), p. 67.
33. BBC/FE/2024 G/1 (17 June 1994)., 94-128 (5 July 1994), pp. 69-70; 94-129 (6 July 1994), p. 66; 94-133 (2 July 1994), p. 68; and, BBC/FE/2028 G/4 (4 July 1994); and 2046 G/2 (13 July 1994).
34. BBC/FE/2024 G/1 (17 June 1994)., 2040 G/5 (6 July 1994).
35. BBC/FE/2024 G/1 (17 June 1994)., 2041 B/7-8 (7 July 1994); and FBIS-EAS-94-129 (6 July 1994), p. 66; 94-156 (12 August 1994), p. 67.
36. BBC/FE/2057 B/4 (26 July 1994). According to a report by Xinhua News Agency, the Chinese Foreign Minister had said that the two countries had reached agreement on basic principles concerning the border disputes and “positive progress” had been made during negotiations, thus laying a “solid foundation” for the settle-ment of disputes (ibid., 2058 G/2 [27 July 1994]). The two sides refrained from publicly criticizing each other over the border disputes following the meeting in July. However, in late July Taiwan claimed that China had deployed warships to blockade Vietnamese “oil prospecting facilities” in the Spratly archipelago (ibid., 2061 B/4 [30 July 1994]; and, 2062 B/2 [August 1994]). Neither China nor Vietnam made any public statement relating to the alleged incident.
37. BBC/FE/2024 G/1, 2078 B/6 (19 August 1994).
38. FBIS-EAS-94-159 (17 August 1994), p. 79; 94-161 (19 August 1994), pp. 62–63; and 94-162 (22 August 1994), p. 80.
39. Excerpts of the interview in Sankei Shimbun have been translated and reproduced in BBC/FE/2085 B/1 (27 August 1994).
40. Excerpts of the interview in Sankei Shimbun have been translated and reproduced in BBC/FE/2085 B/1, 2158 B/1 (21 November 1994).
41. Excerpts of the interview in Sankei Shimbun have been translated and reproduced in BBC/FE/2085 B/1, 2140 B/6 (31 October 1994).
42. For the Chinese statement, see ibid., 2128 G/2 (17 October 1994) and for the Vietnamese response, see FBIS-EAS-94-203 (20 October 1994), p. 84.
43. For the full text of the “Sino-Vietnamese Joint Communiqué”, see BBC/FE/2160 B/1-2 (23 November 1994).
44. For the full text of the “Sino-Vietnamese Joint Communiqué”, see BBC/FE/2160 B/1-2, 2161 B/4-6 (24 November 1994).
45. For the full text of the “Sino-Vietnamese Joint Communiqué”, see BBC/FE/2160 B/1-2, 2187 B/5 (28 December 1994).
46. For the full text of the “Sino-Vietnamese Joint Communiqué”, see BBC/FE/2160 B/1-2 2210 B/4 (25 January 1995).
47. For the full text of the “Sino-Vietnamese Joint Communiqué”, see BBC/FE/2160 B/1-2 (23 November 1994)., 2208 G/15 (23 January 1995).
48. For the full text of the “Sino-Vietnamese Joint Communiqué”, see BBC/FE/2160 B/1-2 (23 November 1994). 2210 B/4.
49. For the full text of the “Sino-Vietnamese Joint Communiqué”, see BBC/FE/2160 B/1-2 (23 November 1994)., 2273 G/1-2 (8 April 1995).
50. For the full text of the “Sino-Vietnamese Joint Communiqué”, see BBC/FE/2160 B/1-2 (23 November 1994)., 2307 G/1 (19 May 1995); and 2309 G/1-2 (22 May 1995).
51. For the full text of the “Sino-Vietnamese Joint Communiqué”, see BBC/FE/2160 B/1-2 (23 November 1994), 2315 B/1 (29 May 1995). The Chinese report from the talks also stated that they had “achieved progress” (ibid., 2319 G/1 [2 June 1995]).
52. For the full text of the “Sino-Vietnamese Joint Communiqué”, see BBC/FE/2160 B/1-2 (23 November 1994)., 2340 B/1-2 (27 June 1995).
53. For the full text of the “Sino-Vietnamese Joint Communiqué”, see BBC/FE/2160 B/1-2 (23 November 1994)., 2356 G/6-7 (15 July 1995). According to the Chinese official version, the experts would work on the “territorial waters issues … and negotiate on the Nansha issue”, that is, on the Spratly issue but not on the Paracel issue (Ibid., 2356 G/6-7). According to the Vietnamese official version, a “joint working group on sea border” was formally set up and its “working mechanism of operation” was discussed. The Vietnamese version does not specify which geographical areas are to be dealt with by the working group (ibid., 2356 G/6). In a subsequent interview with Hoang Nhu Ly, head of the China Department of Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry, published in the Vietnamese publication Tuan Bao Quoc Te on 2 August 1995, Hoang Nhu Ly was quoted as saying that as the Vietnamese side understood it “the sea issues that the team will discuss include those having to do with the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands” (for a translation of the interview, see FBIS-EAS-95-187 [27 September 1995], p. 97).
