Brazil: The politics of the Cruzado Plan

Third World Quarterly

Volumn 8, Issue 4, 1986, Pages 1151-1194

  Flynn, Peter ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84928452274     PISSN: 01436597     EISSN: 13602241     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01436598608419945     Document Type: Article

References (162)

1. For speculation on the possibility of de-indexation at some time in the coming year see: Senhor, 25 February 1986, p 34. For details on the choice of name for the new currency, which gave its more popular name to the Plan as a whole, see ibid., 11 March 1986, p 35.
2. See, for example, the long interview with the economist Pérsio Arida (Special Secretary for Economic Affairs in the Finance Ministry), one of the small group of theorists behind the Plan, in Senhor, 25 March 1986. As he rightly says, had Sarney on Friday 28 February announced that he was starting a process which would culminate in a general price freeze, then prices would have tripled by Monday. As it was, after rumours began to spread on Thursday the 27th, some supermarkets paid employees double-time to work all through the night, marking up prices. In this respect, to criticise the package, as some people have done, for being authoritarian and non-democratic seems unrealistic and unfair.
3. For the immediate background see the interview with another key theorist, Luiz Gonzaga Belluzzo (Special Secretary for Economic and Social Coordination in Seplan, Secretariat of Planning), Senhor, 11 March 1986, pp 32-8.
4. In addition to Belluzzo and Arida, those most associated with the new strategy were Francisco Lopes (PUC), André Lara Resende (Director of Public Debt in the Central Bank), João Manoel Cardoso de Mello (Special Adviser in the Finance Ministry), Luis Carlos Mendonça de Barros (Director in the Area of Capital Markets of the Central Bank), Andrea Calabi (General Secretary of Seplan) and Edmar Bacha (President of the Getúlio Vargas Foundation).
5. See the very interesting interview with Pazzianotto, Veja, 5 March 1986.
6. Again for details see the Belluzzo interview. Senhor, 11 March 1986. The idea of ‘inertial inflation’ and the need for a sudden price freeze seems to have owed much to Francisco Lopes and André Lara Resende, ibid., pp 40-1. Criticism of indexation in these terms was not, of course, confined to economists of the left. A fierce critic, even in the later years of the military government, was Octâvio Gouvêa Bulhöes, Minister of Finance in the Castello Branco government, who, after introducing indexation, later became one of its sternest critics. See especially his long interview in Veja, 20 March 1985, pp 5-8. Bulhôes, speaking two days before Tancredo Neves was to take office, urged the need to end the monetary correction he had introduced, despite the risks entailed. The current deficit is due ‘… above all, to the transmission of past inflation to the future through the mechanism of monetary correction.’
7. For a useful break-down and comparison of the two Plans see Senhor, 11 March 1986, pp 39-41.
8. See the comments of Senator Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Veja, 5 March 1986, p 36. Perhaps the most convenient summary of the Plan, which has parallel texts in Portuguese, English and Spanish, is: Brasil: Programa de Estabilização Econômica. (Economic Stabilisation Programme) Secretariat of Planning of the Presidency of the Republic, Brasilia, 1986.
9. Ibid., p 21.
10. Programa, op. cit., pp 20-1.
11. For balance of payments 1984-86 see Programa, op. cit., p 30, Table I. For inflation rates, exchange rates and monetary correction 1983-February 1986, see ibid., p 36, Table IV.
12. See the report by Robert Graham, Financial Times (London) 7 April 1986.
13. See the Belluzzo interview: op. cit., p 36. Also the article by Marizete Mudim, ibid., pp 29-31.
14. Mudim, op. cit., p. 31. Belluzzo, op. cit., p 36. Arida, op. cit., who notes this as the first success since September 1982: Programa, op. cit., p 29 and p 31, Table III, National Accounts Statistics. For a useful account of attempts at stabilisation see Reinaldo Gonçalves, ‘Brazil's search for stabilisation’, Third World Quarterly 7(2) April 1985, p 279-which shows clearly the difference between those efforts, in relation, for example, to the IMF and the Cruzado Plan.
15. Programa: op. cit., p 29.
16. Veja, 5 March 1986, p 22.
17. This provision, it should be noted, was not in the original decree. It was conceded just over two weeks later, on the decision of Sarney, as a concession to Pazzianotto, to help him in dealing with the trade unions. Funaro opposed it as a dangerous return to indexation. See below p 1173-4.
18. For a typically enthusiastic reception see Veja, 5 March 1986, pp 19-38. It speaks of Sarney's boldness (‘the most courageous decision of his political career’ (p 19),) notes the degree of public support and how critics, especially in the PMDB, have been silenced. See, too, Senhor, 4 March 1986, which refers to ‘extreme courage’ and ibid., 11 March, 1986, pp 32-52, which examines the reaction of different groups of politicians, economists, bankers, industrialists and trade unions. The Latin America Regional Reports (Brazil), having referred, on 7 February, to recent editorials in the Jornal do Brasil, Folha de Säo Paulo and Estado de Sâo Paulo, all critical of the government's inaction over inflation, notes the PMDB's enthusiasism for the new plan (14 March) and the political benefits for Sarney (25 April).
