Practical global climate policy

Architectures for Agreement: Addressing Global Climate Change in the Post-Kyoto World

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 280-340

  Pizer, William A ^a  

^a National Commission on Energy Policy   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84924124781     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511802027.008     Document Type: Chapter

References (9)

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2. Bradford, D. (2002). “Improving on Kyoto: Greenhouse Gas Control as the Purchase of a Global Public Good,” Dept. of Economics Working Paper, Princeton University.
3. Dasgupta, P., P. Hammond, and E. Maskin (1980). “On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control,” Review of Economic Studies 47: 857-860.
4. Montero, J.-P. (1999). “Voluntary Compliance with Market-Based Environmental Policy: Evidence from the US Acid Rain Program,” Journal of Political Economy 107: 998-1033.
5. Montero, J.-P. (forthcoming). “A Simple Auction Mechanism for the Optimal Allocation of the Commons,” American Economic Review.
6. Nordhaus, W. D. (2006). “After Kyoto: Alternative Mechanisms to Control Global Warming,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 96(2): 31-34.
7. Olmstead, S. M., and R. N. Stavins (2006). An International Policy Architecture for the Post-Kyoto Era, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 96(2): 35-38.
8. Weitzman, M. (1974). “Prices vs. Quantities,” Review of Economic Studies 41: 477-491.
9. Wilson, R. (1979). “Auctions of Shares,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 93: 675-689.