Kant’s conception of virtue

The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 505-537

  Denis, Lara ^a  

^a AGNES SCOTT COLLEGE   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84928372356     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CCOL052182303X.016     Document Type: Chapter

References (49)

1. T. H. Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985), 1105a30–34, 1106b36–1107a2, 1144a14– 20.
2. Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) especially pp. 68–84.
3. A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 412.
4. J. W. Basore (London: William Heinemann; Loeb Classical Library, 1928).
5. H. Rackham (London: William Heinemann; Loeb Classical Library, 1914).
6. Stephen Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
7. R. W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 9, 4, pp. 361– 5, 593–6.
8. Bonnie Kent, “Augustine’s Ethics,” The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, eds. Eleanore Stump and Norman Kretzman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 205–33.
9. Donald A. Gallagher and J. Gallagher (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 1966), XV, 25
10. Bonnie Kent, “The Moral Life,” in The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. S. McGrade (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
11. C. H. Oldfather and W. A. Oldfather (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934).
12. Knud Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
13. J. B. Schneewind’s “The Misfortunes of Virtue,” Ethics 101 (1990): 42–63.
14. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), chapters 8, 14, 15.
15. D. D. Raphael (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1991), vol. 1, pp. 305–6, 311.
16. Stephen Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal “Ought’: 1640–1740 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
17. D. D. Raphael (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1991) vol. 1, pp. 175–7. 186–8.
18. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 498.
19. J. B. Schneewind (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1983), Appendix I, p. 85.
20. J. B. Schneewin in volume 1 of Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 335.
21. Mary J. Gregor (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974);
22. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000);
23. Stephen Engstrom, “The Inner Freedom of Virtue,” in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays, ed. Mark Timmons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
24. Henry Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 164, 246, 285;
25. Anne Margaret Baxley, “Autocracy and Autonomy,” Kant-Studien 94 (2003): 1–23.
26. Christine M. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), chapters 6 and 7.
27. Paul Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), chapter 9, especially pp. 303–11;
28. Allen Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 329–33.
29. Lara Denis, “Kant’s Cold Sage and the Sublimity of Apathy,” Kantian Review 4 (2000): 48–73;
30. Marcia Baron, Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), chapter 6;
31. Nancy Sherman, “Kantian Virtue: Priggish or Passional?,” in Reclaiming the History of Ethics, ed. Andrews Reath, Barbara Herman, and Christine M. Korsgaard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 270–96.
32. Owen Flanagan and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1990), pp. 149–70.
33. Annette Churton (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1969), especially chapter 5.
34. Mary J. Gregor, Laws of Freedom (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963).
35. John T. Goldthwait (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965)
36. Robert Louden considers the connection between work of this kind and Kant’s more theoretical ethical writings in Kant’s Impure Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
37. Lara Denis, “Autonomy and the Highest Good,” Kantian Review 10 (2005): 33–59.
38. Eckart Forster’s Kant’s Final Synthesis: An Essay on the Opus Postumum (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), chapter 5.
39. Stephen Engstrom, “The Concept of the Highest Good in Kant’s Moral Theory,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52(4) (1992): 747–80;
40. Andrews Reath, “Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 26(4) (1988): 593–619.
41. T. H. Irwin, “Kant’s Criticisms of Eudaemonism” and Stephen Engstrom, “Happiness and the Highest Good in Aristotle and Kant,” both in Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics.
42. J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
43. E. F. J. Payne (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).
44. E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover Publications, 1969), vol. 1, pp. 524–8.
45. Michael Stocker, “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,” Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 453–66;
46. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), for example, p. 181.
47. Lawrence Blum, Friendship, Altruism, and Morality(Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980);
48. Michael Slote, “The Justice of Caring,” in Virtue and Vice, eds. Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
49. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers(Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987).