19. See Veja, 11 March 1986, pp 43-5; also pp 51-2 on the ending of ‘overnight’ and the blow to financial speculation. For the pressures from bankers see ibid., p 38.
20. Senhor, 4 March 1986, p 34.
21. Ibid., pp 42-3.
22. See the Belluzzo interview, Senhor, 11 March 1986, p 34, where he says that democracy allows a new relationship between government and society, with government accepting the responsibility given to it in the campaign for direct elections (diretasjâ). Also Arida, op. cit., 25 March 1986, who says the participation of the people is fundamental to success, especially of more organised groups, such as the unions and the ‘base communities’ (organizaçôes de base). Also Programa, op. cit., p 29, ending by saying that the Plan can be successful ‘With the confidence and support of Brazilian society… ‘
23. For a rather untypical and unusually bitter comment, see Franklin de Oliveira: ‘Delirio messiânico’, Senhor, 11 March 1986, p 67. Rejecting Sarney's claim to have made ‘the greatest revolution in the history of t he country’, Oliveira insists that all he had done ‘is to patch up [remender] Brazilian capitalism… taken to the point of insanity by a military dictatorship… which, by commission or omission,… Sarney served devotedly for twenty years’.
24. Much of t he following section is taken from the current ESRC-financed project of Elizabeth Allen and Peter Flynn, ‘Brazil: The State and Opposition 1978-85. Parties, Pressures and Policy Implications’.
25. In two long interviews in September 1983 and July 1985, General Golbery explained to the researchers why he believed abertura was necessary and the nature of the opposition to it. The reasons included the need to end the growing corruption in civil and military circles and the need for more effective government, while opposition to the process was mainly seen as centred around retired officers entrenched in the business world, especially through their links to the ‘intelligence community’ and the security services.
26. See P Flynn, Brazil: A Political Analysis, London, 1978, pp 508-9. Also Maria Helena Moreira Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil, Austin, Texas; 1985, pp 148-51.
27. Some people argue that the regime was more often unsuccessful than successful in imposing these controls. It is a fine point, but one has to admire the ability, resilience and capacity for control of a system which can lead the head of the government party to become President of the Republic at t he head of the opposition movement within the space of a few months.
28. The Byzantine politics are complex, but again involved the security services, when two of its members blew themselves up when planting a bomb at a May Day rally. It is interesting that, at the time of Golbery's resignation, someone could recall without the need for embellishment the story of Metternich, who on hearing the news of Talleyrand's death, paused and mused thoughtfully: I wonder what advantage he hopes to gain from t h a t… ? ‘
29. See Flynn, op. cit., pp 483-5.
30. See Moreira Alves, op. cit., especially pp 274-95, Tables A.9, A.10, and A.11 for the strikes of 1978,1979 and 1980; also ibid., pp 174-82. See, too, Scott Mainwaring, Grass Roots Popular Movements and the Struggle for Democracy: Nova Iguaçu 1974-85, Notre Dame, Indiana: Kellogg Institute, University of Notre Dame. Working Papers No. 52, December 1985, and by the same author. The Transition to Democracy in Brazil, Kellogg Institute, Working Paper No. 66, March 1986.
31. T. h e chronological details are important in explaining the pace and direction of these alliances. They include a meeting between Vice-President Aureliano Chaves and Governor Tancredo Neves in the Vice-Presidential Palácio do Jaburú on 1 July, a meeting between Aureliano and ex-President Ernesto Geisel (still a key figure in military as well as civilian politics) on 2 July, and a visit to Brasilia on 6 August by Geisel, to talk to the President. On 14 August the alliance between the Frente Liberal and the PMDBwas formalised as the agreement of the Palácio do Jaburú. For some of these moves see especially: G Dimenstein et al., O Complô que elegeu Tancredo, Rio de Janeiro, 1985. Also David Fleischer: ‘Brazil at the Crossroads: The Elections of 1982 and 1985’, (mimeo) San Diego, California: February 1985.
32. In an interesting interview in September 1984, Senator Sarney explained to us how he and others had been able to make the shift in party and bring most of their base support with them.
33. In an interview in Rio de Janeiro in 1985, Wellington Moreira Franco, PDS candidate for governor in 1982, explained how, with more determined and astute leadership, the Agreement of the Palácio do Jaburú could have been the pact of the Palácio da Alvorada: in other words, made within the P. D. S and t he regime, not outside it.
