The role of article 50 of the UN charter in the search for international peace and security

International and Comparative Law Quarterly

Volumn 49, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 528-557

  Carver, Jeremy ^a   Hulsmann, Jenine ^a  

^a Moscow State Institute of International Relations   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84923993337     PISSN: 00205893     EISSN: 14716895     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020589300064368     Document Type: Article

References (184)

1. Security Council Resolutions 661 (1990), 666 (1990) and 670 (1990).
2. Security Council Resolutions 757 (1992), 787 (1992), 820 (1993), 942 (1994), 943 (1994), 988 (1995), 992 (1995), 1003 (1995), 1015 (1995), 1022 (1995) and 1074 (1996). In the wake of the crisis in Kosovo, an arms embargo was imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) by Resolution 1160 (1998).
3. Security Council Resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993). Sanctions were suspended on 5 Apr. 1999 in accordance with the terms of Resolution 1192 (1998).
4. Security Council Resolution 918 (1994). The embargo was partially lifted in relation to sales to the Government of Rwanda by Resolution 1011 (1995).
5. Security Council Resolutions 841 (1993). 861 (1993), 872 (1993) and 917 (1994).
6. Sanctions measures were lifted by Resolution 944 (1994).
7. see also Resolution 948 (1994)
8. Security Council Resolution 788 (1992).
9. Security Council Resolution 733 (1992).
10. Security Council Resolutions 1054 (1996) and 1070 (1996).
11. Security Council Resolution 1132 (1997). Sanctions measures were progressively lifted by Resolutions 1156 (1998) and 1771 (1998), which imposed an embargo on arms sales to non-governmental forces in Sierra Leone (excluding the Military Observer Group of ECOWAS).
12. Security Council Resolutions 864 (1993), 1127 (1997) and 1173 (1998).
13. Security Council Resolution 1227(1999).
14. Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999).
15. B. Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, (1994), at p.659.
16. During the discussion about implementing the Uniting for Peace Resolution, the Collective Measures Committee demanded that both Arts. 49 and 50 should also apply in the case of actions of the General Assembly under that resolution. See B. Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary n.14, at p.661.
17. B. Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary n.14, at p.625.
18. See H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems (1951), at pp.744–745.
19. The Security Council may, however, make non-binding recommendations under Art.39 of the Charter in relation to boycott measures if it does not wish to make a binding decision. See B. Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary n.14, at pp.627–628.
20. V. Gowlland-Debbas, “Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State Responsibility”, I.C.L.Q., (1994)43, p.84.
21. See, for example, Resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) (Libya)
22. Resolution 918 (1994) (Rwanda)
23. Resolution 841 (1993) (Haiti)
24. Resolution 788 (1992) (Liberia)
25. Resolution 733 (1992) (Somalia)
26. Resolutions 1054 (1996) and 1070 (1996) (Sudan)
27. Resolutions 1132 (1997) and 1771 (1998) (Sierra Leone)
28. Resolutions 864 (1993), 1127 (1997) and 1173(1998).
29. In a small number of States, Security Council resolutions are considered to be “directly applicable” within the domestic jurisdiction concerned. See for example, the responses of Peru, Tunisia, Uruguay and Surinam to the Secretary-General in relation to the implementation of sanctions against Iraq, reprinted in D. Bethlehem (ed), The Kuwait Crisis: Sanctions and Their Economic Consequences—Parr II, Cambridge International Documents Scries, Vol. 2 (1991), at pp.602–603, 623–625, 634–635 and 618–619.
30. See for example, Resolution 661 (1990) in relation to Iraq and Kuwait.
31. Resolution.
32. See for example, J. Carver “Making Financial Sanctions Work: Preconditions for successful implementation of sanctions by the implementing State” paper presented to the Expert Seminar on Targeting UN Financial Sanctions hosted by the Swiss Federal Office for Foreign Economic Affairs, Department of Economy, 17–19 Mar. 1998, Interlaken, Switzerland.
33. See V. Gowlland-Debbas, paper presented to the Expert Seminar on Targeting UN Financial Sanctions hosted by the Swiss Federal Office for Foreign Economic Affairs n.20, at pp.87–90
34. B. Simma (ed), paper presented to the Expert Seminar on Targeting UN Financial Sanctions hosted by the Swiss Federal Office for Foreign Economic Affairs n.14, at pp. 1116–1125.
35. See B. Simma (ed), paper presented to the Expert Seminar on Targeting UN Financial Sanctions hosted by the Swiss Federal Office for Foreign Economic Affairs n.14, at p.660.
