Sins of the epistemic probabilist exchanges with Peter Achinstein

Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 189-201

  Mayo, Deborah G ^a  

^a VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84927023832     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511657528     Document Type: Chapter

References (10)

1. Achinstein, P. (2001), The Book of Evidence, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
2. Buldt, B. (2000), “Inductive Logic and the Growth of Methodological Knowledge, Comment on Mayo,” pp. 345–54 in M. Carrier, G. Massey, and L. Ruetsche (eds.), Science at Century’s End, Philosophical Questions on the Progress and Limits of Science, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh.
3. Howson, C. (1997a), “A Logic of Induction,” Philosophy of Science, 64: 268–90.
4. Mayo, D.G. (1996), Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
5. Mayo, D.G. (1997a), “Response to Howson and Laudan,” Philosophy of Science, 64: 323–33.
6. Mayo, D.G. (2003), “Could Fisher, Jeffreys and Neyman Have Agreed on Testing? Commentary on J. Berger’s Fisher Address,” Statistical Science, 18: 19–24.
7. Mayo, D.G. (2005), “Evidence as Passing Severe Tests: Highly Probed vs. Highly Proved,” pp. 95–127 in P. Achinstein (ed.), Scientific Evidence, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD.
8. Mayo, D.G. (2006), “Philosophy of Statistics,” pp. 802–15 in S. Sarkar and J. Pfeifer (eds.), Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia, Routledge, London.
9. Mill, J.S. (1888), A System of Logic, 8th edition, Harper and Bros., New York.
10. Musgrave, A. (1974), “Logical versus Historical Theories of Confirmation,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 25: 1–23.