34. In a fascinating interview in September 1984, one of the main author's of the programme of the Democratic Alliance, when asked about Tancredo's chances of winning, smiled, and asked in return whether we thought Tancredo would have given up t he governorship of his home state. Minas Gerais, the job he had always wanted, unless his election were already guaranteed ‘by us’?
35. Both the PT and the P. D. T (Democratic Labour Party) expressed strong reservations about voting indirectly. During the meeting of the Electoral College, five of t he eight PT deputies remained in a public hallway in the Congress building, denouncing the election as spurious. All PDT deputies but one voted for Tancredo, to defeat Maluf, but making it clear that his government must be ‘provisional’ with a Constituent Assembly to be called by, at the latest, November 1986. See Jornal do Brasil, 16 January 1985, and criticism in Folha de São Paulo of the same day, especially by Francisco de Oliveira, ‘E agora transição.’
36. Born in 1910, Tancredo, a lawyer, banker and academic was a cautious politician, tied closely to Juscelino Kubitschek and the PSD in his native state, Minas Gérais. Elected Federal Deputy in 1951, he became Minister of Justice under Vargas and always remained loyal to one thread in the Vargista tradition. He was defeated in the election for State Governor of Minas in 1960 by the UDN candidate, Magalhães Pinto, but became the first Prime Minister of the parliamentary regime, in 1961-2 under Goulart, and in 1963 the Chamber majority leader. He survived the coup of 1964, when others lost their political rights, but never compromised with the new regime, whose leaders mostly respected him. He joined the MDB, but in 1979-80 moved into the new PP (Partido Popular), the group especially favoured by entrepreneurs and bankers. In February 1982, under new pressures, he joined the PMDB and in November was elected Governor of Minas Gérais. For an especially useful discussion of his career, see Folha de Säo Paulo, 16 January 1985.
37. See on this concept Michel Debrun, A ‘Conciliaçâo’ e outras estrategias, Säo Paulo, 1983. One was not surprised to be told in an interview that Golbery do Couto e Silva had once remarked that if his strategy, for whatever reason, could not be carried through, Tancredo Neves would be the ideal fall-back candidate. It has not yet been possible to verify the report, but it is distinctly plausible.
38. By publicly criticising Brizola's choice of state secretaries.
39. Senhor, 4 March 1986.
40. Veja, 20 November 1985, p 40.
41. On the elections for prefeito, see especially Veja, 6 November, 13 November and 20 November 1985. On Brizola's position especially see 20 November, pp 52-5.
42. Veja, 6 November 1985, p 36.
43. Veja, 6 November 1985.
44. Veja, 6 November 1985, pp 36-41.
45. This came out clearly in an interview in Rome with Fernando Henrique Cardoso in late January 1986, a view he later expressed more forcefully and publicly.
46. Veja, 20 November 1985, pp 43, 48-50.
47. One journalist remarked that the ARENA men of the day before yesterday, the PDS men of yesterday, are now ‘liberals’ and continue in power-even stronger than before. Senhor, 18 February 1986, p 24.
48. Cf. Senhor, 18 February 1986, pp 33-4.
49. Senhor, 18 February 1986, p 33. î 3 Senhor, 25 February 1986, pp 2 2-3. This was a more reformist and nationalist group within the UDN.
50. See ibid., pp 28-9.
51. Roberto Magalhães, Governor of Pernambuco (PFL), threatened to join forces with his arch-enemy Brizola, ibid., pp 29-30.
52. Senhor, 11 February 1986, p 28.
53. Senhor, 25 February 1986.
54. Interview, Rome, January 1986. See, too, interview Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Senhor, 4 March 1986.
55. Senhor, 25 February 1986, p 32.
56. Just two days before the announcement, Fernando Henrique Cardoso in an interview in the Jornal do Brazil had made one of the most scathing attacks so far by a PMDB leader on the government, declaring that the New Republic was really no different from the Old, and that the Democratic Alliance had broken up.
57. See Veja, 5 March 1986, p 36.
58. As Fernando Henrique Cardoso admitted, ibid. Even Federal Deputies further to the left, such as Alberto Goldman of the PCB (Brazilian Communist Party) and Haroldo Lima of the PC do B (Communist Party of Brazil) praised, for example, the attempt to protect wages, ibid.
59. See, for instance, Francisco Dornelles, former Minister of Finance: “The measures will profoundly affect the private sector, the financial system and wages…. Overall, the package is recessive’, ibid, p 27. This, and other criticism quoted here, still contrasts sharply with the praise from other former Finance Ministers, such as Octávio Bulhoes and Mário Henrique Simonsen, ibid.
60. On the eve of the Plan he strongly disclaimed any direct political interest, telling Ministers and advisers: ‘You all know how I came to the presidency. I have no commitment to any political o r economic group whatsoever and I am not a candidate for anything. What I do know is that Brazil needs a reform like this one. Let's get on with i t… “ Veja, 5 March 1986.
