A simple framework for estimating consumer benefits from regulating hidden fees

Journal of Legal Studies

Volumn 43, Issue S2, 2015, Pages S239-S252

  Agarwal, Sumit ^a   Chomsisengphet, Souphala ^b   Mahoney, Neale ^c   Stroebel, Johannes ^d  

^a NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

^b OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^d NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84924732891     PISSN: 00472530     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/677856     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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