A theory of confucian selfhood: Self-cultivation and free will in confucian philosophy

Confucian Ethics: A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy, and Community

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 124-147

  Cheng, Chung Ying ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII   (United States)

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EID: 84928924778     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511606960.007     Document Type: Chapter

References (30)

1. The term “xiuji” was used in the Analects, when Confucius says: “Cultivate oneself for/with reverence, cultivate oneself for/with bringing peace to others, cultivate oneself for/with bringing peace to the people” (Analects [or Lunyu], 14-42)
2. Here one must beware of the ambiguity of the particle “yi”. “Yi” (by means of, in virtue of, therewith) is instrumental as well as teleological. Hence we should interpret and understand this Confucian statement carefully. D. C. Lao’s translation that “He cultivates himself and thereby achieves reverence. He cultivates himself and thereby brings peace and security to his fellow men. He cultivates himself and thereby brings peace and security to the people”, though correct with regard to the sense of teleology of “yi”, is deficient with regard to the sense of instrumentality of the “yi”. Do we have independent content of the self-cultivation? If the independent content of self-cultivation is a fixed process, then we need not consider the instrumental aspect of cultivation in this quotation. The instrumental use of “yi” in the Lunyu is amply exemplified in such sentences as “daozhi yi zheng, qizhi yi xing”, “daozhi yi de, qizhi yi li”, which are respectively translated by D. C. Lau as “Guide them by edicts, and keep them in line with punishments”, “Guide them by virtue and keep them in line with rituals.” In this essay, all my quotations from Analects (Lunyu), Mencius (Mengzi), the Doctrine of the Mean (Zhong Yong) and the Great Learning (Da Xue) are from the Index Editions of the Confucian texts of the Harvard-Yenching Institute. But I have done the actual English translations from the Confucian texts.
3. For example, one could think in time on mathematical structures or logical analytical reasoning. In reflection, one could reorder different elements from a subject matter drawn from life and world. This is how theoretical and scientific thinking is possible.
4. With regard to Kant, we could think of experience as the transcendental condition for the rise of categories or as the source from which categories emerge by reflection. Since there is no absolute necessity that one set of categories must be uniquely relevant and explanatory, there could be many and alternative sets of categories for epistemological or scientific explanation. In fact, development of modern science has shown that discovery of new phenomenon and enlargement of experience, whether controlled experimentally or not, gives rise to new theoretical constructs or even revolutionary theoretical revolutions. Thomas Kuhn’s discussion of logic of discovery and structures of scientific revolutions in paradigm shifts illustrates at length that there are no transcendental categories fixed for all in a transcendental ego but instead that our empirical inquiry into reality and our reflection on our findings determine or give rise to laws and theories: laws and theories emerge from reflections on inquiries. As empirical inquiry is an open process so is the process of reflection. In this connection, I want to show that similar arguments can be given against Kant’s model of moral reasoning. It seems clear that Kant reaches his notion of moral agent as a lawgiver and moral law as a categorical imperative as a result of modeling his transcendental ego as defining and dictating the categorical forms for the formation of knowledge. Similarly the formation of morality (or moral action) must be defined and determined in accordance with the moral law of the transcendental moral ego. But then if we could substitute an Emergence Model for the Transcendence Model of knowledge, we could analogically substitute an Emergence Model for the Transcendence Model of morality so that we could conceive morality as resulting from emergence of a right principle in our concrete grasp of a moral situation in light of all relevant facts of world and history. This is precisely how we could understand the Confucian philosophy of morality, and this is the point Mou Tsungshan wishes to convey in his construction of a moral metaphysics, which unfortunately he has failed to do.
5. Augustine says: “I know well enough what time is, provided nobody asks me to explain. But if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled.” (See his Confessions, Book XI.) But in trying to identify time, Augustine comes to the conclusion that “Time is insofar as it tends not to be.” The essence of time is its ability to absent itself. Similarly we could say that the subject of self consists in its ability to absent itself and is found only in reflection of the subject as object, and the reflective activity of the subject is a presentation or emergence based on the object as subject. The reflection defines the subject and gives it transcendence, but there is nothing else to be posited for the subject or its content.