61. In the weeks leading up to the Plan, Brizola's supporters had grown more hopeful in their opposition to the government and their aim to reduce Sarney's mandate to three years. Senhor, 11 March 1986, pp 27-8. Brizola's television speech of 7 March was much criticised for being misinformed and opportunist. See, for example, Veja, 12 March 1986, pp 36-7. Also Senhor, 18 March 1986, pp 52-3.
62. Ibid. Others, such as Fernando Henrique Cardoso, also commented that it would take some months for the success or failure of the Plan to be seen. Veja, 5 March 1986, p 39. : ‘Either we'll be saved or we'll be in a similar situation.to that of Argentina’.
63. Veja, 12 March 1986, p 38. See, too, Senhor, 11 March 1986, pp 42-3.
64. Veja, 12 March 1986, p 38. For severe criticism see the piece by Franklin de Oliveira, Senhor, 18 March 1986, p 73.
65. Veja, 12 March 1986, p 38. The question, it must be said, is not simple. One calculation suggests that, as from 1 March, in terms of the new law, the average wage will be less than in the past six months, only if inflation were to run at 2.5 per cent a month or more. For details and a useful table, see Veja, 19 March 1986, p 42.
66. Bankers, feeling themselves badly hit by the changes, spoke of the need for very substantial cuts in staff. See Veja, 12 March 1986, p 30, and 19 March, pp 52-3. Also Brazil Information No. 24. April-May 1986, p 1.
67. Veja, 12 March 1986, p 38. Meneguelli's doleful remark: ‘Now, after the package, there is no climate in which to talk of a general strike’, ibid p 64.
68. Decree Law No. 2. 284. See above p 1158 and Note 17.
69. See Veja, 19 March 1986, pp 42-5. ‘Um passo para trás’ (‘A step backwards.’) Also Senhor, 18 March 1986, pp 28-32. The conservative Estado de Säo Paulo said ironically that this new law confirmed the Sarney government's ‘option for the poor’, the phrase associated with ‘liberation theology’.
70. See the comments of Luís Eulálio de Büeno Vidigal Filho, president of FIESP (Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo), ibid. Another employer did note, however, that not allowing prices to be passed on automatically did not mean they could not be passed on at all. The critics of the measure introduced yet another neologism, pazzianottar, meaning, for them, an attempt to destabilise the economy.
71. Ibid., p 45.
72. Veja, 9 April 1986, p 20. Also see the useful article ibid., pp 100-3, which examines these price falls in detail. It suggests that preliminary estimates of the IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) put the fall at 1.8 p e r cent.
73. Luis Gushiken in Sâo Paulo claimed that over one hundred jobs a day were being lost in banks in São Paulo. Work, therefore, was stopped on the previous Friday in twenty-eight banks in the city and more disruption was promised, ibid.
74. Veja, 9 April 1986, p 20. The teachers’ strike in Rio de Janeiro was particularly embarrassing for Brizola and the mayor, Saturnino Braga, who had condemned the Plan for its depression of wages. The State Teachers’ Centre (CEP) claimed that their wages, in Brazil's second richest state, were substantially lower than that of equivalent colleagues in Acre or Mato Grosso do Sul. A teacher starting work in one of the CIEPs, the integrated schools, on which Brizola has lavished money and of which he is rightly proud, earned, it was claimed, less than the man on the nearby corner, the apontador of the jogo do bicho (animal game), a sort of ‘bookie's runner’. Brizola, as with earlier strikes (of doctors, for example) refused to negotiate ‘with a knife at my chest’. Interestingly, eight hundred parents in Nova Iguaçu, a Brizola stronghold, even though their children had lost their school meals because of the strike, organised a rally in support of the teachers.
75. Early June 1986. However by late May, one source did suggest that up to 600 strikes were being prepared. Senhor, 20 May 1986, p 25.
76. One interesting development, which may help more effective organisation, was the appearance in late March of a new CGT (Central Geral dos Trabalhadores). The new organisation, which has been criticised, especially by the CUT, as a new way of presenting CONCLAT, has the stated aim of uniting the trade union movement. It has adopted the initials of the Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores of the 1960s, which put strong pressure on Goulart to introduce basic reforms and became a prime target after the coup of 1964. The PCB (Brazilian Communist Party), again made legal, was prominent in the CGT's congress in São Paulo state, attended by 6,000 workers. Cooperation between CUT and the CGT was achieved in late May during the debate in Congress on j ob security legislation (Senhor, 27 May 1986, p 25), but it was hard to keep up.
77. For a government statement of its aims and achievements in the first year of office, see ‘Governo José Sarney-Ano. 1. O Brasil Mudou.’ Veja, 19 March 1986. For a detailed study, again based on an E. S. RC project, of the problem of poverty and of one aspect of the social security system, to which Sarney's government has promised to give urgent help, see: Elizabeth Allen: Poverty and Social Welfare in Brazil: A Challenge for Civilian Government, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Glasgow, Occasional Paper No. 44. 1985.
