Incentives and information security

Algorithmic Game Theory

Volumn 9780521872829, Issue , 2007, Pages 633-650

  Anderson, Ross ^a   Moore, Tyler ^a   Nagaraja, Shishir ^a   Ozment, Andy ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

APPLICATION PROGRAMS; COMMERCE; COMPUTER SOFTWARE SELECTION AND EVALUATION; DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS; ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY; NETWORK SECURITY; PUBLIC RISKS; SECURITY OF DATA;

DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE; DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS; ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION; EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; INSURANCE MARKETS; PEER-TO-PEER SYSTEM; SECURITY PRODUCTS;

PEER TO PEER NETWORKS;

EID: 84926093593     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511800481.027     Document Type: Chapter

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