54. For the full text of the “Sino-Vietnamese Joint Communiqué”, see BBC/FE/2160 B/1-2 (23 November 1994)., 95–199 (16 October 1995), p. 71.
55. BBC/FE/2441 (23 October 1995).
56. BBC/FE/2441 (23 October 1995)., 2463 B/1 (17 November 1995).
57. BBC/FE/2441 (23 October 1995)., 2471 G/1-2 (27 November 1995); 2473 G/4-5 (29 November 1995); and, 2474 G/2-6 (30 November 1995).
58. For the full text of the “Sino-Vietnamese Joint Communiqué”, see ibid., 2477 G/1-2 (4 December 1995). The agreement on opening rail links between the two countries relates to two links between Dong Dang and Lao Cai on the Vietnamese side and Pingxing and Shanyao respectively on the Chinese side, thus connecting the provinces of Lang Son and Guangxi, and the provinces of Lao Cai and Yunnan respectively. See ibid., 2477 B/3 (4 December 1995); 2494 B/5 (23 December 1995); and, 2524 B/1 (1 February 1996).
59. BBC/FE/2441 (23 October 1995)., 2479 B/3-4 (6 December 1995).
60. BBC/FE/2441 (23 October 1995)., 2518 B/4 (25 January 1996); 2524 B/1; 2525 B/4 (2 February 1996); 2536 B/4 (15 February 1996); and 2539 G/3 (19 February 1996).
61. BBC/FE/2441 (23 October 1995)., 2538 B/5-6 (17 February 1996).
62. BBC/FE/2441 (23 October 1995)., 2515 B/3 (22 January 1996); and 2517 B/1 (24 January 1996).
63. BBC/FE/2441 (23 October 1995)., 2522 B/2 (30 January 1996).
64. BBC/FE/2441 (23 October 1995)., 2550 G/4 (2 March 1996).
65. BBC/FE/2441 (23 October 1995)., 2562 B/5 (16 March 1996).
66. BBC/FE/2441 (23 October 1995)., 2586 B/6 (15 April 1996); and 2595 B/7 (25 April 1996).
67. BBC/FE/2441 (23 October 1995). 2589 G/2 (18 April 1996); and 2590 G/2 (19 April 1996).
68. BBC/FE/2441 (23 October 1995)., 2614 G/10-12 (17 May 1996).
69. BBC/FE/2441 (23 October 1995)., 2615 B/6 (18 May 1996).
70. BBC/FE/2441 (23 October 1995)., 2618 G/3 (22 May 1996).
71. BBC/FE/2441 (23 October 1995)., 2651 G/2-3 (29 June 1996). For other reports on the visit of the Chinese Prime Minister, see ibid., 2647 G/2 (25 June 1996); 2650 G/3-4 (28 June 1996); 2651 B/5-7 and 10–12 (29 June 1996); 2652 B/4 and 6–7 (1 July 1996); 2653 B/3-4 (2 July 1996); and 2654 B/6-7 (3 July 1996).
72. BBC/FE/2441 (23 October 1995)., 2651 B/11.
73. BBC/FE/2441 (23 October 1995)., 2662 B/6 (12 July 1996); and 2665 B/3 (16 July 1996).
74. BBC/FE/2441 (23 October 1995)., 2688 B/4 (12 August 1996).
75. BBC/FE/2441 (23 October 1995)., 2701 G/1 (27 August 1996). See also British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Weekly Economic Report. Parts Three Asia-Pacific/0450 WB/2 (28 August 1996).
76. BBC/FE 2701 G/1; 2704 B/5-6 (30 August 1996); and 2705 B/4 (31 August 1996).
77. BBC/FE 2701 G/1; 2704 B/5-6 (30 August 1996); and 2705 B/4 (31 August 1996)., 2759 G/2-3 (2 November 1996).
78. BBC/FE 2701 G/1; 2704 B/5-6 (30 August 1996); and 2705 B/4 (31 August 1996)., 2773 B/6-7 (19 November 1996); 2774 B/4 (20 November 1996); and 2775 B/4-5 (21 November 1996). All these reports were carried by Chinese sources.
79. BBC/FE 2701 G/1; 2704 B/5-6 (30 August 1996); and 2705 B/4 (31 August 1996)., 2724 B/4-5 (23 September 1996).
80. BBC/FE 2701 G/1; 2704 B/5-6 (30 August 1996); and 2705 B/4 (31 August 1996)., 2748 B/6 (21 October 1996).
81. BBC/FE 2701 G/1; 2704 B/5-6 (30 August 1996); and 2705 B/4 (31 August 1996)., 2789 B/3 (7 December 1996).
82. BBC/FE 2701 G/1; 2704 B/5-6 (30 August 1996); and 2705 B/4 (31 August 1996)., 2802 B/4-5 (23 December 1996).
83. BBC/FE 2701 G/1; 2704 B/5-6 (30 August 1996); and 2705 B/4 (31 August 1996)., 2826 B/3 (25 January 1997).
84. BBC/FE 2701 G/1; 2704 B/5-6 (30 August 1996); and 2705 B/4 (31 August 1996)., 2837 G/5 (7 February 1997).
85. BBC/FE 2701 G/1; 2704 B/5-6 (30 August 1996); and 2705 B/4 (31 August 1996)., 2870 B/4 (18 March 1997); and 2871 B/4 (19 March 1997).