78. See Senhor, 18 March 1986, pp 49-51, and, especially, 18 March, pp 32-4.
79. Veja, 12 March 1986, p 32.
80. Brazil Information, No 24, April-May 1984, p 1.
81. Veja, 19 March 1986, p 41.
82. Ibid., 2 April 1986, p 26. ‘Bombril’ (a kind of Brillo pad) was fixed at a price lower than the cost of production. A tin of Vienna sausages cost 6.64 cruzados in Santa Catarina (where it was made) but its price in Fortaleza, over 4,000 kilometres away, was fixed at 6.40.
83. Veja, 2 April 1986, pp. 20-6.
84. On Monday, 28 April, one of Brazil's most popular television comedians, Jô Soares, did a sketch as the ‘Fiscala do Sarney’ (the lady watch-dog of Sarney), indignant that a toilet roll which she had bought contained half a metre less than it should. He did not know, at the time, that over 1,500 kilometres to the south, in Rio Grande do Sul, the Federal Police had discovered that Bom Dia (Good Morning) toilet roll was 8 metres short in every roll (27 instead of 35). ‘Just as well I warned them’, said J ô.
85. Brazil Information. Rio de Janeiro, (24) April-May 1986, p 1.
86. Veja, 12 March 1986, p 28. Especially see Senhor, 18 March 1986, pp 57-60.
87. Ibid., 19 March 1986, p 36.
88. Ibid., pp 52-3. The incoming president of Febraban, Antonio de Pâdua Rocha Diniz, asked the government to minimise the difficulties of ‘transition’. Funaro replied that bankers must first show that they had done everything possible to cut costs. For other evidence of pressure from bankers and of government resistance, see Senhor, 11 March 1986, p 38, and, especially, pp 43-5.
89. O. Globo, 16 March 1986. In the first weeks after the announcement of the Plan the police were called upon to try to discover the source of waves of rumours, especially in Rio and São Paulo, of the imminent collapse of banks, especially when, in only two days in early March, more than 600 million cruzados were withdrawn from the Banco Itaú in São Paulo by frightened customers. Again, the government and the bankers had to give reassurances that no such threat existed. Veja, 19 March 1986, pp 54-5.
90. Senhor, 22 April 1986, pp 45-7.
91. Veja, 23 April 1986, p 19.
92. Veja, 30 April 1986, p 20.
93. Ibid., p p 20-5.
94. Ibid., p 22.
95. Senhor, 6 May 1986, pp 30-2. ‘Os inimigos d o bom senso.’ Also Veja, 30 April 1986, pp 22-3.
96. Ibid., pp 31-2.
97. O. n the problem of the deficit, which some people forecast could reach 5 per cent of G. N. P by the end of the year, see Senhor, 13 May 1986, pp 48-50. Funaro, again spoke of ‘saboteurs’ of the Plan and in an interview, on 7 May, said the government was doing everything to contain public spending. The state companies, it was estimated, were responsible for a deficit of 2.5 per cent of GNP. One result of the growing worry over the deficit was a quickening of plans to reform the banking system. Also on the deficit see the interview given by Minister Joâo Sayad to Jornal da Tarde, 13 May 1986, and Senhor, 20 May 1986, pp 32-4.
98. Veja, 30 April 1986, p 25.
99. See the interview with the Minister of Justice, Paulo Brossard, Veja 12 March 1986, p 6.
100. Ibid., p 8
101. Veja, 30 April, 1986 p 20.
102. Senhor. 22 April, 1986. T h e President proudly announced on 15 May figures which showed that 72 per cent of all the television sets in the country were switched on for his speech of the night before. 108 See, for example, José Bardawil, ‘José “Getülio” Sarney’ (Senhor, 25 March 1986, p p 37-8) stressing Sarney's growing control over the parties of the Democratic Alliance and his aim to strengthen his party support, perhaps by building his own party.
103. Veja, 9 April 1986, p 25.
104. See the survey of middle-class opinion reported in Senhor, 29 April 1986, p p 36-8.
105. Luis Gonzaga Belluzzo, Veja, 12 March 1986, p 65.
106. Senhor, 6 May 1986, p p 32-4.
107. Ibid., p 33.-Unemployment benefit was to be 70 per cent of the minimum wage (Cz $562.80) for workers who had earned, on average, 1.4 minimum wage (Cz $1.125.60) in the three months before being unemployed, and 150 per cent of the minimum wage (Cz $1,206.00) for those who were earning three minimum wages. Those who earned between 1.5 and three minimum wages would get 50 per cent of their basic pay (based on the average of the last three months, calculated by adding the wages for those three months and dividing by three.) Benefit would last for up to four months in any period of eighteen months, but would start only after seventy-five days of unemployment. Initially, this was to have been forty-five days, but there were fears of the impact on the deficit.
