Conceptual and practical problems of moral enhancement

Bioethics

Volumn 29, Issue 4, 2015, Pages 233-240

  Beck, Birgit ^a  

^a Center for Advanced Study in Bioethics   (Germany)

Author keywords

Biomedical enhancement; Moral enhancement; Moral theory

Indexed keywords

COGNITION; CONCEPT FORMATION; EMOTION; ETHICAL THEORY; ETHICS; FREEDOM; HUMAN; MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY; METAPHYSICS; MORALITY; PERSONAL AUTONOMY; POLITICS; PREVENTION AND CONTROL; PROCEDURES; SOCIAL JUSTICE; SOCIAL PROBLEM; SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY;

BIOMEDICAL ENHANCEMENT; CONCEPT FORMATION; EMOTIONS; ETHICAL ANALYSIS; ETHICAL THEORY; FREEDOM; HUMANS; METAPHYSICS; MORALS; PERSONAL AUTONOMY; POLITICS; SOCIAL JUSTICE; SOCIAL PROBLEMS; SOCIAL VALUES; VIRTUES; VOLITION;

EID: 84928213711     PISSN: 02699702     EISSN: 14678519     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12090     Document Type: Article

References (44)

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6. In the first place, if 'enhancement' by definition referred to anything (subjectively and/or objectively) evaluated as increasing 'the chances of leading a good life', it would be unintelligible how enhancement could be at all objectionable. Moreover, taking the welfarist definition for granted, it would only be possible to deem intervention as enhancement after its beneficial effects had been assured, so that the welfarist definition is (again) begging the question. Eventually, assuming the welfarist definition, it is the underlying theory of a good life upon which it depends whether intervention is to count as enhancement. Therefore, the presumption of rival ethical concepts does not allow for a consistent notion of enhancement. Any concept of 'moral enhancement' relying on the welfarist definition certainly inherits all these difficulties.
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19. Meanwhile, the hype about oxytocin as a possible means for moral enhancement seems to have declined as it has turned out that the beneficial attitude of being more affectionate towards others appears to apply basically to in-group-members. Cf. C.K. de Dreu et al. Oxytocin promotes human ethnocentrism. PNAS 2011; 108: 1262-1266. 10.1073/pnas.1015316108
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23. There is a related debate about the evolutionary origins of morality which centers around the question if pro-social behaviour of, e.g. higher primates (or, for that matter, human infants) is to be considered as morality proper or only a kind of 'proto-morality'
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29. The respective meta-ethical assumptions provide the preliminary decision for moral realism/moral anti-realism, cognitivism/noncognitivism, objectivism/subjectivism, and universalism/particularism.
30. This level of argumentation sets the course for the target features to be enhanced according to the presumption of a particular moral theory (such as 'deontology', 'consequentialism', 'virtue ethics', or 'minimal moral commonsensism').
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32. These good reasons presumably consist in the metaphysical burdens of justification which one has to assume in order to advocate a libertarian concept of free will.
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39. It should be noted, however, that even if all of us are very likely to agree on this point, so far there has been no self-sufficient justification to the claim stated by German philosopher Hans Jonas that there is a categorical metaphysical imperative to ensure the further existence of humankind
40. H. Jonas. Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrk 2003. p. 8
41. Apart from that, it should be kept in mind that, for Persson and Savulescu, the most worrying moral problems relate to the overexploitation of natural resources and the anthropogenic climate change.
42. See R. Merkel et al. Intervening in the Brain. Changing Psyche and Society. Berlin et al.: Springer; 2007
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