Occasions of Identity: A Study in the Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness

Occasions of Identity: A Study in the Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 1-312

  Gallois, André ^a  

^a SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Ancient Greece; Change; Eternity; Identity; Occasional identities; Persistence; Sameness; Time

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921983014     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261833.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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