Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers

Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 1-400

  Fine, Kit ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

First person; Identity; Modality; Normative; Possible; Realism; Tense; Time

Indexed keywords

EID: 84922017657     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/0199278709.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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