Pitfalls in the interpretation of customary law

The Nature of Customary Law

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 13-34

  Schauer, Frederick ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84926984117     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511493744.002     Document Type: Chapter

References (73)

1. Rupert Cross, Precedent in English Law (3rd edn, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 157-9;
2. Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 4-14, 219-30.
3. A. W. B. Simpson, “The Common Law and Legal Theory,” in A. W. B. Simpson, ed., Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Second Series) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), pp. 77-99.
4. Larry Alexander, “Constrained by Precedent,” Southern California Law Review, vol. 63 (1989), pp. 1-64;
5. Arthur L. Goodhart, “The Ratio Decidendi of a Case,” Modern Law Review, vol. 22 (1959), pp. 117-24;
6. Arthur L. Goodhart, “Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case,” Yale Law Journal, vol. 40 (1930), pp. 161-83;
7. J. L. Montrose, “The Ratio Decidendi of a Case,” Modern Law Review, vol. 20 (1957), pp. 587-95;
8. J.L. Montrose, “Ratio Decidendi and the House of Lords,” Modern Law Review, vol. 20 (1957); pp. 124-30;
9. A. W. B. Simpson, “The Ratio Decidendi of a Case,” Modern Law Review, vol. 21 (1958), pp. 155-60;
10. A. W. B. Simpson, “The Ratio Decidendi of a Case,”Modern Law Review, vol. 20 (1957), pp. 413-15.
11. Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (New York: Brentano’s, 1930);
12. Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927-1960 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1986);
13. Karl Nickerson Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: Some Lectures on Law and Its Study (New York: Columbia University School of Law, 1930);
14. William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973).
15. Especiallyin Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986);
16. Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985);
17. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977).
18. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980);
19. Antonin Scalia, et al., A Matter of Interpretation (Amy Guttman ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997);
20. Akhil Reed Amar, “Intratextualism,” Harvard Law Review, vol. 112 (1999), pp. 747-803;
21. Richard H. Fallon, “Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning,” Harvard Law Review, vol. 119 (2006), pp. 1274-332;
22. Michael J. Perry, “The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional ‘Interpretation,’” Southern California Law Review, vol. 58 (1985), pp. 551-602;
23. Frederick Schauer, “An Essay on Constitutional Language,” UCLA Law Review, vol. 29 (1982), pp. 797-832.
24. Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 23-7.
25. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 9-12, 55-60.
26. Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Law as Moral Judgment (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1986), p. 125.
27. Deborah L. Spar, The Cooperative Edge: The Internal Politics of International Cartels(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994);
28. Lisa Bernstein, “Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry,” Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 21 (1992), pp. 115-57.
29. Lloyd Fallers, Law Without Precedent: Legal Ideas in Action in the Courts of Colonial Busoga (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 310-14;
30. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Law in Modern Society(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 48-58.
31. Paul Bohannon, “The Differing Realms of Law,” American Anthropologist, vol. 6 (1965), pp. 33-42;
32. Stanley Diamond, “The Rule of Law versus the Order of Custom,” Social Research, vol. 38 (1971), pp. 42-72.
33. H. L. A. Hart, “Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons,” in Essays on Bentham: Jurisprudence and Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. 243-68.
34. Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979);
35. Donald H. Regan, “Reasons, Authority, and the Meaning of ‘Obey’: Further Thoughts on Raz and Obedience to Law,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, vol. 3 (1990), pp. 3-28;
36. Frederick Schauer, “The Questions of Authority,” Georgetown Law Journal, vol. 81 (1992), pp. 95-115.
37. Lon L. Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart,” Harvard Law Review, vol. 71 (1958), pp. 630-72.
38. H. L. A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 6-8.
39. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Word Meaning in Legal Interpretation,” San Diego Law Review, vol. 42 (2005), pp. 465-83.
40. Karl R. Popper, Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography (London: Open Court, 1976).
41. Norwood R. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958).
42. William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, Act 1, Scene 3.
43. Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).
44. MarkV. Tushnet, “Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles,” Harvard Law Review, vol. 96 (1983), pp. 542-83.
45. G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, Scepticism, Rules and Language (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984).
46. Frederick Schauer, “Rules and the Rule-Following Argument,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, vol. 3 (1990), pp. 187-92.
47. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).
48. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977).
49. Anthony D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971), pp. 131-2.
50. Dick W. P. Ruiter, Legal Institutions (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), pp. 119-34.
51. Ronald A. Cass, “Economics and International Law,” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, vol, 29 (1997), pp. 473-502;
52. Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman, “Economic Analysis of International Law,”Yale Journal of International Law, vol. 24 (1999), pp. 1-54.
53. Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (P. P. Wiener trans., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954);
54. Willard Van Orman Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960).
55. Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, “A Theory of Customary International Law,” University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 66 (1999), pp. 1113-77.
56. George Priest and William Klein, “The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,” Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 13 (1984), pp. 1-23;
57. Frederick Schauer, “Judging in a Corner of the Law,” Southern California Law Review, vol. 61 (1988), pp. 1717-33.
58. Karl N. Llewellyn, “Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are To Be Construed,” Vanderbilt Law Review, vol. 3 (1950), pp. 395-405.
59. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: Some Lectures on Law and Its Study (New York: Columbia University School of Law, 1930).
60. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (Boston: Little Brown, 1960).
61. Lon L. Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself (New York: Beacon Books, 1940), p. 140.
62. James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds (New York: Anchor Books, 2004).
63. Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), ch. 2.
64. John Milton, Areopagitica (J. C. Suffolk ed., London: University Tutorial Press, 1968), p. 126.
65. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (D. Spitz ed., New York: W. W. Norton, 1975).
66. Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (5th edn, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966).
67. Alvin I. Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
68. Clayton P. Gillette, “Harmony and Stasis in Trade Usages for International Sales,” Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 39 (1999), pp. 707-36.
69. Friedrich A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978);
70. Paul G. Mahoney and Chris W. Sanchirico, “Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm Efficient?,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 149 (2001), pp. 2027-61.
71. Steven Hetcher, “Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous World?,” Southern California Law Review, vol. 73 (1999), pp. 1-56.
72. Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds., Judgments Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982);
73. Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman, eds., Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).