108. Ibid. See also Maurício Dias, ‘Sarney descobre o povo’, ibid., pp 35-6.
109. Veja, 12 March 1986, p 29.
110. See the very stern article by Elio Gáspari, ‘A democracia dispensa xerifes’, Veja, 12 March 1986, pp 58-9.
111. See the comments of Uchôa Cavalcanti in M. Dias, op. cit., Senhor, 6 May 1986, p 36. He distinguishes between Sarney's attempt to find popular support for modern capitalism, aiming for modernisation and long-term growth, and Brizola's concern for redistribution of income and less social injustfce. The distinguished lawyer, Raymundo Faoro, deplored the use of decree-laws (ibid., p 35), while Carlos Nelson Coutinho explained the force of Brizola's reaction to the pacote as stemming, in part, from the fact that Sarney was appealing precisely to Brizola's own constituency, ‘the less organised sector of society’, ibid., p 36.
112. See Sarney's own remark, p 1172, note 64 above.
113. Senhor, 6 May 1986, p 36.
114. See Veja, ‘O Sarney das multidões’, 12 March 1986. Senator Alfonso Camargo of the PMDB said that, when the politicians who were leaving the field saw the team doing better they came running back after the ball ‘which is with the President’. Deputy Cristina Tavares, PMDB, from Pernambuco, said: ‘The President is above parties…. He has removed Ulysses Guimarães and Aureliano Chaves from decision-making and, personally, has assumed the centre of power… ‘,ibid., p 63-4. Raymundo Faoro, by contrast, said sudden shifts of this kind were typical of weak governments; strong governments had bases which held them fast, making their movements slower, ibid.
115. For useful material on the parties generally, see David V. Fleischer (ed), Os Partidos Políticos no Brasil, Brasilia, 2 vols 1981. Also Robert Wesson and David Fleischer, Brazil in Transition, New York, 1983, and Fleischer, ‘Brazil at t he Crossroads: The Elections of 1982 and 1985’, (mimeo) February 1985. For the PMDB and the election in Sâo Paulo see Bolivar Lamounier and Judith Muszynski, ‘São Paulo, 1982: A Vitória do (P)MDB’, São Paulo, 1983. Also Moreira Alves, op. cit., pp 220-30.
116. Veja, 9 April 1986, p 24.
117. See the article by Eurico Figueiredo, Senhor, 8 April 1986, pp 35-6. Also Claudio Abramo, ‘A maratona da insensatez’, ibid. 6 May 1986, pp 34-5.
118. idem. See the article, ‘A dança dos partidos’, The article particularly notes, for example, how José Alencar Furtado in Curitiba has left the PMDB, which he helped to found in 1979, having served the MDB for a dozen years, being cassado in 1977 {Veja says 1975) when leading the MDB in the Chamber (See Flynn, op. cit., p 512). He left to join the tiny Brazilian Municipalist Party (PMB), formed two weeks earlier, saying that the PMDB had lost its direction. He apparently was joining forces with a group which intended to support the ex-mayor Jaime Lerner (PDT) for Senate, with the help of a former governor, Paulo Pimentai (PDS) and a deputy from the PFL. The episode underlines the general point.
119. Raymundo Faoro, quoted in Senhor, 6 May 1986, p 35.
120. As Fernando Henrique Cardoso put it in an interview in Rome in January 1986; ‘How can you have democracy without political parties?’
121. See the interview referred to on pp 1166-7 above. Setübal was a highly respected banker, previously president of Banco Itaú, the former mayor of São Paulo and a leader of the short-lived PP, to which Tancredo Neves had belonged.
122. Senhor, 11 March 1986, pp 53-4. The party was divided between the Setübal group and another around José Maria Marin, formerly of the PDS.
123. Ibid., p 54. PFL national leaders such as Aureliano Chaves and Marco Maciel expressed their anxiety over the situation in São Paulo and the national president, Senator Guilherme Palmeira of Alagoas, flew to São Paulo to try to find a solution. He, however, had other worries, being severely criticised by colleagues who wanted to see him replaced by Paulino Cicero. Cícero is close to Aureliano Chaves and Palmeira to Maciel, so, again, it was part of a struggle for power within the party. See Senhor, 18 March 1986, p 50.
124. Senhor, 18 March 1986, p 51. There was talk of a Senate seat for Setúbal.
125. Cardoso had expressed this fear in the interview in Rome, January 1986. See above p 1170 and Note 58. Talking of the growth in strength of the right and the need to reshape and pull together the left of the party, he said that the only alternative might be to support Brizola.
