The Decision of the German Constitutional Court on the Immigration Act

German Law Journal

Volumn 4, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 91-106

  Becker, Florian ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84929268205     PISSN: None     EISSN: 20718322     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S2071832200015789     Document Type: Article

References (50)

1. The translation of the German word "können" influences the understanding of the provision. In German the meaning of this word is ambiguous. It may express either a prohibition or an impossibility of differing votes. The majority of the judges and the dissenters were not unanimous in their characterization of the meaning of this word.
2. According to Article 51.2 of the Basic Law each Land has at least three votes in the Bundesrat. Laender with more than two million inhabitants have four, Laender with more than seven million inhabitants, six votes. Article 51.3 of the Basic Law says that each Land may delegate as many representatives as it has votes. All in all there are 69 votes to be cast in the Bundesrat which means that 35 votes constitute a majority. The votes are distributed as follows: Baden-Württemberg (10.61 million inhabitants/6 votes); Bavaria 12.34/6; Berlin (3.39/4); Brandenburg (2.59/4); Bremen (0.66/3); Hamburg (1.73/3); Hesse (6.08/5); Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (1.76/3); Lower Saxony 7.96/6); North Rhine-Westphalia (18.05/6); Rhineland-Palatinate (4.05/4); Saarland (1.07/3); Saxony 4.37/4); Saxony-Anhalt (2.57/4); Schleswig-Holstein (2.81/4); Thuringia (2.41/4); source: http://www.bundesrat.de/Englisch/Wissen/index.html.
3. th ed.)
4. See, Fritz W. Scharpf, OPTIONEN DES FÖDERALISMUS IN DEUTSCHLAND UND EUROPA, p. 65 et seq.; Fritz W. Scharpf, Die gefesselte Republik, DIE ZEIT 35/2002; Rudolf Wassermann, 2003 NJW p. 331.
5. See, Fritz W. Scharpf, OPTIONEN DES FÖDERALISMUS IN DEUTSCHLAND UND EUROPA, p. 65 et seq.; Fritz W. Scharpf, Die gefesselte Republik, DIE ZEIT 35/2002; Rudolf Wassermann, 2003 NJW p. 331.
6. See, Fritz W. Scharpf, OPTIONEN DES FÖDERALISMUS IN DEUTSCHLAND UND EUROPA, p. 65 et seq.; Fritz W. Scharpf, Die gefesselte Republik, DIE ZEIT 35/2002; Rudolf Wassermann, 2003 NJW p. 331.
7. th ed., 2000).
8. th ed., 2000).
9. th ed., 2000).
10. The question whether the Bundesrat is, in the perspective of the constitution, a second chamber of legislation is discussed by Korioth at Art. 51 para. 24.
11. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the party "Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen" lend their political colours for this denomination.
12. t November 2001 (BT-Drcks. 14/7387; to be found under http://www.bundestag.de/).
13. See, Section 5.2.2 of this coalition agreement between the SPD and the CDU of Brandenburg (http://www.brandenburg.de/spd-fraktion/wir/koalitionsvertrag.htm (27 January 2003). But it has to be said that these contracts are of a political as opposed to a binding nature. Any violation does not have a legal effect on the violating act. See, Korioth at Art. 51 para. 24
14. nd ed. 1966); Klaus Stern, DAS STAATSRECHT DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND Vol. II, § 27 III 2 b (1980). Stern was followed by Dieter Blumenwitz, in BONNER KOMMENTAR ZUM GRUNDGESETZ, Art. 51 para. 26, 29 (Rudolf Dolzer / Klaus Vogel / Karin Graßhof eds., 1987).
15. nd ed. 1966); Klaus Stern, DAS STAATSRECHT DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND Vol. II, § 27 III 2 b (1980). Stern was followed by Dieter Blumenwitz, in BONNER KOMMENTAR ZUM GRUNDGESETZ, Art. 51 para. 26, 29 (Rudolf Dolzer / Klaus Vogel / Karin Graßhof eds., 1987).
16. nd ed. 1966); Klaus Stern, DAS STAATSRECHT DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND Vol. II, § 27 III 2 b (1980). Stern was followed by Dieter Blumenwitz, in BONNER KOMMENTAR ZUM GRUNDGESETZ, Art. 51 para. 26, 29 (Rudolf Dolzer / Klaus Vogel / Karin Graßhof eds., 1987).
17. It is essential to point out the fact that, though Minister/Prime Minister being the title for the capacity the acting persons have as a member of their Laender-government, in the sphere of the Bundesrat they all are "representatives" and not Ministers or Prime Ministers.
18. th session of the Bundesrat on 22 March 2002, p. 147 et seq. (to be found under http://www.parlamentsspiegel.de/).
19. See, Section 29.1(2) of the standing order of the Bundesrat (German version http://www.bundesrat.de/Wissen/index.html). According to this provision one Land after the other is called to cast its vote.
20. th session of the Bundesrat on 19 December 1949, p. 116.
21. Decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (2 BvF 1/02), 18 December 2002 (www.bverfg.de). In the following text I refer to the decision by citing its paragraphs.
