How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties

How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 1-224

  Mackie, Penelope ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bare identities; Counterpart theory; De re; Essentialism; Haecceitism; Identity; Individual essence; Natural kind; necessity of origin; Possible world

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921956363     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/0199272204.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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