126. Veja, 26 March 1986, p 37.
127. Senhor, 25 March 1986, p 30.
128. Ibid., 6 May 1986, p 36.
129. Veja, 26 March. 1986, pp 38-9. See, too, on Gusmâo, Senhor 25 March 1986, p p 31-2.
130. Ibid. See also Roberto Santos, Minister of Health, ‘Ermfrio has all the qualities to head a good government in São Paulo.’ Fernando Lyra, former Minister of Justice of Tancredo Neves, said he would be a real threat to the other candidates. Senator Carlos Chiarelli, leader of the PFL, praised his combination of modern capitalism and social concern, ibid., p 37. Sarney was said to be, at least, encouraging the candidacy. Senhor, 25 March 1986, p 31
131. Senhor, 25 March 1986, p 3 1. He also declined Sarney's invitation in February to become Minister of Foreign Affairs, ibid. For t he build-up to his candidacy, see ibid., pp 31-2. Especially see t h e comments on opinion in t h e Planalto, that Sarney and his advisors were becoming increasingly anxious over the Säo Paulo succession question, seeing support growing for the P. T. and Maluf. The candidacy of Setübal, in effect, had been torpedoed by the malufista group in t h e P FL in São Paulo and Quércia did not seem able to guarantee victory for the PMDB; hence the enthusiasm for Antônio Ermírio.
132. Veja, 26 March 1986, p 36.
133. Ibid., 1 April 1986, p 30.
134. Veja, 26 March 1986, p 39.
135. Senhor, 15 April 1986, p 5.
136. l42 Ibid., p 6.
137. Ibid., p 7.
138. By late April it was reported that he had more support in the industrial ABC towns than Quércia; Senhor, 22 April 1986. A survey for the Folha de São Paulo gave him 23 p e r cent of popular support, Quércia 13 per cent and Suplicy 10 per cent, ibid., 29 April 1986, p 26.
139. Senhor, 29 April 1986, pp 22, 26-31. Also ibid., 6 May 1986, pp 68-9. For some of t he background to his choice see Veja, 2 April 1986, p 32. Concerned at Quércia's difficulty in finding a candidate for Vice-Governor (Pazzianotto had refused the offer), some people in the PMDB even discussed the possibility of Antônio Ermírio becoming PMDB candidate for Governor, with Pazzianotto as Vice-Governor and Quércia as candidate for the Senate. See also ibid., 9 April 1986, p 24, where there is mention of Fernando Henrique Cardoso perhaps moving into the PSB (Partido Socialista Brasileiro), where he may more easily be able to help Antônio Ermfrio against Quércia. The report also mentions, however, Antônio Ermírio's talks with Quadros. While all this was going on, Quércia was apparently threatening to move to the PDT with Brizola, unless he got full support!
140. Veja, 9 April 1986, p 25. There was talk of Senator Itamar Franco leaving the PMDB to run as Governor for the PL (Partido Liberal) and of the governor, Hélio Garcia, forming a new party after November 1986. See, too, Senhor, 6 May 1986, pp 66-7.
141. Veja, 9 April, 1986 p 25.
142. Senhor, 13 April 1986, pp 28-9; this mainly critical article on Maciel (pp 26-30) emphasises how ambitious he is, especially in his bid to succeed Sarney.
143. Senhor, 1 April 1986, p 30.
144. Ibid., p 31.
145. Ibid., p 33.
146. See the interview with Weffort, ibid., p 5.
147. See Cláudio Abramo, Senhor, 6 May 1986, p J4: ‘Only those who don't stop for five minutes to think, could imagine that the dominant class would permit, even for a moment, a victory of the PT-and of Lula-in the economic nerve-centre of the country. If there were really any chance of this, everyone would unite to defeat the PT candidate, and we would see all the other candidates uniting, with alacrity, on the same platform, all aligned against Suplicy. Even the PT knows this…. ‘
148. While this was true in São Paulo, it was not the case in, for example, Rio de Janeiro, where Fernando Gabeira was to be PT candidate in November, and still less so in other states. The surprise victory in Fortaleza in November 1985 was not likely to be repeated on any large scale. On Gabeira see the interview with Maurício Dias, Senhor, 20 May 1986, pp 5-9. Also in May came the damaging news that some elements linked to the PT in Bahia had been involved in armed robbery, an action in no way typical of the party as a whole, but which gave support to their enemies.
149. In broad terms, the left wanted an independently elected constituinte, a view supported by such distinguished lawyers as Raymundo Faoro, who might have led the relevant committee. The interests of the old regime wanted a more restricted constituinte, which seems to have been part of their deal in accepting Tancredo Neves as the candidate of conciliation. New light was thrown on this issue by Fernando Henrique Cardoso in a seminar in Santa Catarina, reported in Senhor, 27 May 1986, p 22. Also on the constituinte see the interview (Veja, 4 June 1986, pp 5-8) with Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco, the eighty-year-old lawyer who is the presidentof the Comissão de Estudos Constitutionals, the committee of forty-five ‘notables’ who have to draw up the project for the new Constitution, which the government will present to the Constituent Assembly. Afonso Arinos has been criticised by the OAB (Order of Brazilian Lawyers), the CUT and the CNBB (National Conference of Brazilian Bishops) for being too conservative and elitist and for wanting to write the new Constitution himself.