22. A few days after the conflict arose the first opinions were published in newspaper articles (Peter Lerche, Christian Pestalozza, Martin Morlok, in the SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, (25 March 2002)). The FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG of 25 March 2002 printed parts of the counselling opinion Josef Isensee had delivered to Minister Schoenbohm before the session of the Bundesrat about the constitutional implications of the coming situation. Apart from those articles dozens of interviews and readers' opinions written by lawyers or non-lawyers were published in every German newspaper. Not surprisingly, the legal journals and their authors worked hard and quickly to publish articles about the constitutional question at the core of the conflict. It did not take long until a huge number of articles was published. See, e.g., Wolf-Rüdiger Schenke, 2002 NJW p. 1318; Carsten F. Soerensen, 2002 NJW Vol. 24, p. XII; Roland Fritz / Karl-Heinz Hohn, AUSLÄNDER- UND ASYLRECHT (AuAS) - special edition on 19 April 2002; Claus-Peter Bienert, 2002 THÜRVBL. p. 108; Florian Becker, 2002 NVWZ p. 569; Jörn Ipsen, 2002 DVBL. p. 653; Werner Hoppe, 2002 DVBL. p. 725; Dieter Dörr / Heinrich Wilms, 2002 ZRP p. 265; Rolf Gröschner, 2002 JZ p. 621; Albert v. Mutius / Jörg Pöße, 2002 LKV p. 345; Tobias Linke, 2002 VERWALTUNGSRUNDSCHAU p. 229; Hartmut Bauer, 2002 RUP p. 70; Jürgen Jekewitz, 2002 RUP p. 83. The articles are compiled and commented in a book edited by the counsellor of the Federal Government. See, ABSTIMMUNGSKONFLIKT IM BUNDESRAT IM SPIEGEL DER STAATSRECHTSLEHRE (Hans Meyer ed., 2003). In this article I will cite the texts as they can be found in the book. After the deadline of the book the following articles were published: Rolf Lamprecht, 2002 NJW p. 2686; Peter Lerche, 2002 BAYVBL p. 577; Christian Burkiczak, 2002 BAYVBL p. 578; Thomas Starke, 2002 SÄCHSVBL p. 232; Andreas Fischer-Lescano / Peter Spengler, 2002 KJ p. 337; Kerstin Odendahl, 2002 JUS p. 1049.
23. Para. 136 et seq. of the decision.
24. Para. 141 et seq. of the decision.
25. Konrad Reuter, in PARLAMENTSRECHT UND PARLAMENTSPRAXIS IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND, § 56 para. 5 (Hans-Peter Schneider / Wolfgang Zeh eds., 1989)
26. See, e.g., Article 89.1 of the Brandenburg Constitution.
27. This does not mean that the directives would be invalid. But acting against the directive does not have any influence on the validity of the vote.
28. Section 12 Abs. 1 lit. (d) of the standing order of the Government of Brandenburg (4 July 2000) (See, Article 89.1 of the Brandenburg Constitution).
29. See, Reuter, PRAXISHANDBUCH BUNDESRAT, Art. 51 GG para. 62 (1991).
30. From what has been said before it should have become clear that it was not the Land Brandenburg but its representatives that did not vote unanimously. The discussion whether the votes belong to the Land or to the representatives is carried out by Meyer at p. 146 (149 et seq.)
31. Para. 143 et. seq. of the decision.
32. Para. 154 et seq. of the decision.
33. Para. 177 et seq. of the decision.
34. The misunderstanding, that it is the Land that has to cast its votes and not its representatives can be seen throughout the dissenting opinion. Hereby it becomes obvious that the dissenting opinion relies upon a highly questionable approach to the structure of the Bundesrat, saying that the majority denies the "right of the Land Brandenburg" to correct its dissenting vote from the first voting round (para. 155 of the decision). But if one talks of the Land, than there is only a short way to go to a reintroduction of hierarchical structures within the Land. And this is exactly what happens.
35. Para. 157 et seq. of the decision.
36. Para. 158 of the decision.
37. Para. 159 of the decision.
38. Article 6.2 of the Reichsverfassung 1870/71: "Every member of the Federation can send as many authorized persons to the Bundesrat as it has votes, but the whole of the votes can only be cast unanimously."
39. th ed., 1911).
40. All decisions come into force at the end of the session (See, § 32.1 of the standing orders of the Bundesrat). The dissenting judges show that in numerous cases the President of the Bundesrat has been asked to repeat a voting process. See, para. 164 of the decision.
41. Para. 169 of the decision.
42. Para. 145 of the decision.
43. See, Maunz, Der Bundesrat als Verfassungsorgan und politische Kraft, in BUNDESRAT 193, 206 (1974).
44. According to Section 29.1(2) of the standing order of the Bundesrat the Land is to be called to cast its vote.
45. Para. 174 of the decision.
46. This knowledge did not result from any background information, rumours or newspaper reading, as the dissenting judges imply, but from the clear and unequivocal announcement during the debate and from the "no" vote of the first voting round.
47. Para. 178 of the decision.
48. Martin Oldiges, DIE BUNDESREGIERUNG ALS KOLLEGIUM, p. 456 (1983)
49. Para. 168 et seq. of the decision.
50. Para. 178 et seq. of the decision.