36. See, for example, the legal advice provided by the UN Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee of the Security Council established to give effect to Resolution 661 (1990) (UN Document S/AC.25/SR.2,22 Aug. 1990, reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), paper presented to the Expert Seminar on Targeting UN Financial Sanctions hosted by the Swiss Federal Office for Foreign Economic Affairs n.23, at pp.774–780).
37. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Lybian Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom) (Provisional Measures) Order, 1992, ICJ Rep. 3, at p.61 (Judge Weeramantry, Dissenting Opinion).
38. This is reflected in the Charter, which grants an extremely wide discretion to the Council to determine the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression under Art.39. See V. Gowlland-Debbas, ICJ Rep. n.20, at p.53
39. M.N. Shaw, “The Security Council and the International Court of Justice: Judicial Drift and Judicial Function” in A.S. Muller et al (ed). The International Court of Justice: It's Future Role After Fifty Years (1997) p.219, at p.226. Although it has been questioned whether the same “wide latitude” applies to all enforcement measures deployed as a consequence of an Art.39 determination, considerable leeway has been granted to the Security Council by those who framed the Charter. In deciding upon enforcement measures the Security Council is not constrained by elaborate procedural requirements or by the conditions which have been said to apply to unilateral countcrmcasures, which would arguably hamper the Security Council in the exercise of its enforcement responsibilities.
40. See V. Gowlland-Debbas, The International Court of Justice: It's Future Role After Fifty Years n.20, at p.62.
41. Security Council Resolution 661 (1990) was adopted on 6 August 1990.
42. In imposing economic sanctions under Art.41, the Security Council has provided exemptions for services considered to be necessary for the free flow of information (including telecommunications, postal services and legal services) and for certain goods and services necessary for humanitarian or other exceptional purposes, subject to the approval of the relevant Security Council Committee. See, for example. Resolutions 661 (1990) (Iraq), 986 (1995) (Iraq), 841 (1993) (Haiti), 1132 (1997) (Sierra Leone) and 967 (1994) (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).
43. See also V. Gowlland-Debbas, Resolutions n.20, at p.92.
44. UN Document S/AC.25/SR.3,27 Aug. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), Resolutions n.23, at pp.781–785.
45. See Report of the Copenhagen Round Table on United Nations Sanctions in the Case of the Former Yugoslavia, Resolutions n.35.
46. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Art. 17, Paragraph 2 of the Charter), ICJ Reports (1962) pp.151,169.
47. Memorandum of the Legal Staff of the UN, 15 Jun. 1976, United Nations Juridical Yearbook (1976) pp.204 et seq.
48. See, for example, the legal advice provided by the UN Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee of the Security Council established to give effect to Resolution 661 (1990) (UN Document S/AC.25/SR.2,22 Aug. 1990, reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed). United Nations Juridical Yearbook n.23, at pp.774–780).
49. See, for example, the legal advice provided by the UN Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee of the Security Council established to give effect to Resolution 661 (1990) (UN Document S/AC.25/SR.2,22 Aug. 1990, reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), United Nations Juridical Yearbook n.23. at pp.774–780).
50. Resolution 217 (1965).
51. Resolutions 253 (1968); 277 (1970); 333 (1973); 388 (1976) and 409 (1977).
52. See M. Doxey, International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective 2nd edn (1996), at pp.70–73
53. V. Gowlland-Debbas, Collective Reponses to Illegal Acts in International Law: United Nations Action in the Question of Southern Rhodesia (1990), at pp.633–639.
54. In particular, Portugal cited the severe financial and economic losses suffered by ports in Mozambique, estimated by the Portuguese Government to have reached £10 million by the end of 1966. See V. Gowlland-Debbas, Collective Reponses to Illegal Acts in International Law: United Nations Action in the Question of Southern Rhodesia n.55, at p.633.
55. UN Document A/48/573 S/26705, Collective Reponses to Illegal Acts in International Law: United Nations Action in the Question of Southern Rhodesia n.52, at p.6.
56. UN Document A/48/573 S/26705, Collective Reponses to Illegal Acts in International Law: United Nations Action in the Question of Southern Rhodesia n.52, at p.7.
57. UN Documcnl A/48/573 S/26705. Collective Reponses to Illegal Acts in International Law: United Nations Action in the Question of Southern Rhodesia n.52, at p.7.
