First carrot, then stick: How the adaptive hybridization of incentives promotes cooperation

Journal of the Royal Society Interface

Volumn 12, Issue 102, 2015, Pages

  Chen, Xiaojie ^a,b   Sasaki, Tatsuya ^a,c   Brännström, Åke ^a,d   Dieckmann, Ulf ^a  

^a INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS   (Austria)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ELECTRONIC SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF CHINA   (China)

^c UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^d UMEÅ UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Evolutionary game; Public good; Punishment; Reward; Social design

Indexed keywords

BIOPHYSICS; BIOTECHNOLOGY;

EVOLUTIONARY GAMES; PUBLIC GOODS; PUNISHMENT; REWARD; SOCIAL DESIGNS;

SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS;

ARTICLE; CLINICAL EFFECTIVENESS; COOPERATION; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HUMAN; MATHEMATICAL COMPUTING; PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT; REWARD; ALGORITHM; GAME; HUMAN RELATION; MOTIVATION; PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL; PUNISHMENT; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

DAUCUS CAROTA;

ALGORITHMS; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; MOTIVATION; PUNISHMENT; REWARD; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

EID: 84924427767     PISSN: 17425689     EISSN: 17425662     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2014.0935     Document Type: Article

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