86. BBC/FE 2701 G/1; 2704 B/5-6 (30 August 1996); and 2705 B/4 (31 August 1996)., 2872 G/1 (20 March 1997). This report was carried by Xinhua News Agency in English. An earlier version in Mandarin differed in three aspects in the translation reproduced in the BBC/FE. First, the statement of the spokesman was made in response to a question of a “reporter”, secondly, the “normal operation” was said to be “beyond reproach”, and thirdly, China’s “indisputable” “right” to be in the area was not stressed (ibid., 2871 G/1).
87. BBC/FE 2701 G/1; 2704 B/5-6 (30 August 1996); and 2705 B/4 (31 August 1996)., 2874 B/3 (22 March 1997).
88. BBC/FE 2701 G/1; 2704 B/5-6 (30 August 1996); and 2705 B/4 (31 August 1996)., 2878 B/7 (27 March 1997).
89. BBC/FE 2701 G/1; 2704 B/5-6 (30 August 1996); and 2705 B/4 (31 August 1996)., 2880 G/15 (31 March 1997).
90. BBC/FE 2701 G/1; 2704 B/5-6 (30 August 1996); and 2705 B/4 (31 August 1996)., 2882 B/3 (2 April 1997).
91. BBC/FE 2701 G/1; 2704 B/5-6 (30 August 1996); and 2705 B/4 (31 August 1996)., 2884 B/7 (4 April 1997). In this context, it can be noted that according to a report by Beijing Review from the regular news briefings of the Chinese Foreign Ministry on 1 and 3 April, Shen Guofang, spokesman of the Ministry, said, in response to a question if the Chinese Government was “willing to negotiate” with Vietnam on the “issue of the sea border”, that China hoped that issues like the “South China Sea and oil drilling” could be solved through “expert-level consulta-tions” (“Foreign Ministry News Briefings”, Beijing Review, 21–27 April 1997, p. 10).
92. BBC/FE/2892 B/3 (14 April 1997). See also Michael Richardson “China-Vietnam Dispute Revives Regional Fears”, International Herald Tribune, 14 April 1997, p. 4. Richardson refers not only to “Vietnamese officials” but also to the National Offshore Oil Corporation of China for providing the information. On 15 April, Shen Guofang, spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said, in response to a question by a reporter, that a meeting was held the previous week between China and Vietnam to discuss the “Nansha Islands issue”, that is, the Spratlys and both sides had agreed to solve the issue through “constant” consultations. No reference was made to the issue of Chinese oil exploration (BBC/FE/2895 G/4 [17 April 1997]).
93. BBC/FE/2892 B/3 (14 April 1997). See also Michael Richardson “China-Vietnam Dispute Revives Regional Fears”, International Herald Tribune, 14 April 1997, p. 4. Richardson refers not only to “Vietnamese officials” but also to the National Offshore Oil Corporation of China for providing the information. On 15 April, Shen Guofang, spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said, in response to a question by a reporter, that a meeting was held the previous week between China and Vietnam to discuss the “Nansha Islands issue”, that is, the Spratlys and both sides had agreed to solve the issue through “constant” consultations. No reference was made to the issue of Chinese oil exploration (BBC/FE/2895 G/4 [17 April 1997])., 2889 B/3 (10 April 1997). Michael Richardson attributes the information that the “oil rig” had been withdrawn following the “completion of planned exploration work” to the two sources referred to above (see note 92). Richardson, op. cit., p. 4.
94. BBC/FE/2900 G/5 (23 April 1997).
95. BBC/FE/2900 G/5 (23 April 1997)., 2872 B/5 (20 March 1997); and 2874 B/4.
96. BBC/FE/2900 G/5 (23 April 1997)., 2886 G/5 (7 April 1997).
97. Reports in the international press in connection with the latest upsurge in tension in March and April 1997 clearly showed the repercussion of the crisis on relations in the region and the turbulence it caused. See, for example, Richardson, op. cit., p. 4; “A rig too near”, The Economist 342, no. 8010 (29 March 1997): 68; and Michael Vatikiotis, Murray Hiebert, Nigel Holloway and Matt Forney, “Drawn to the Fray”, FEER, 3 April 1997, pp. 14–16.
98. The Chinese side reiterated its commitment to handle the territorial disputes through peaceful means in connection with the third round of political consultations between senior officials from ASEAN and China, held in Anhui Province in April 1997 (BBC/FE/2899 G/2 (22 April 1997); and 2900 G/5-7).
99. For details relating to the negotiations and agreement, see ibid., 2378 B/4–5 (10 August 1995): 2379 B/3 (11 August 1995); 2380 B/2-3 (12 August 1995); and FBIS-EAS-95-155 (11 August 1995), p. 50; 95–157 (15 August 1995), pp. 76–77; 95– 158 (16 August 1995), pp. 46–47.
100. For details relating to the negotiations and agreement, see BBC/FE/2456 B/4 (9 November 1995); and 2459 B/2 (13 November 1995).