58. See V. Gowlland-Debbas, Collective Reponses to Illegal Acts in International Law: United Nations Action in the Question of Southern Rhodesia n.56, at p.635.
59. See UN Document S/8786/Add.2; S/9853/Add.1, Annex 1. See also V. Gowlland-Debbas Collective Reponses to Illegal Acts in International Law: United Nations Action in the Question of Southern Rhodesia n.55, at p.635.
60. See V. Gowlland-Debbas, Collective Reponses to Illegal Acts in International Law: United Nations Action in the Question of Southern Rhodesia n.56, at p.633.
61. Collective Reponses to Illegal Acts in International Law: United Nations Action in the Question of Southern Rhodesia., at p.635.
62. UN Document A/48/573 S/26705, Collective Reponses to Illegal Acts in International Law: United Nations Action in the Question of Southern Rhodesia n.52, at p.7.
63. UN Document A/48/573 S/26705, Collective Reponses to Illegal Acts in International Law: United Nations Action in the Question of Southern Rhodesia n.52, at p.9.
64. UN Document A/48/573 S/26705, Collective Reponses to Illegal Acts in International Law: United Nations Action in the Question of Southern Rhodesia n.52, at p.8–9.
65. For example. General Assembly Resolution 3173 (XXVIII), Resolution 33/131 of 19 Dec. 1978 and Resolution 36/214 of 17 Dec. 1981.
66. Resolutions 1766 (LIV) of 18 May 1973; 1798 (LV) of 24 Jul. 1973; 1832 (LVI) of 8 May 1974; 1875 (LVII) of 16 Jul. 1974; 1951 (LlX)of 22 Jul. 1975; 2012 (LXI)of 3 Aug. 1976; 2093 (LXIII) of 26 Jul. 1977; 1978/46 of 2 Aug. 1978; and decision 1979/46 of 27 Jul. 1979.
67. UN Document A/48/573 S/26705, Resolutions n.52, at p.8.
68. See V. Gowlland-Debbas, Resolutions n.56, at p.637.
69. Resolutions 1987(LX) of 11 May 1976 ;2020(LXI) of 3 Aug. l976; 2094 (LXIII) of 29 Jul. 1977, 1978/63 of 3 Aug. 1978; and decision 1979/46 of 27 Jul. 1979.
70. Resolutions 31/43 of 1 Dec. 1976,32/95 of 13 Dec. 1977,33/126of 19 Dec. 1978,34/129 of 14 Dec. 1979.35/99of 5 Dec. 1980,36/215 of 17 Dec. 1981,37/161 of 17 Dec. 1982.38/208 of 20 Dec. 1983, 39/199 of 17 Dec. 1984.
71. See also UN Document A/48/573 S/26705. Resolutions n.52, at p. 10.
72. V. Gowlland-Debbas, Resolutions n.56, at p.637.
73. V. Gowlland-Debbas, Resolutions n.56, at pp.638–639.
74. Resolutions.
75. Commonwealth Secretariat (1978) “The Front Line States: The Burden of the Liberation Struggle”
76. cited in M. Doxey, “The Front Line States: The Burden of the Liberation Struggle” n.56, at p.73.
77. See for example, B. Simma (ed), “The Front Line States: The Burden of the Liberation Struggle” n.14, at p.661, who notes that the special accounts opened by the UN on behalf of Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana were always short of funds.
78. Commonwealth Secretariat (1978) “The Front Line States: The Burden of the Liberation Struggle”
79. cited in M. Doxey, “The Front Line States: The Burden of the Liberation Struggle” n.56, at p.73.
80. See, for example, UN Documents A/48/573 S/26705, “The Front Line States: The Burden of the Liberation Struggle” at n.52
81. S/1996/700, “The Front Line States: The Burden of the Liberation Struggle” at n.84; E/1993/47/Add.1, 19 Apr. 1993; E/1994/19,7 Apr. 1994; E/1995/21,21 Apr. 1995; E1996/18, 22 May 1996.
82. See also, D. Bethlehem (ed). The Kuwait Crisis: Sanctions and Their Economic Consequences—Part I, Cambridge International Documents Series, Vol. 2 (1991) pp.xliv-xlv.
83. UN Document S/AC25/SR.2,22 Aug. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), Cambridge International Documents Series n.23, at pp.774–780.
84. Cambridge International Documents Series.
85. Cambridge International Documents Series.
86. Cambridge International Documents Series.
87. UN Document S/21620,24 Aug. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), Cambridge International Documents Series n.23, at pp.659–664.
