Introduction to the symposium on conflicts of rights

Legal Theory

Volumn 7, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 235-238

  Finkelstein, Claire Oakes ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84920938645     PISSN: 13523252     EISSN: 14698048     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s1352325201073013     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. The traditional debate is between the “Interest Theory” and the “Will Theory.” For a discussion of this, see A DEBATE OVER RIGHTS (Kramer et al. eds., Clarendon Press 1998).
2. See L.W. SUMNER, THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF RIGHTS §2.2 (Clarendon Press 1987) for a discussion of this point.
3. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153-68 (Jeremy Waldron ed., Oxford University Press 1984).
4. Notable exceptions include JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS (Harvard University Press 1990) (who allows that rights can conflict without specifically discussing the point); JEREMY WALDRON, Rights in Conflict, in LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991 (Cambridge University Press 1993).
5. Kamm, this issue, at 246.
6. Montague, this issue, at 261.
7. Hurd, this issue, at 308.
8. Katz, this issue.