Plans, weapons, doctrines: The strategic cultures of interwar Europe

The Shadows of Total War: Europe, East Asia, and the United States, 1919-1939

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 55-82

  Showalter, Dennis E ^a  

^a Department of Psychology   (United States)

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EID: 84924664489     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139052351.004     Document Type: Chapter

References (133)

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6. David A. Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War: Germany, Britain, France, and Eastern Europe, 1930–1939 (Princeton, N.J., 1980), carries the story forward.
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11. Azar Gat, Fascist and Liberal Visions of War: Fuller, Liddell Hart, Douhet, and Other Modernists (Oxford, 1998).
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13. David J. Childs, A Peripheral Weapon? The Production and Employment of British Tanks in the First World War (Westport, Conn., 1999).
14. Gerald D. Feldman, Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany, 1914–1918 (Princeton, N.J., 1966), is still the best overview.
15. Richard Bessel, Germany After the First World War (Oxford, 1993), 4
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37. Max Hastings, Bomber Command (New York, 1979), 54 passim.
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42. Vincent J. Pitts, France and the German Problem: Politics and Economics in the Locarno Period (New York, 1987);
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50. Eugen Weber, The Hollow Years: France in the 1930s (New York, 1994).
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55. “‘If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It’: French Military Doctrine Between the Wars,” War in History 3 (1996): 90ff.
56. Judith Hughes, To the Maginot Line: The Politics of French Military Preparation in the 1920s (Cambridge, Mass., 1971);
57. Michel Forget, “Cooperation Between Air Force and Army in the French and German Air Forces During the Second World War,” in Boog, ed., Conduct of the Air War, focus on specific aspects of planning.
58. Dennis E. Showalter, “Le quel’armée française avait compris de la guerre moderne,” in Maurice Vaïsse, ed., Mai-Juin 1940: Défaite française, victoire allemand, sous l’oeil des historiens étrangers (Paris, 2000), 29–58.
59. Martin Alexander, The Republic in Danger: General Maurice Gamelin and the Politics of French Defence, 1933–1940 (Cambridge, 1992);
60. Claude Paillat’s survey, La guerre immobile (Avril 1939–10 Mai 1940) (Paris, 1984).
61. Robert Doughty, The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940 (Hamden, Conn., 1990);
62. Jean Vidalnec, “Les divisions de serie ‘B’ dans l’armée française pendant la campagne de France, 1939–1940,” Revue Historique des Armées 1 (1980): 106–26
63. Giorgio Rochat, Gli arditi della grande guerra, rev. ed. (Gorizia, 1990).
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65. Helm Speidel, “1813–1814: Eine militärpolitische Untersuchung,” Ph.D. diss., University of Tübingen, 1924.
66. Giorgio Rochat, L’ esercito italiano da Vittorio Veneto a Mussolini (Bari, 1967), is still a useful introduction.
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68. Sullivan, “A Thirst for Glory: Mussolini, the Italian Military, and the Fascist Regime,” Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1984;
69. Curtis S. King, “Victory in Red: An Analysis of the Red Commanders on the Southern Front of the Russian Civil War, 1918–19,” Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1999, is excellent on the Red Army’s professionalization.
70. Rex A. Wade, Red Guards and Workers’ Militias in the Russian Revolution (Stanford, Calif., 1984).
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72. Jacob W. Kipp, “The Militarization of Marxism,” Military Affairs 49 (1985): 184–91;
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74. Roger R. Reese, Stalin’s Reluctant Soldiers: A Social History of the Red Army, 1925–1941 (Lawrence, Kans., 1996);
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76. V. K. Triandafilov, The Nature of the Operation of Modern Armies (London, 1994).
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78. Richard W. Harrison, The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 190–1940 (Lawrence, Kans., 2001).
79. Lennart Samuelsson, Plans for Stalin’s War Machine: Tukhachevskii and Military-Economic Planning, 1925–1941 (Basingstoke, U.K., 1999);
80. Jacob Kipp, “Military Reform and the Red Army, 1918–1941: Bolsheviks, Voyenspetsy, and Young Commanders,” in Winton, ed., The Challenge of Change.
81. Walter Dunn, The Soviet Economy and the Red Army, 1930–1945 (Westport, Conn., 1995).
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84. “Stalin, Benesch und der Fall Tuchatschewski,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 44 (1996): 527–47.
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87. Vincenzo Gallinari, L’ esercito italiano nel primo dopoguerra, 1918–1920 (Rome, 1980), 169ff.;
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89. Harold Winton, To Change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armored Doctrine, 1927–1938 (Lawrence, Kans., 1988);
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102. Robert M. Citino, The Evolution of Blitzkrieg Tactics (Westport, Conn., 1987).
103. Richard T. Burke, “The German Panzerwaffe, 1920–1939: A Study in Institutional Change,” Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 1969.
104. Karl-Volker Neugebaur, “Operatives Denken zwischen dem Ersten und Zweiten Weltkriege,” in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, ed., Operatives Denken und Handeln, 97–122.
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111. McGregor Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 1939–1941: Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy’s Last War (Cambridge, 1982);
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113. Marc Michel, “Un Mythe: La ‘Force noire’ avant 1914,” Relations Internationales 1 (1974): 83–90.
114. William G. Perrett, “French Naval Policy and Foreign Affairs, 1930–1939,” Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1977;
115. Ronald Chalmers Hood, Royal Republicans: The French Naval Dynasties Between the World Wars (Baton Rouge, La., 1985).
116. Marc Michel, L’ Appel a l’Afrique. Contributions et reactions a l’éffort de guerre en AOF (Paris, 1982).
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118. Recham Belkacem, Les Musulmans algeriens dans l’ armée française, 1919–1945 (Paris, 1996).
119. Jonathan Gosnell, “The Politics of Frenchness in Colonial Algeria, 1930–1954,” 2 vols., Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1998.
120. Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment (London, 1972).
121. Anthony Clayton, The British Empire as a Superpower, 1919–1939 (London, 1986).
122. Roy F. Holland, Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance, 1918–1939 (London, 1987);
123. John Robertson, “The Distant War: Australia and Imperial Defence, 1919–41,” in Michael McKernan and Margaret Browne, eds., Australia; Two Centuries of War and Peace (Canberra, 1988), 223–44;
124. David Day, The Great Betrayal: Britain, Australia, and the Onset of the Pacific War (North Ryde, New South Wales, 1988).
125. Orest Babij, “The Royal Navy and the Defence of the British Empire, 1928–1934,” in Keith Neilson and Greg Kennedy, eds., Far Flung Lines: Studies in Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman (London, 1996), 171–89;
126. Larry Pratt, East of Malta, West of Suez: Britain’s Mediterranean Crisis, 1936–1939 (Cambridge, 1975);
127. T. R. Moreman, “‘Small Wars’ and ‘Imperial Policing’: The British Army and the Theory and Practice of Colonial Warfare in the British Empire, 1919–1939,” Journal of Strategic Studies 19 (1996): 105–31.
128. Williamson Murray, The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938–1939: The Path to Ruin (Princeton, N.J., 1984).
129. A. C. Bell, A History of the Blockade of Germany During the Great War (London, 1937; reprinted, 1961), 73.
130. Wolfgang Wegener, Die Seestrategie des Weltkrieges (Berlin, 1929);
131. Carl-Axel Gemzell, Raeder, Hitler und Skandinavien: Der Kampffur einen maritimen Operationsplan (Lund, 1965);
132. Jost Dülffer, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine: Reichspolitik und Flottenbau 1920–1939 (Düsseldorf, 1973).
133. David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937–1941: A Study in Competitive Co-operation (London, 1981).