88. UN Document S/21786,18 Sept. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), Cambridge International Documents Series n.23, at pp.727–729
89. UN Document S/AC.25/SR.3, 27 Aug. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), Cambridge International Documents Series n.23, at pp.781–785.
90. UN Document S/AC.25/SR.3,27 Aug. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), Cambridge International Documents Series n.23, at pp.781–785.
91. UN Document S/AC.25/SR.4,11 Sept. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), Cambridge International Documents Series n.23, at pp.785–794.
92. UN Document S/AC.25/SR.5, 12 Sept. 1990; UN Document S/AC.25/SR.6, 8 Oct. 1990, UN Document S/AC.25/SR.7, 27 Sept. 1990; UN Document S/AC25/SR.8. 28 Sept. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), Cambridge International Documents Series n.23. at pp.794–835.
93. UN Document S/21786,18 Sept. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), Cambridge International Documents Series n.23, at pp.727–729.
94. Cambridge International Documents Series.
95. Cambridge International Documents Series.
96. UN Document S/21826,26 Sept. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed),Cambridge International Documents Series n.23, at p.729.
97. UN Document S/21938,13 Nov. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed),Cambridge International Documents Series n.23, at pp.729–748.
98. Cambridge International Documents Series., at p.731.
99. Cambridge International Documents Series., at pp.741–748.
100. Cambridge International Documents Series., at p.731.
101. Cambridge International Documents Series.
102. Cambridge International Documents Series.
103. Cambridge International Documents Series., at p.734.
104. Cambridge International Documents Series., at pp.731–732.
105. Cambridge International Documents Series., at p.733.
106. The World Bank, “Briefing note on Potential World Bank Assistance to Countries Affected by the Gulf Crisis”, 14 Sept. 1990.
107. UN Document S/21938,13 Nov. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), “Briefing note on Potential World Bank Assistance to Countries Affected by the Gulf Crisis” n.23. at pp.736–739.
108. “Briefing note on Potential World Bank Assistance to Countries Affected by the Gulf Crisis”., at p.729.
109. See UN Document A/48/573 S/26705, “Briefing note on Potential World Bank Assistance to Countries Affected by the Gulf Crisis” n.52
110. UN Document S/AC.25/I990/CRP.4.27 Aug. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), “Briefing note on Potential World Bank Assistance to Countries Affected by the Gulf Crisis” n.23, at pp.662–664.
111. UN Document S/1996/700, “Briefing note on Potential World Bank Assistance to Countries Affected by the Gulf Crisis” n.84.
112. “Briefing note on Potential World Bank Assistance to Countries Affected by the Gulf Crisis”.
113. UN Document S/21872,12 Oct. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), “Briefing note on Potential World Bank Assistance to Countries Affected by the Gulf Crisis” n.23, at p.645.
114. UN Document S/21882,16 Oct. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), “Briefing note on Potential World Bank Assistance to Countries Affected by the Gulf Crisis” n.23, at pp.674–681.
115. See for example, UN Documents S/22021,20 Dec. 1990 and S/1996/700, “Briefing note on Potential World Bank Assistance to Countries Affected by the Gulf Crisis” n.84.
116. UN Document A/48/573 S/26705, “Briefing note on Potential World Bank Assistance to Countries Affected by the Gulf Crisis” n.52, at p.35.
117. See D. Bethlehem, ed., “Briefing note on Potential World Bank Assistance to Countries Affected by the Gulf Crisis” n.23, at pp.643–725.
118. UN Document E/1991/102, “Briefing note on Potential World Bank Assistance to Countries Affected by the Gulf Crisis” n.124, at pp.3–7.
119. “Briefing note on Potential World Bank Assistance to Countries Affected by the Gulf Crisis”., at p. 12.
120. “Briefing note on Potential World Bank Assistance to Countries Affected by the Gulf Crisis”., at pp.7–9.
121. “Briefing note on Potential World Bank Assistance to Countries Affected by the Gulf Crisis”., at pp.3–7.
122. “Briefing note on Potential World Bank Assistance to Countries Affected by the Gulf Crisis”.
123. UN Documents S/AC.25/SR.U, 5 Oct. 1990; S/AC.25/SR.15, 12 Oct. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), “Briefing note on Potential World Bank Assistance to Countries Affected by the Gulf Crisis” n.23, at pp.871–904.
124. UN Document S/AC.25/SR.16,29 Oct. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), “Briefing note on Potential World Bank Assistance to Countries Affected by the Gulf Crisis” n.23, at pp.905–915.
