The optimal design of a constituent assembly

Collective Wisdom: Principles and Mechanisms

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 148-172

  Elster, Jon ^a  

^a Howard Hughes Medical Institute   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84923423183     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511846427.008     Document Type: Chapter

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