Why Deliberative Democracy?

Why Deliberative Democracy?

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 1-217

  Gutmann, Amy ^a   Thompson, Dennis ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84923834190     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

References (104)

1. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du contrat social, in Political Writings, vol. II, ed. C. E. Vaughan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1915)
2. James Bohman and William Rehg, eds., Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997);
3. Jon Elster, Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998);
4. Stephen Macedo, ed., Deliberative Politics (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1999);
5. John Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000);
6. David Estlund, ed., Democracy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002);
7. Frank Cunningham, Theories of Democracy (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 163-83.
8. Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, S. Lattimore, trans. (Indianapolis:Hackett, 1998), II. 40.
9. Aristotle, Politics, in Complete Works, vol. II, J. Barnes, ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), Bk. III.
10. Edmund Burke, Burke's Politics, R. Hoffman and P. Levack, eds. (New York: Knopf, 1959), p. 115.
11. Joseph Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 13.
12. John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, in Collected Writings, vol. XIX, ed. J. M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press; London: Routledge & Keagan Paul, 1977), ch. XV.
13. Dennis F. Thompson, John Stuart Mill and Representative Government (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 80-82.
14. Dennis F. Thompson, The Democratic Citizen: Social Science and Democratic Theory in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 86.
15. Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996).
16. Also see his "Discourse Ethics," in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), p. 94.
17. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York:Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 36, 37, 63, 136, 141, 144, 152f, 216f;
18. Joshua Cohen, "Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus," in David Copp et al., eds., The Idea of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 270-91.
19. See our discussion of the sources of moral disagreement in Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, pp. 18-26.
20. For a contemporary defense of majoritarianism, see Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 147-50.
21. On the limits of majority rule, see Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, pp. 27-33.
22. Joseph Schumpeter [Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 3d ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1950), p. 269]
23. Bernard Grofman, ed., Information, Participation, and Choice (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), p. 193.
24. David Estlund, ed., Democracy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 289-307.
25. See Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, pp. 173-78.
26. E.g., David Estlund, "Beyond Fairness and Deliberation: The Epistemic Dimension of Democratic Authority," in J. Bohman and W. Rehg, eds., Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 173-204.
27. Elizabeth S. Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993);
28. Elizabeth S. Anderson and Richard H. Pildes, "Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 148 (May 2000), pp. 1503-75;
29. Cass Sunstein, "Law, Economics and Norms: On the Expressive Function of Law," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 144 (May 1996), esp. pp. 2045-49;
30. Robert Nozick, The Nature of Rationality (Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 26-35;
31. Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 370-80.
32. For criticisms of the approach, see Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 239-41;
33. Charles R. Beitz, Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 93-95.
34. Habermas, "Discourse Ethics," p. 261.
35. This can be seen most clearly in his discussion of neutrality: Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 190-95, esp. n24.
36. E.g., Michael Sandel, Democracy's Discontent (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996).
37. Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, pp. 18-26.
38. See Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," in Estlund, ed., Democracy, pp. 101, and 106, n. 28;
39. Thomas E. Cronin, Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum and Recall (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 38-59.
40. James S. Fishkin, The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).
41. Jürgen Habermas, "Deliberative Politics" in Estlund, ed., Democracy, pp. 114-15, 120-21.
42. Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," in Estlund, ed., Democracy, pp. 101-3;
43. Jane Mansbridge, "Everyday Talk in the Deliberative System," in Macedo, ed., Deliberative Politics, pp. 211-39.
44. Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," p. 102.
45. Claudia H. Deutsch, "The Revolt of the Shareholders," New York Times, February 23, 2003, sec. 3, p. 1.
46. Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 50-52, 292-303, and passim.
47. Cass Sunstein, Democracy.com (Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 2002).
48. Michael Pastore, "Search Engines, Browsers Still Confusing Many Web Users" at http://cyberatlas.internet.com/big_picture/traffic_patterns/article/0, 5931_588851,00.html [accessed 11 March 03].
49. Exceptions are John S. Dryzek, "Transnational Democracy," Journal of Political Philosophy 7 (1999), pp. 30-51;
50. Dennis F. Thompson, "Democratic Theory and Global Society," Journal of Political Philosophy 7 (1999), pp. 111-25.
51. Joseph Raz, "Disagreement in Politics," American Journal of Jurisprudence 43 (1998), pp. 25-52.
52. Stanley Fish, "Mutual Respect as a Device of Exclusion," in Macedo, ed., Deliberative Politics, pp. 88-102.
