How can an agent learn to negotiate?

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 1193, Issue , 2015, Pages 233-244

  Zeng, Dajun ^a   Sycara, Katia ^a  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

APPLICATION PROGRAMS; AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; DECISION MAKING; GAME THEORY; MANAGEMENT SCIENCE; SOFTWARE AGENTS; COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS;

AUTOMATED NEGOTIATIONS; DECISION MAKERS; GAME-THEORETIC; HUMAN INTERACTIONS; INTERACTING SOFTWARES; MULTI-ISSUE NEGOTIATION; NEGOTIATION FRAMEWORK; SEQUENTIAL DECISION MAKING;

INTELLIGENT AGENTS;

EID: 84926300981     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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