150. In 1985 160 people died in conflicts over land and a further eighty in only the first four months of 1986. The demand for agrarian reform has grown in volume, with powerful backing from the church. In its first year of office the government of the ‘New Republic’ dragged its feet. At the end of May the Minister of Agrarian Reform, Nelson Ribeiro, was replaced by Dante Oliveira and, in the wake of the much publicised murder of a priest in Sarney's own state, the government announced it would take tougher measures with landowners and speed up the pace of change. For an excellent survey of the problem see Senhor, 3 June 1986, pp 20-31. For earlier reports see ‘Revolucão no Campo’, Afinal 19 March 1985, pp 35-41; ‘Agriculture’, Visão, 3 July 1985, pp 57-72; ‘Os fazendeirosse armam’, Veja, 19 June 1985, pp 20-6; ‘Politica Agrária do Regime Pós-64’, IBASE, Rio de Janeiro. 1984, and Veja, 21 May 1986, pp 28-33 and 4 June, pp 44-7.
151. See Senhor, 6 May 1986, p 33 and 13 May, p 24, which expresses alarm at the rise of inflation and ibid., 20 May, suggesting that the Plan will need adjustments, probably in July. The article reports growing concern over the deficit and over illicit price rises.
152. By late April Sarney's economic advisers were saying that some liberation of imports would be necessary. Senhor, 29 April 1986, p p 3 0-1. The plans for this were eventually announced in June. See Financial Times, 16 June 1986, which reports that restrictions are to be lifted on imports of several key agricultural and industrial products, in response to pressure from industrialists, food manufacturers and retailers, anxious to avoid short-falls and restore stocks. 159 The rest of the left was much more cautious, even the PT, unwilling to be seen out of step with the popular enthusiasm. See, for example, the interview with Weffort, Senhor, 1 April 1986.
153. See the interview with Brizola, Senhor, 29 April 1986, p 8, where he draws an historical parallel, noting that, within a year of Princess Isabel signing in 1888 the act which ended slavery, the monarchy fell.
154. Brizola, on the other hand, tends to exaggerate the hostility of the press. H e is also extremely partial in his treatment of it, using it when he can, but regarding even the constructive criticism to be expected of a free press as an act of hostility. See the comments of Evandro Carlos de Andrade of O Globo and Marcos Sá Correia of Jornal do Brasil, Senhor, 6 April 1986, p 44. Also Afinal, 4 September 1984, pp 46-8.
155. Studies of Brizola are few a nd rather weak. See, however, the useful entry in Dicionário Hislórico-Biográfico Brasileiro, 1930-83. Vol. I, R i o d e Janeiro: 1984, p 489. Also Moniz Bandeira, Brizola e o Trabalhismo, Rib de Janeiro, 1979; Lauro Schuch, Para Onde Vai Brizola? Trabalhismo ou Socialismo, Rio de Janeiro, 1983, and Cibilis da Rocha Viana Reformas de Base e a Política Nacionalista de Desenvolvimento-de Getûlio a Jango, Rio de Janeiro: 1980. See especially, Elizabeth Allen, Housing Programmes, Opposition Government, and the Move towards Democracy in Brazil: 1983-6. Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Glasgow, Occasional Paper, 1986 (forthcoming). Allen notes how Brizola, as governor of Rio Grande do Sul, provided 6,302 new schools, 688,209 new pupils, and 42,153 new teachers.
156. The ESRC research project referred to above is still in progress and the preliminary findings are just now being written up. For a useful, succinct, and generally fair, evaluation of the Brizola government see Senhor, 6 May 1986, pp 37-60.
157. Tancredo spoke disparagingly of the quality of Brizola's Secretariat. In reply, Brizola and his Secretaries decided not to attend the ceremony in Brasilia.
158. O. Globo, 18 November 1985.
159. See Allen, op. cit. Also Mauricio Dias ‘As estocades de Brizola’, Senhor, 20 November 1985, pp 37-9 and Veja, 20 November 1985.
160. See Senhor, 15 April 1986, p p 35-6.
161. For discussion of some of Brizola's current difficulties see Veja, 21 May 1986, p p 26-7. Brizola is complaining of worse treatment by the federal government under Sarney than under Figueiredo. H e says Sarney is holding back funds due to t he state of Rio de Janeiro to make things more difficult in t he period leading to t he November elections. There have also been more defections from the PDT.
162. See ‘A si'ndrome do austral’ (‘The Austral Syndrome’), Senhor, 27 May 1986, pp 30-2. Also Veja, 6 June 1986, pp 126-7.