6. In common use, zi means “from” whereas ji simply means oneself being referred to by whoever is speaking. Together ziji means “from oneself”. When we know whichever person is identified as the speaker or subject of a sentence by a noun or a pronoun, ziji refers back to that person so identified. Hence we can speak of “myself” (wo ziji), “himself” (ta ziji), or “Wang himself” (Wang ziji). Hence ziji as a whole performs a reflective or self-reflexive function. But between zi, and ji, zi represents an action originating from the self as a source, whereas ji represents the source from which an action originates. Etymologically, in light of a careful inquiry into the oracle bone inscriptions, we can see that zi originates from the script symbolizing “nose”. We also know that, according to early Chinese understanding, a human embryo shapes into a human form by first growing a nose. Hence the term zi embodies not only the meaning of the human self but the meaning of a natural development of a human being. On the other hand, ji has a more complicated etymological background in oracle bone inscriptions. It originates from the system of qualities for seasons and directions (so-called heavenly stems) in which ji (together with wu) stands for the earth as the center of a system of five powers. In this way, ji refers to the self as an inner and central position as opposed to an outer and peripheral position. It is obvious that one gains this metaphorical insight because one can compare the inner with the outer, the central with the peripheral, from consideration or reflection on a whole system of locations. Even more important is the fact that one has to reflect on oneself as something located in the center of the world, hence comparable to the ji or wu-ji position in the five powers. To assign a reflective function to ji is no doubt warranted. As to the use of the composite term ziji to refer to self, it is obviously a modern term that does not appear in the Confucian classics and other classics. For the etymological explanations of zi and ji, please confer with Duan Yucai’s Shouwn Jiezi Shou (Taipei: Culture Books Company, 1979), pp. 142, 769-70.
7. But for zi, the reflection on self is a matter of either originating or having source from self, whereas for ji the reflection on self is a matter of relating to a target, namely to what the self wishes to achieve.
8. See the Analects, 1-8, 6-30.
9. See Analects, 4-17, 5-27.
10. In Lunyu, we have a total count of nine cases of the use of zi as subject of self and a total count of twelve cases of the use of zi as source or direction. In both accounts, zi is used as a syncategoretic term that signifies no positing of an independent entity.
11. My purpose here is to show that the Confucian notion of the human self can be explained in relation to the notions of mind and nature of the human person on the one hand, and that the notions of mind and nature of the human person can be illuminated by the active and reflective powers of the human self as the term zi-ji connotes under a philosophical interpretation of zi and ji on the other hand.
12. See Analects, 7-25.
13. See Analects., 2-4.
14. As we shall see, the basis and the medium for the unity and mutual transformability of the mind and body is the nature understanding the person or the self.
15. See Analects, 7-12, 6-19. In this connection we can identify the active or empirical self as the “heart-mind-body” (xin-shen) of the person, and we can identify the transcendent or reflective self as the “heart-mind-nature” (xin-xing) of the person.
16. See Analects, 18-8.
17. Analects, 19-6.
18. See Mencius, 7a-23.
19. See Mencius, 6a-7.
20. See Mencius, 6b-15.
21. For this one needs to read Mencius, 6a-10, on his discussion on the choice between fish and bear palm and the analogical choice between life and righteousness (yi). That a person could choose righteousness over life is because his will can desire and has desired righteousness more than life. Therefore, it chooses the latter over the former.
22. There are nevertheless the notion of Lord on High (shangdi) and the notion of the Heaven (tian) in the Shangshu (Book of History) and Shijing (Book of Odes), which have been suggested to reflect a notion of God. But we must be aware that the Hebrew notion of Jehovah has transformed into the later and modern Christian notion of God, and that the pre-Confucian notions of shangdi and tian have also transformed into the Confucian notion of ren and the Mencian notion of xing or for that matter the Daoist notion of the dao.
23. See Lawrence Kohlberg, Essays on Moral Development (New York: Harper and Row, 1981).
24. Carol Gilligan (in her In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982])
25. Nel Noddings (in her Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984]) have attempted to describe a different route of moral development, which is centered on caring rather on rational law. This approach is close to the Confucian doctrine of ren but lacks the metaphysical considerations and thus the metaphysical basis of moral virtues from the understanding of the human person.
26. In recent feminist literature, “care ethics” and “trust ethics” have been proposed as alternative models for moral development and moral understanding other than the rational ethics of Kant and the Kohlbergian development of the rational morality. Confer with Carol Gilligan’s book In a Different Voice.
27. See Mencius, 2a-2.
28. In fact, one may consider that this creative individuation of the self is presented as first the creative individuation of nature into heart-mind and then second as the creative individuation of heart-mind into intention and will in the heart-mind, and finally we can see the freedom of will (hence that of mind and self) as a matter of creative individuation of will into freedom or individuative creation of freedom from the will.
29. See the Doctrine of the Mean (Zhong Yong), Section 25.
30. See his book Tianzhu Shiyi (The Substantial Meanings of the Catholic Religion) (English-Chinese version: St. Louis: St. Louis University Press, 1985), pp. 352-4.