125. See UN Documents S/Ac.25/SR.18, 7 Nov. 1990; S/AC.25/SR.19, 8 Nov. 1990; S/AC.25/SR.20,3 Dec. 1990; S/AC25/SR.21,20 Dec. 1990; and S/AC.25/SR.22,7 Jan. 1991 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), “Briefing note on Potential World Bank Assistance to Countries Affected by the Gulf Crisis” n.23, at pp.921–968.
126. See G.L. Burci, “The Indirect Effect of United Nations Sanctions on Third States: The Role of Article 50 of the UN Charter”, African Yearbook of International Law (1995) p. 157, at p. 162.
127. UN Document S/22033,21 Dec. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), African Yearbook of International Law n.23, at p.771; UN Document S/22398, 22 Mar. 1991.
128. See UN Document S/1996/700, African Yearbook of International Law n.84.
129. See UN Document S/1996/700, African Yearbook of International Law n.84.
130. See. for example, G. Burci. African Yearbook of International Law n.138, at p.162.
131. See UN Document A/48/573 S/26705. African Yearbook of International Law n.52, which cites responses from Australia, Austria, Canada (UN Document S/22713,17 Jun. 1991), Belgium (UN Document S/22537,30 May 1991), Denmark (UN Document S/22538,26 Apr. 1991), France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan (UN Document S/22368, 20 Mar. 1991), Liechtenstein, Luxembourg (UN Document S/22541, 26 Apr. 1991), Luxembourg on behalf of Member States of the EC (UN Document S/22542, 26 Apr. 1991), Netherlands (UN Document S/22553, 29 Apr. 1991), New Zealand (UN Document S/22296, 1 Mar. 1991), Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia (S/23058) Spain (UN Document S/22539, 26 Apr. 1991), Sweden (UN Document S/22586,10 May 1991), Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, Former USSR.
132. UN Document A/48/573 S/26705, African Yearbook of International Law n.52, at p.36.
133. M.P. Doxcy “United Nations Sanctions: Current Policy Issues”, unpublished working paper, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University (1997), at p.7.
134. Financial Times, “Survey of Egypt”, 21 Jan. 1992.
135. See M. Doxey, “Survey of Egypt”. n.56 at p.7, fn.5. Yemen and Cuba were the only members of the Security Council not to vote in favour of Resolutions 661 (1990), 665 (1990) and 666 (1990); they abstained in relation to the first two resolutions and voted against Resolution 666 (1990). In relation to non-sanctions related resolutions. Yemen did not participate in the vote on Resolution 660 (1990), abstained in relation to the votes on Resolutions 674 (1990), 686 (1991), 687 (1991), 688 (1991), 706 (1991) and 712 (1991), and voted against Resolution 678(1990).
136. UN Document A/48/573 S/26705, “Survey of Egypt” n.52, at pp.40–41.
137. M. Doxcy, “Survey of Egypt” n.147, at p.8.
138. UN Documents E/1993/47/Add. 1, “Survey of Egypt”. n.85; E/1994/19,7 Apr. 1994; E/1995/21,21 Apr. 1995; E1996/18, 22 May 1996.
139. “Survey of Egypt”.
140. UN Documents E/1993/47/Add. 1, “Survey of Egypt” n.85
141. A/48/573 S/26705, “Survey of Egypt” n.52.
142. The suspension was extended by Resolutions 970 (1995), 988 (1995) and 1003 (1995), 1015 (1995).
143. See Resolutions 1021 (1995) and 1022 (1995). The measures imposed on the Bosnian Serbs were suspended indefinitely starting on 27 Feb. 1996, after the Security Council was informed by the IFOR commander that the Bosnian Serb forces had withdrawn from the zones of separation established in the Dayton Peace Agreement.
