Preventing economists’ capture

Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit it

Volumn 9781107036086, Issue , 2013, Pages 124-151

  Zingales, Luigi ^a  

^a NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84928093724     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2353489     Document Type: Chapter

References (24)

1. I wish to thank Chiara Fratto for her research assistantship and the Center for Research on Security Prices, the George Stigler Center at the University of Chicago, and the Initiatives on Global Markets for financial support.
2. University of Chicago, National Bureau of Economic Research, and Centre for Economic Policy Research.
3. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965).
4. George Stigler, “Theory of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics 2 (1971): 3-21.
5. Ernesto Dal Bó and Rafael Di Tella, “Capture by Threat,” Journal of Political Economy 111 (2003): 1123-54.
6. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York:Harper & Brothers, 1957).
7. GeorgeW. Hilton, “The Basic Behavior of Regulatory Commissions,” American Economic Review 62 (1972): 47-54.
8. Clare Leaver, “BureaucraticMinimal Squawk Behavior: Theory and Evidence from Regulatory Agencies,” American Economic Review 99 (2009): 572-607.
9. Paul G. Mahony, “The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933,” Journal of Legal Studies 30 (2001): 1-31.
10. Gary Becker, “A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,” Quarterly Journal of Finance 98 (3) (1983): 371-400.
11. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action.
12. Deniz Igan, Prachi Mishra, and Thierry Tressel, “A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis,” Working Paper 17076, National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2011.
13. See, for example, XLI Congresso Nazionale del Notariato, “Civil law-Common law. Sviluppo Economico e certezza giuridica nel confront tra sistemi diversi,” Pesaro, 2005.
14. For example, Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan, “Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principles Are,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 (2001): 901-32.
15. “Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,” The Brookings Institute, Spring 2009, 76.
16. Alexander Dyck and Luigi Zingales, “The Bubble and theMedia,” in Corporate Governance and Capital Flows in a Global Economy, eds. Peter Cornelius and Bruce Kogut (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
17. Dyck and Zingales, “The Bubble and the Media.”
18. George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton, Identity Economics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).
19. Luis Garicano, “Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production,” Journal of Political Economy 108 (2000): 874-904.
20. Alexander Dyck, David Moss, and Luigi Zingales, “Media vs. Special Interests,” Working Paper 14360, National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2008.
21. On March 8, 1988, all the major U.S. networks broadcast a tape of a Panamanian tuna boat, the Maria Luisa, killing hundreds of dolphins while fishing for tuna. Building on public outrage, the Earth Island Institute, Greenpeace, and the Humane Society launched a boycott of tuna. Restaurant chains took tuna off the menu and school boards across the country stopped using tuna until it was “dolphin safe.” On April 12, 1990, Heinz announced that it would only sell dolphin-safe tuna. Within hours the two other largest tuna producers made a similar commitment. A similar story applies to Nike after the June 1996 issue of Life magazine carried an article about the use of child labor in Pakistan to produce Nike’s soccer balls.
22. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Jonathan M. Orszag, and Peter R. Orszag, “Implications of the New Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Risk-Based Capital Standard,” in Fannie Mae Papers, 1 (2) (March 2002), 6.
23. As my initial footnote reveals, Center for Research on Security Prices funds my research; so I may be accused of a conflict of interest here.
24. Becker, “A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence.”