Auction theory for auction design

Auctioning Public Assets: Analysis and Alternatives

Volumn 9780521830591, Issue , 2004, Pages 19-63

  Borgers, Tilman ^a   Van Damme, Eric ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84927054312     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511610844.003     Document Type: Chapter

References (47)

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