144. UN Document A/49/356, Resolutions n.162, at pp.8–12.
145. Resolutions.
146. UN Document A/49/356, Resolutions n.162, at p.11.
147. Resolutions., at pp.11–12.
148. Resolutions.
149. See UN Document S/1996/946, Resolutions n.170, at p.13.
150. UN Document A/49/356, Resolutions n.162.
151. UN Document S/1996/946, Resolutions n.170.
152. Resolutions., at p 34.
153. UN Document S/1996/776, Resolutions n 35, at p.13.
154. UN Documents A/52/535, Resolutions n.167, at p.3.
155. UN Document A/52/535, Resolutions n.167, at p.4.
156. In 1993, responses to the initial request were received from Antigua and Barbuda, Belgium, Denmark, Ecuador, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Malawi, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Turkey and the United Kingdom (UN Document A/48/317, 8 Nov. 1993, at para.46). By 1 Aug. 1994, responses to the initial request for information had also been received from Argentina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Malaysia, Norway, Togo and Switzerland (UN Document A/49/356, Resolutions n.162, at para.35). In response to requests for updated information in May 1995, responses were received from Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom (UN Document A/50/423, 12 Sept. 1995, at para.26) A further request in 1996 elicited responses from Germany, the Russian Federation, Syria, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States (UN Document A/51/150,13 Sept. 1996, at para.16). Five responses were received to the request for information following the lifting of sanctions in Mar. 1997: Ecuador, Estonia, France, Germany and Japan.
157. The observer of the Holy See also addressed the Secretary-General in relation to the humanitarian and ethical aspects of sanctions (UN Document A/52/535, Resolutions n.167, at paras. 15–20).
158. Only one response was received from Germany in 1999 (UN Document A/54/534, Resolutions n.188, at para.6).
159. See UN Document S/1996/776, Resolutions n. 35.
160. UN Document A/52/535, Resolutions n.167, at p.9.
161. UN Documents A/49/356, Resolutions n.162; A/50/423,12 Sept. 1995; A/51/356,13 Sept. 1996
162. A/54/534, Resolutions n.188.
163. UN Document A/49/356, Resolutions n.162, at paras. 64–67.
164. UN Document A/52/535, Resolutions n.167, at pp.9–11
165. A/54/534, Resolutions n.188, at pp.10–13.
166. Resolutions.
167. UN Document S/1996/946, Resolutions n.170, at p.20.
168. Resolutions.
169. UN Document S/1996/946, Resolutions n.170, at p.18.
170. To borrow from the words of the Secretary-General, see UN Document A/49/356, Resolutions n.162, at para.14.
171. UN Document A/49/356, Resolutions n.162, at para.14.
172. See General Assembly Resolution 53/107 of 8 Dec. 1998. A note verbale circulated by the Secretary-General to all States on 21 Apr. 1999 inviting their views regarding the report of the ad hoc expert group meeting, elicited replies from only five States (Belarus, Poland, the Russian Federation, Slovakia and Ukraine), which were generally supportive of the methodology proposed (UN Document A/54/383, 23 Sept. 1999, at paras. 6–31).
173. See Report of the Copenhagen Round Table on United Nations Sanctions in the Case of the Former Yugoslavia, General Assembly Resolution n.35.
174. UN Document A/53/312, General Assembly Resolution n.209, at paras. 54–57. It was recommended that the Special Representative should put in place an inter-agency arrangement or taskforce, with subgroups to evaluate the economic, trade and financial effects of sanctions, to deal with the social and humanitarian effects of sanctions and to address the secondary effects of sanctions, by recommending appropriate amendments to sanctions regimes, partial or limited exemptions under exceptional circumstances and other non-financial measures in order to maximise the political impact of sanctions and minimise their collateral damage.
175. UN Document A/49/356, General Assembly Resolution n.162, at p.6.
176. In 1993, the Secretary-General noted that measures to ease the economic impact of sanctions depend on “the political will of countries that arc in a position to provide assistance or on the capacity of the financial and other organisations of the United Nations system to respond adequately and swiftly.” UN Document A/48/573 S/26705, General Assembly Resolution n.52, at para. 151.
177. Sec UN Document A/48/573 S/26705, General Assembly Resolution n.52, at para. 152.
178. Resolution 47/120 B of 20 Sept. 1993.
179. UN Document A/53/312, Resolution n.209, at para.44.
180. UN Document A/52/308, Resolution n.208, at para.5.
181. UN Document A/53/312, Resolution n.209, at para.39.
182. For example, in relation to sanctions against Iraq, it is unclear why Jordan was permitted to resume limited imports of Iraqi petroleum whereas Romania's request to do the same was denied. See G. Burci, Resolution. n.138, p.162. This issue has also been considered in the course of the 1994 and 1995 sessions of the Special Committee on the UN Charier, see for example UN Document A/50/361, 22 Aug. 1995.
183. This type of assistance has been used on an ad hoc basis by several UN agencies, such as the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). UN Document A/52/308, Resolution n.208, at paras. 27–29.
184. UN Document A/52/308, Resolution n.208, at para.5.