Presumption and the practices of tentative cognition

Presumption and the Practices of Tentative Cognition

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 1-181

  Rescher, Nicholas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

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EID: 84930698981     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511498848     Document Type: Book

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