53. A more nuanced version of the power-oriented objection is Ian Shapiro, "Enough of Deliberation," also in Macedo, pp. 28-38;
54. The State of Democratic Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), pp. 22-26.
55. Dennis F. Thompson, Just Elections (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2002), pp. 173-79.
56. Lynn Sanders, "Against Deliberation," Political Theory 25:3 (1997), pp. 347-76.
57. Cass Sunstein, "The Law of Group Polarization," Journal of Political Philosophy 10 (2), p. 176.
58. Cass Sunstein, Why Societies Need More Dissent (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), chapter 6.
59. James Fishkin and R. Luskin, "Bringing Deliberation to the Democratic Dialogue: the NIC and Beyond," in A Poll with a Human Face:the National Issues Convention Experiment in Political Communication, ed. M. McCombs and A. Reynolds (New York: Erlbaum, 1999), pp. 30-38.
60. Michael Walzer, "Deliberation, and What Else?" in Macedo, ed., p. 67.
61. William Galston, "Diversity, Toleration, and Deliberative Democracy," in Macedo, ed., pp. 39-48.
62. Thompson, Just Elections, esp. pp. 138-39.
63. David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 237. New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, 1990).
64. For example, John Rawls, "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical," Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985), pp. 248-51;
65. Thomas Nagel, "Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy," Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (1987), pp. 223-27;
66. David A. J. Richards, Toleration and the Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 67-162.
67. For a more thorough discussion of several relevant meanings of neutrality and their application to a procedural theory, see John Rawls, "The Priority of the Right and Ideas of the Good," Philosophy and Public Affairs 17 (1988), pp. 260-64.
68. For a defense of neutrality in the justification of governmental policies, directed against communitarianism and perfectionism, see Will Kymlicka, "Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality," Ethics 99 (1989), pp. 883-905.
69. For a helpful discussion of the foundations of the deliberative ideal, see Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," in Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit, eds., The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 17-34.
70. Also see Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), esp. pp. 59-66;
71. Bernard Manin, "On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation," Political Theory 15 (1987), pp. 338-68.
72. Roger Wertheimer, "Understanding the Abortion Argument," in Marshall Cohen et al., eds., The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 23-51.
73. American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings 79 (1989), pp. 75-79.
74. Quoted in Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Governing America (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1981), p. 84.
75. Remarks of Congressman Bill Green (R-N.Y.), Congressional Record, September 9, 1988, p. H7351.
76. See, for example, Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), esp. pp. 6, 20-21, 189;
77. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (New York:Cambridge University Press, 1982), esp. p. 183.
78. John Rawls, "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7 (1987), pp. 1-25.
79. Stuart Hampshire, Innocence and Experience (Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 112.
80. Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, pp. 199-229.
81. The discussion here of moral and political provisionality draws on our analysis in "Why Deliberative Democracy is Different," in Ellen Frankel Paul et al., eds., Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 161-80 [chapter 4 of the present volume].
82. E. Rous et al., "A Purchase Experience of Managing New Expensive Drugs: Interferon Beta," British Medical Journal 313 (November 9, 1996), pp. 1195-96.
83. Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, pp. 57-58.
84. Frederick Schauer, "Talking as a Decision Procedure," in Macedo, pp. 17-27.
85. See Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996).
86. Karen Grandstrand Gervais et al., eds., Ethical Challenges in Managed Care (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1999), 2.
87. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996).
88. Lawrence C. Becker, Reciprocity (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), pp. 73-144.
89. Gutmann and Thompson, "Deliberating about Bioethics," Hastings Center Report (May/June 1997), pp. 38-41.
90. Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1958), pp. 187-213;
91. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 130-136.
92. John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (London: Longman, Green, and Roberts, 1865), chap. III, p. 68.
93. Tina Rosenberg, "Recovering from Apartheid," New Yorker (18 November 1996), p. 92.
94. Asmal et al., Reconciliation, pp. 19, 22.
95. Mark Gevisser, "The Witnesses," New York Times Magazine (22 June 1997), p. 32.
96. See Rajeev Bhargava, "Restoring Decency to Barbaric Societies," in Truth v. Justice, pp. 45-62.
97. For the strengths and weaknesses of the therapeutic approach, see Martha Minow, "The Hope for Healing," in Truth v. Justice, pp. 235-60.
98. Suzanne Daley, "In Apartheid Inquiry, Agony Is Relived but Not Put to Rest," New York Times (17 July 1997), p. A10.
99. Timothy Garten Ash, "True Confessions," New York Review of Books (17 July 1997), pp. 36-37.
100. Lawrence C. Becker, Reciprocity (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), pp. 73-144.
101. For a complementary perspective on the value of deliberation by truth commissions, see David Crocker, "Truth Commissions, Transitional Justice and Civil Society," in Truth v. Justice, pp. 99-121.
102. See Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, pp. 85-94.
103. Rosenberg, "Recovering," p. 90.
104. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (New York: Doubleday, 1959), pp. 217-218.